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Abstract
Perceptual decision making involves the classification of sensory information, usually
followed by an overt behavioural response. Any decision making, and perceptual de-
cision making in particular, can be understood both theoretically and neurologically as
a process of an accumulation of evidence to some threshold, at which point a commit-
ment to a choice is made. This process can be examined in human subjects by analysing
EEG data during perceptual decision making and identifying temporal components that
are the neural signatures of the accumulation-to-bound decision making (see Philiastides
& Sajda, 2006; Philiastides, Ratcliff, & Sajda, 2006a; Philiastides et al., 2006a; Ratcliff,
Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009b). It may also be statistically modelled using sequential sam-
pling models (see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff &
McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2011). Taken together, these provide us with a
experimental and theoretical framework for the study of the neuroscience of human deci-
sion making. In this thesis, our aim is to address some open questions with respect to hu-
man perceptual decision making using the theoretical framework of sequential sampling
models and the experimental paradigm of measuring temporal components in single-trial
EEG discriminant analysis.
In Chapter 2, we will describe our studies of the role of learning on perceptual deci-
sion making. In particular, here we address competing hypotheses about the nature and
location of perceptual learning in the brain. We provide evidence that perceptual learning
arises from changes in higher level brain areas that are related to decision-making, rather
than from perceptually earlier areas that are related to the encoding of sensory stimuli. In
Chapter 3, we provide a specific mechanistic account of how learning affects perceptual
decision making. This work follows from the work of others who have applied reinforce-
ment learning theories (see Sutton & Barto, 1998) to the study of perceptual learning. In
Chapter 4, we will describe our studies of the interaction of prior expectation and learning
on decision making. In this study, we particularly aim to address whether prior expecta-
tion affects baseline activation or evidence accumulation in the decision making system,
and how this changes with training. Here, we obtain evidence showing how the effects
of prior expectation are more related to evidence accumulation rather than baseline acti-
vation. In Chapter 5, we provide sequential sampling models, particularly drift diffusion
models, of the data that we’ve obtained in the main experiments described in Chapter 2
and Chapter 4. The principal results here show how learning and prior expectation pri-
marily have their effect on perceptual decision making by increasing the rate of evidence
accumulation.
Our general conclusion is that using a combination of the theoretical framework of
sequential sampling models and the experimental paradigm of measuring temporal com-
ponents in single-trial EEG discriminant analysis provides an effective and comprehensive
means to address open questions with respect to human perceptual decision making.
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Chapter 1
General introduction
In psychology and neuroscience, decision making is, generally speaking, the commitment
to some categorization or classification of data, often followed by an action. While this
very general description could apply to anything from the choice of a career or profession,
to the choice of who to vote for in an election, for the most part, the term decision making
in the context of psychology and neuroscience entails a relatively fast choice, i.e. on
the order of hundreds to thousands of milliseconds, from a relatively constrained set of
possibilities, and often on the basis of relatively constrained observable data. Examples
of decision making of this kind include deciding if the following string of letters
uhnerts
is a word in the English language (see Ratcliff et al., 2004, for an example of a deci-
sion theoretic treatment of the lexical decision task), or after viewing the image shown
in Figure 1.1 deciding if it contains a bottle of red wine (see Strayer & Kramer, 1994,
for a decision theoretic description of visual memory search). In these examples, the
choices are constrained to be binary, the response times will be on the order of hundreds
of milliseconds, and the relevant data is clearly delimited.
A special case of the above type of decision making, and the one that is the focus of
this thesis, is perceptual decision making. A perceptual decision is the classification of
sensory, or sensory-motor, information usually followed by an overt behavioural response.
Examples are easy to come by: A digital chirp is recognised (i.e., classified) as notification
on our phone and we then pick up our phone to read the message; when passing someone
1
Figure 1.1: An example of decision making in a psychology experiment. This is an example
image that could be used in a visual memory search experiment. The task could be, for example,
to remember whether image contained a bottled of red wine.
on the street, we recognize that they are our colleague and we exchange greetings; when
driving towards an intersection, we recognize the street sign as a Yield sign and slow
down and cautiously drive through the intersection. In all these mundane examples, we
experience auditory, visual and other sensory information, classify that information as
belonging of some category, and then respond accordingly1.
Perceptual decision making has received scientific attention only relatively recently.
One of the seminal papers on this topic, if not the seminal paper, was by Newsome,
Britten, and Movshon (1989). In that paper, Newsome et al. (1989) present the close
correspondence between psychophysical measures of monkeys’ decision making in the
classification of the direction of motion of a Random Dot Kinematogram (RDK) and the
response profiles of individual neurons in the Medial Temporal area (MT) area. Indeed,
1Decision making and perceptual decision making are related to categorization. In both cases, stimuli
are classified into categorically distinct classes. However, categorization, as the term is usually used in
cognitive science, is more than recognition. It usually refers to the formation of semantic taxonomies,
and how stimuli or items are assigned to categories within this taxonomy. For example, recognizing a
hammer as a hammer would be an example of visual recognition, which is decision making according to
our definition here. On the other hand, recognizing a hammer as an instance of a tool, and a tool as an
instance of artefact, is more than visual recognition, and concerns how an object is assigned to a semantic
categories or semantic hierarchies. Ultimately, we view recognition or decision making as a vital activity
or component of categorization, but categorization goes beyond mere recognition.
2
they claim that the response profiles of a small number of individual neurons may be more
sensitive and accurate in the measurement of visual motion that the monkey itself. This
implies that perceptual decisions may be determined largely by the responses of a small
number of cortical neurons.
1.0.1 Statistical decision theory
All decision making can be described from a statistical point of view. According to this
perspective, we have the observed or available data D , the set of possible classifications
or choices c1,c2 . . .cK , and a reward or loss function L that gives the payoff or loss for
any given choice. The probability that data D is classified by choice ck can be described
in terms of Bayesian inference:
P(ck|D) = P(D |ck)P(ck)
∑Kk=1 P(D |ck)P(ck)
.
Here, P(D |ck) is the probability of observing data D given that true class is ck, and P(ck)
is the baseline probability of the class being ck. Put another way, the relative probability
of choice ck versus choice cl is given by
P(ck|D)
P(cl|D) =
P(D |ck)
P(D |cl) ×
P(ck)
P(cl)
.
This shows that the relative probability of one choice versus another is the product of the
relative evidence in favour of one choice over another and the relative prior or baseline
plausibility of one choice over another.
While P(ck|D) gives the (subjective) probability that ck is the correct choice, whether
the subject in fact ultimately chooses ck must take into account the payoff for choosing
ck. We can use Lkl to denote the payoff (which could be a negative value) for choosing
ck when the correct choice is cl . The expected loss for making choice ck is
K
∑
j=1
Lk jP(c j|D),
where we calculate the payoff for making choice ck under all possible values of the correct
choice, and then calculate the average payoff by weighting the payoff by the probability
that each possible classification is correct. Therefore, it is optimal to choose ck over cl if
K
∑
j=1
Lk jP(c j|D)>
K
∑
j=1
Ll jP(c j|D).
3
1.0.2 Sequential sampling models
We can consider the process of making a decision by a human or an animal as a process
of evaluating evidence, and then when the evidence is above a certain threshold making a
response. This is most easily appreciated in the binary choice case. In this case, we have
two choices c1 and c2. As mentioned above, the evidence in favour of c1 relative to c2 is
v =
P(D |c1)
P(D |c2) .
Here, we can treat v as a subjective decision variable. If it is greater than 1, then there is
more evidence for c1. If it is less than 1, then there is more evidence for c2.
As a consequence of the following relationship
P(c1|D)
P(c2|D) =
P(D |c1)
P(D |c2) ×
P(c1)
P(c2)
,
if v > P(c2)P(c1) , then
P(c1|D)> P(c2|D).
As such, if the decision variable v crosses the threshold P(c2)P(c1) , then it is optimal for the
decision maker to choose c1 as their response, assuming a symmetric payoff matrix (i.e.
L11 =L22 andL12 =L22). More generally, if
v >
(L22+L12)P(c2)
(L11+L21)P(c1)
,
then c1 is the optimal choice, and if
v <
(L11+L21)P(c1)
(L22+L12)P(c2)
,
then c2 is the optimal choice.
From this, we can see that optimal decision making can be simply and accurately
modelled by representing the relative evidence in favour of one decision over another by
single scalar variable v, and then committing to one choice when v exceeds one upper
threshold, and committing the alternative choice when v exceeds a lower threshold.
The previous description assumes that the evidence in favour of c1 over c2 has one
fixed value. Of course, we can extend this idea to the case of where the evidence is
building up over time. This is clearly a realistic and natural extension. For example,
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when we observe an image, we do not instantaneously acquire all the information in the
image, but rather we experience this information gradually as the eye moves over the
image and our visual system processes this information (by way of its feed forward and
feed back neural connections). According to this description, we now have a variable
vt that represents the evidence in favour of c1 over c2 on the basis of the information
available so far at time t. However, whenever vt crosses an upper or lower threshold, a
commitment to one decision or the other is made. An illustration of an example of this
process is provided on page 99 in Chapter 5 (Note that we devote all of Chapter 5 to the
consideration of models of this nature.).
Mathematical models of decision making whereby a scalar random variable changes
its value on the basis of experienced data until an upper or lower threshold criterion is
met are known as sequential sampling models. Well established sequential sampling
models include the Drift Diffusion model (DDM) (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon,
2008), which we describe in more detail in Chapter 5, the Linear Ballistic Accumulator
(Brown & Heathcote, 2008), the leaky accumulator model (Usher & McClelland, 2001),
and many more. In all these models — while differences exist between them that af-
fect their interpretation and their degree of fit to the data — the general principles are
the same: Evidence accumulates gradually until a threshold is met, and this signifies the
commitment to a decision.
Sequential sampling models and cognitive neuroscience
Sequential sampling models have proved exceptionally good at modelling the speed and
accuracy of the behavioural responses in decision making (see, e.g., Ratcliff & Smith,
2004; Ratcliff et al., 2004; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2011, for
detailed reviews). Moreover, sequential sampling models have also provided particularly
compelling accounts of the neuroscience of decision making. For example, Roitman and
Shadlen (2002) have shown that Lateral Interparietal (LIP) area neurons, which have been
shown to initiate saccades in motion discrimination tasks, build up their firing rates over
time in accordance with the signal-to-noise ratio in the available data, and the saccadic
response is made when a fixed threshold of firing rate activity is reached. In other words,
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these decision related LIP neurons show the accumulation to threshold characteristics of
all sequential sampling models.
In human neuroscience, sequential sampling models are routinely used to model the
influence of external and internal variables and how they modulate decision making. For
example, in sequential sampling models, accuracy of response and speed of response
are inextricably coupled with one another and can not be treated as independent response
variables. According to these models, arbitrarily high accuracy can always be achieved by
increasing response times; arbitrarily fast responses can always be made when accuracy
is sacrificed. Likewise, internal or external demands for greater accuracy must come at
the expense of speed, and vice versa. Initial investigations of the neural basis of the speed
versus accuracy modulation of decision making include Forstmann et al. (2008); Ivanoff,
Branning, and Marois (2008). In Forstmann et al. (2008), in an Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (FMRI) based study, subjects were required to indicate whether a
cloud of moving dots was moving on average to the left or right. In one condition, subjects
were cued to increase speed, while in another they were cued to increase their accuracy.
Analysis of behavioural data using a Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) model (a two
barrier sequential sampling model that is functionally similar to the DDM) shows that these
experimental manipulations were almost perfectly accounted for by the changing of the
distance between response barriers. FMRI analysis showed that the cueing for increased
speed is associated with activity in the striatum and the pre-supplementary motor area,
brain areas that are known to be involved in voluntary motor planning (Shima & Tanji,
1998). Moreover, individual differences in the level of activation of the striatum and pre-
supplementary motor area was associated with individual variation in the estimated barrier
change according to the LBA model. In Forstmann et al. (2010), again using a moving dot
task where instructions varied between an emphasis on speed or on accuracy, showed
that the strength of connection between the presupplementary motor area and striatum
predicted the efficiency with which subjects could change their response threshold (as
measured by an LBA model analysis). In related work, van Maanen et al. (2011) used
a trial by trial variation in speed versus accuracy tradeoff. On trials where a speeded
response was required, a positive relationship between trial by trial variation in the barrier
height of the LBA model was found to correlate with activity in presupplementary motor
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area and dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). On trials where increased accuracy was
demanded, the trial by trial variation in the LBA barrier was correlated with activity in
ACC proper. Collectively, these results strongly imply that the speed and accuracy trade-
off modulation is well modelled by changing the barrier height in accumulation to bound
sampling models and furthermore that the neural basis of this system in the frontostriatal
network.
Also motivated by the theoretical perspective of sequential sampling models, a study
by Basten, Biele, Heekeren, and Fiebach (2010) has investigated how the costs and bene-
fits of a particular decision can be modelled as an evidence accumulation process. Specif-
ically, Basten et al. (2010) used an FMRI study to test the hypothesis that, when making
perceptual decisions, evidence in favour of the potential costs of a decision is accumu-
lated in parallel with evidence in favour of the decision’s potential benefits and that the
decision is eventually made when the difference between these two evidence accumula-
tors passes a criterion threshold. The experiment task involved the presentation of colored
shapes where subjects could accept or reject these stimuli in order to maximize their to-
tal reward. Each color and each shape had an associated monetary reward or monetary
cost. During training, the colors and the shapes were presented separately and subjects
learned the monetary values associated with each color and each shape. As such, dur-
ing the experiment task itself, subjects must integrate their knowledge of the potential
benefits of a particular color-shape combination against its potential costs. Reaction time
and accuracy to accept or reject an offer both increased in accordance with the total pay-
off or total cost, respectively, of a decision. FMRI analysis identified a potential system
underlying perceptual decision making as involving the accumulation of cost-benefit dif-
ference. For example, the ventral striatum and amygdala were identified as the sources
of the benefits and costs, respectively, associated with the stimuli. The ventro-medial and
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were shown to be involved in the integrating of the in-
formation being calculated by the striatum and amygdala in order to calculate a difference
signal. Finally, the bilateral middle intraparietal sulcus was shown to be involved in the
accumulation of this difference signal in order to reach the decision boundary.
While Basten et al. (2010) have demonstrated how the role of reward on decision
making may be understood in terms of a DDM and have identified a potential neurophys-
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iological basis for this system, it is still unclear whether the affects of changes in reward
and costs primarily affect the earlier sensory processing stages or at later post-sensory
processing stages. To address this question, an Electroencephalography (EEG) study by
Blank, Biele, Heekeren, and Philiastides (2013) investigated the temporal dynamics of the
role of punishment on decision making. Subjects in this experiment performed a face-car
visual discrimination task, where the stimuli occurred at two levels of visual noise. Sepa-
rate blocks in the experiment were associated with distinct punishment values (i.e., zero,
medium, high) for incorrect responses. Behavioural analysis revealed that accuracy, but
not reaction time, increased with punishment level. Single trial EEG analysis was used to
identify EEG temporal component that best distinguish between the zero punishment and
high punishment conditions. Unlike temporal components that distinguished between the
high and low visual noise conditions, the punishment related temporal components ap-
peared later in the trial, specifically around 400ms after stimulus onset or around 100ms
prior to response, indicating that punishment affects later or post-sensory processing. In
addition, the magnitude of the punishment temporal components correlate with the ex-
tent of the behavioural effects of the punishment conditions and trial by trial changes in
the alpha and gamma EEG bands were predictive of the magnitude of the punishment
components. Collectively, these results were taken to indicate that punishment affects at-
tention and motivation which leads to more efficient accumulation of evidence to reach a
decision.
1.0.3 EEG and the neural signatures of decision making
While Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and EEG have poor spatial resolution, their tem-
poral resolution is on the order of milliseconds. As such, they have the potential to mea-
sure the time-course and temporal characteristics of human decision making to an extent
not possible by, for example, FMRI.
Using a novel experimental paradigm, O’Connell, Dockree, and Kelly (2012) identify
the neural signature of a accumulation-to-bound decision making variable in the human
brain. In particular, the Central Parietal Positivity (CPP) Event Related Potential (ERP)
activity was shown by O’Connell et al. (2012) to index the temporal integration of sen-
sory evidence for decision making (see also Kelly & O’Connell, 2013). Similar to the
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behaviour of LIP neurons described above (see, Roitman & Shadlen, 2002), the CPP ERP
increases with signal quality and upon reaching a common threshold, a behavioural re-
sponse is made.
An alternative approach to measuring the temporal correlates of human decision mak-
ing has been taken by Philiastides et al (see, for example, Philiastides & Sajda, 2006;
Philiastides et al., 2006a, 2006a; Ratcliff et al., 2009b). This approach aims to find a basis
vector onto which the EEG signal is projected that will maximally discriminate between
the EEG patterns in trials of one stimulus type compared to those of the other. On a two al-
ternative forced choice visual discrimination task, specifically a face versus house image
discrimination task, Philiastides et al identified two time points best discriminated be-
tween the stimulus categories. These are referred to as temporal EEG components. First,
there is the early component that occurred around 170 ms after stimulus presentation and
second there is a late component that occurred around 300 ms post-stimulus. The late
component is identified as the decision variable. In comparison to the early component,
the late component occurs later in time with increased task difficulty (Philiastides et al.,
2006a). When the images are coloured red and green and the task is to discriminate red
from green, the late component is reduced in magnitude to almost zero, while the early
one is not affected. Also, in comparison to the early component, the late component is a
significantly better predictor of trial-by-trial changes in the rate of evidence accumulation
(i.e. drift rate) in a DDM (Ratcliff et al., 2009b). Taken together these findings indicate
that the early component is a face recognition component that encodes the incoming sen-
sory evidence, whereas the late component is a decision variable indicating the build up
of decision-relevant evidence. (In Section 2.1, pages 23-24, we return to this work on EEG
temporal components by Philiastides and Sajda (2006); Philiastides et al. (2006a, 2006a);
Ratcliff et al. (2009b) and provide additional details and descriptions.)
1.0.4 Interim summary & introduction to the specific topics
considered in this thesis
In the foregoing, we have described how human and animal decision making, and partic-
ularly perceptual decision making, can be described in terms of statistical decision theory,
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which leads naturally to sequential sampling models of decision making. These models
have been particularly effective models of the behavioural responses and neuroscience
of decision making. In human neuroscience, while perceptual decision making has been
studied using FMRI, and sequential sampling models have been applied to the descrip-
tion of FMRI decision making studies, EEG signals are at present more effective measures
of the accumulation-to-bound characteristics of human perceptual decision making. In
particular, the late temporal component identified using the single-trial EEG discriminant
analysis pioneered by Philiastides et al has been shown to be a neural signature of per-
ceptual decision making.
Accordingly, in this thesis, our aim is to address some open questions with respect
to human perceptual decision making using the theoretical framework of sequential sam-
pling models and the experimental paradigm of measuring temporal components in single-
trial EEG discriminant analysis. The two open questions that we will address in this thesis
are 1) how does learning or training affect perceptual decision making, and 2) how do
prior experiences interact with learning to affect perceptual decision making.
1.1 The effects of learning on perceptual decision
making
Perceptual learning, as defined by Goldstone (1998), involves any long-lasting changes to
an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment. As
described by Law and Gold (2008a), it involves long-lasting improvements in our ability
to detect, discriminate or identify sensory stimuli. Put less formally, perceptual learning
involves any improvement in the speed or accuracy of an organism’s perceptual system
that results from learning or direct experience from the environment. A simple example
of perceptual learning occurs in a visual discrimination task where noisy images must be
classified as belonging to one of two mutually exclusive classes, namely faces or cars. In
a task such as this, the subject’s ability to quickly and accurately discriminate between
the two classes of objects improves with practice with the task.
As defined above, perceptual learning is inextricably related to perceptual decision
making. The outcome of perception, according to the descriptions just given, is that
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of detecting, discriminating, identifying or responding to sensory stimuli. These are all
examples of perceptual decision making, and as such, perceptual learning necessarily in-
volves (though it is not limited to) improvements in the speed and accuracy of perceptual
decision making. It is obvious, however, that, decision making is a general cognitive phe-
nomenon that is also found in tasks, such as economic decision making, that are not just
perceptual in nature. In addition, perception itself involves more than just decision mak-
ing — decision making is essentially the final outcome of perception. An open question,
therefore, and one that is the focus of this section, is the extent to which perceptual learn-
ing is due to improvements in general decision making processes or due to improvement
in sensory abilities that are (informationally and temporally) prior to perceptual decision
making.
Despite the obvious prevalence of perceptual learning in natural cognition, the under-
lying neural plasticity is still not well understood. We can identify at least three major
hypotheses about the nature and location of perceptual learning in the brain. Learning
may occur early in the perceptual system, such as in primary visual cortex. Learning may
occur at intermediate levels in the perceptual system, for example, higher areas of the
visual cortex. Finally, learning may occur late in, or even beyond, the perceptual system,
specifically involving changes in the perceptual decision making system. We will review
the evidence for these three hypotheses in turn.
1.1.1 “Early” perceptual learning
Until recently, the majority of studies on perceptual learning pointed to the conclusion that
perceptual learning is occurring early in the perceptual system. This body of evidence can
be sub-divided into psychophysical, neuroimaging and electrophysiological work.
Many psychophysical studies of perceptual learning in the 1980s and 1990s have
shown that perceptual learning is often highly specific to the location and other prop-
erties of the stimuli used (see, for example, Sagi & Tanne, 1994, for an overview). This
lends support to the hypothesis that perceptual learning arises early in the perceptual sys-
tem. For example, Fiorentini and Berardi (1980) demonstrated that perceptual learning
is specific to both orientation and spatial frequency of the gratings used in a discrimina-
tion task. In a hyperacuity task, Poggio, Fahle, and Edelman (1992); Fahle and Edelman
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(1993) have shown that discriminative learning is highly specific to the location or orien-
tation of stimulus in the visual field. Karni and Sagi (1991) have shown that in a visual
texture discrimination task, learning is specific to the retina location of the stimulus, its
orientation and also that there is no inter-ocular transfer of learning. Crist, Kapadia, Wes-
theimer, and Gilbert (1997) reported that learning in a visual discrimination task is also
specific to the location, orientation and geometric arrangement of the stimuli. Ball and
Sekuler (1987) have reported improvements in motion discrimination that is specific to
the direction of motion. Although these results are clearly behavioural in nature, given
that the receptive fields of neurons early in the visual cortex are more tuned to specific
locations in the visual field, as well as to orientation and spatial frequency, these results
imply that the perceptual learning in these tasks is occurring early in the visual system.
Corroborating neuroimaging data for the hypothesis that perceptual learning occurs
early in the perceptual system is also available. For example, Furmanski, Schluppeck,
and Engel (2004) used FMRI to measure neural signals before and after a month long per-
ceptual training period where subjects learned to detect oriented patterns. They observed
an increase in responsiveness in Primary Visual Cortex (V1) cortex that correlated with
improvement in behavioural performance. Similar results were obtained by Schwartz,
Maquet, and Frith (2002) who used FMRI to identify neural correlates of perceptual learn-
ing in a texture discrimination task. The textured stimuli were shown to quadrants of
the visual field. Using FMRI to compare activity in the retinotopic areas correspond-
ing to the same quadrants of trained and untrained eyes, they showed higher activity in
those areas corresponding to the trained eyes. Comparable results were found in the au-
ditory domain. For example, using MEG, Pantev et al. (1998); Elbert, Pantev, Wienbruch,
Rockstroh, and Taub (1995) found enhanced activity in early somatosensory and auditory
cortices in trained musicians when compared to non-musicians, and the extent of activity
in the musician correlated with the duration of their experience. Using Positron-Emission
Tomography (PET), Molchan, Sunderland, McIntosh, Herscovitch, and Schreurs (1994)
found increased activity in the primary auditory cortex after an associative learning task
involving auditory stimuli, and Seitz and Roland (1992) found that increased blood flow
in the primary somatosensory area as a consequence of a finger movement sequence was
learned.
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Direct electrophysiological recording of sensory neurons also supports the hypothesis
that perceptual learning occurs early in the perceptual system. In Recanzone, Merzenich,
Jenkins, Grajski, and Dinse (1992), adult owl monkeys were trained to detect differences
in the frequency of a stimulus applied to their hands. They compared the primary so-
matosensory hand areas (area 3b) of the trained hands to the same areas in untrained
hands. They also compared this somatosensory area in monkeys whose hands were stim-
ulated but who did not perform a tactile discrimination task. Using electrophysiological
recordings, the cortical representations of the trained hands were substantially more com-
plex in topographic detail than the representations of monkey’s untrained hands or of
the passively stimulated hands. In a related study, Recanzone, Schreiner, and Merzenich
(1993) trained owl monkeys for several weeks to discriminate differences in the frequen-
cies of sequentially presented tones. Again, using direct electrophysiological recordings,
the tonotopic organization of Primary Auditory Cortex (A1) in trained monkeys was com-
pared to that in monkeys who heard the same stimuli, but did not engage in the discrimi-
nation task. The sharpness of tuning, and the latency of the response were greater for the
trained monkeys when compared to control monkeys.
As a whole, these results clearly indicate that perceptual learning involves changes in
the representation or processing of information in early stages in the perceptual system.
This may involve, for example, changes in the receptive fields, tuning properties and
activity rates of neurons in primary visual, somatosensory or auditory cortices.
1.1.2 “Intermediate” perceptual learning
Despite the body of evidence, just reviewed, for perceptual learning involving changes in
the response properties of neurons in early parts of the perceptual system, some studies
have failed to identify changes of this nature in otherwise similar experiments. For ex-
ample, using electrophyiological recordings, Ghose, Yang, and Maunsell (2002) showed
that, after long term training in a visual discrimination task with monkeys, the receptive
fields of V1 and Secondary Visual Cortex (V2) neurons in trained and untrained regions
were indistinguishable. Likewise, using a bisection visual discrimination task, Crist, Li,
and Gilbert (2001) showed that the location, size and orientation selectivity of recep-
tive fields were indistinguishable in trained and untrained monkeys. Yang and Maunsell
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(2004) trained macaque monkeys to perform an orientation discrimination task at specific
retinal locations and specific orientations. They showed that after training, neurons in
Visual Cortex Area 4 (V4) but not in V1 had stronger responses compared to those in the
untrained hemifield. These results were taken as providing one of the first demonstrations
that the neural plasticity underlying perceptual learning occurs at an intermediate level in
the visual cortex. More recently, work by Kuai, Levi, and Kourtzi (2013) has shown that
higher ventral areas, such as the Lateral Occipital area, are more involved in the learning
of decision templates in visual classification tasks.
Other recent evidence has shown that the location and orientation specificity of per-
ceptual learning, reviewed above, may also not be unequivocal. For example, Xiao et
al. (2008) has shown that training to discriminate a visual feature at one location could
transfer to a second location if training with both location occurred either simultaneously
or immediately in succession. Xiao et al. (2008) argue that perceptual learning is central
in its location and involves both discriminating specific stimulus features and learning to
deal with stimulus-nonspecific factors like local noise at the stimulus location. When per-
ceptual training with other stimulus locations had occurred, then the discrimination ability
could transfer. In a similar manner, Ahissar and Hochstein (1997); Hochstein and Ahissar
(2002); Ahissar and Hochstein (2004) have argued that generalization across stimulus
characteristics such as orientation and retinal position is possible, that it readily happens
when a task is not difficult, and that easy learning tasks followed by more difficult ones
allow areas higher in the cortical hierarchy to guide generalization in lower areas.
1.1.3 “Late” perceptual learning
All the studies reviewed thus far have placed the locus of perceptual learning as being
exclusively at some stage within the perceptual system itself, and the debate has centered
on whether this stage is lower, such as V1, or higher, such as V4. A more intriguing
possibility, and one that has been raised recently, is that perceptual learning occurs at
higher or more central areas of the brain, beyond the perceptual system per se.
A recent primate based electrophysiology experiments by Law and Gold (2008a) has
provided compelling evidence that perceptual learning arises from changes in decision
making centres of the brain. Law and Gold (2008a) trained macaque monkeys to deter-
14
mine the direction of visual motion while making electrophysiological recordings from
their MT and LIP areas. Area MT is well known to be involved in the representation of vi-
sual motion. The LIP is known to be involved in the control of eye-movement, particularly
the execution of saccades. During the perceptual learning, the neurons in the LIP but not
MT showed increasing responsiveness to motion, and there was a correlation between the
neural responsiveness and the performance on the task. Law and Gold (2008a) conclude
that these results imply that perceptual learning does not change how sensory informa-
tion is represented in the brain, but rather how sensory representations are interpreted,
particularly by the higher areas in the brain involved in decision making.
Law and Gold (2009) show that the results reported in Law and Gold (2008a) can
be explained in terms of Reinforcement Learning (RL) (see, e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998).
They modelled the connections between the sensory neurons in the MT area and the deci-
sion making centre of LIP, and used a RL signal to modify the connections between these
two areas. This explanation was corroborated by the work of Kahnt, Grueschow, Speck,
and Haynes (2011) who trained subjects in a visual discrimination task where feedback
was given. Their behavioural results are well modelled by a RL model that changes how
the sensory information is interpreted. Using FMRI they found that activity patterns in the
ACC, rather than in sensory areas, correlated with this learning.
In related work, S. Li, Mayhew, and Kourtzi (2009) also demonstrated that the locus
of perceptual learning may be beyond the perceptual system itself. S. Li et al. (2009)
used a categorical perception task whereby subjects had to decide if a stimulus (sampled
from a continuum) was radial or spiral, and used FMRI to identify the brain regions that
provide the neural signatures of the learning in this task. They identify that these regions
are in frontal and higher occipitotemporal regions rather than in regions involved in signal
detection or response execution such as primary visual or motor areas.
1.1.4 Interim summary concerning effects of learning on per-
ceptual decision making
Although perceptual learning is well established phenomenon, its neural basis is not clear.
In particular, there are open-questions about the locus of perceptual learning in the brain.
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Initial empirical evidence, whether from psychophysics, neuroimaging or from electro-
physiology, pointed to perceptual learning being largely based on changes in the earliest
part of the perceptual system, e.g. primary visual cortex. Later work has shown that some
of these earlier finding were unsound, and that sometimes higher areas of the perceptual
system, and not lower areas, are the loci to perceptual learning. Moreover, there is no
compelling evidence that areas beyond the perceptual system, and in particular, decision
making centres of the brain such as LIP and ACC, are involved in perceptual learning, and
that perceptual learning and more general reward based learning in the brain may have a
common basis.
The recent research implicating general reward based learning and decision making
mechanisms in perceptual learning has deep implications for our understanding of both
perceptual learning and the role of decision making in perception. However, given that
the clearest evidence for this comes from Non-Human Primates (NHPs) electrophysiology
(i.e., Law & Gold, 2008a), it is currently not known whether and to what extent this
revised interpretation extends to the human brain. Moreover, what neural mechanisms
underlie these post-sensory processing changes remains unclear. The research that we
carry out in this thesis directly addresses these main questions.
1.2 The role of prior expectation on perceptual de-
cision making
In natural environments, perceptual stimuli do not occur in isolation or independently of
their temporal and spatial context. Consider the two images shown in Figure 1.2. While
both images depict familiar vehicles, clearly the image on the left is completely unnatu-
ral. Any time we observe a vehicle in the real world, as opposed to the artificial setting
of psychophysics experiment, we observe it in the context of other objects and events.
Moreover, these objects and events can not only have familiar spatial arrangements to one
another, e.g. tables and chairs are usually arranged next to one another, a roof is always
on top of a building, etc., objects can have familiar temporal arrangements too. For ex-
ample, the flash of lightening precedes the crash of thunder, or the sound of your front
door opening is often followed by the sight or sound of a familiar person. As such, the
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spatial and temporal context potentially provide rich sources of information to facilitate
the recognition perceptual stimuli.
Figure 1.2: Images illustrating the role of context on perception. The image on the left is
unnatural because the object appears independently of any context.
The effect of prior expectation on perceptual processing has in fact been repeatedly
demonstrated behaviourally (see, e.g., Bar, 2004; Oliva & Torralba, 2007, for reviews).
For example, seminal work by Palmer (1975) showed that objects were identified more
accurately when they are in familiar scenes, e.g. a toaster is recognized faster when seen
in a kitchen. Similarly, Davenport and Potter (2004) show that objects are identified more
accurately when they are in meaningfully consistent backgrounds, e.g. a ballerina is rec-
ognized more quickly when she is on a stage rather than when she is depicted on a football
field. Auckland, Cave, and Donnelly (2007) show that objects are recognized more ac-
curately when they are simply surrounded by meaningfully related objects. Auckland et
al. (2007) claim that recognition of an object is affected by context not only when it is
embedded in a consistent or familiar scene, but also when it is simply near other meaning-
fully related objects. These results are also not just limited to visual spatial relationships.
For example, Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996); Aslin, Saffran, and Newport (1998);
Fiser and Aslin (2002) show that temporal statistical relationships between auditory or
visual stimuli can be learned even by infants.
Thus far, however, the neurobiological mechanisms underlying how prior expectations
affect perceptual decision making are not well understood. Just as in the case of how and
when perceptual learning occurs, which we considered in the previous section, there is
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a debate concerning how and when prior expectation affects perceptual decision making.
For example, Basso and Wurtz (1998) showed that in monkeys an increased probability
of an upcoming perceptual stimuli, indicated by a perceptual cue, affected the build up of
activity of Superior Colliculus (SC) neurons. The SC is known to be responsibility for the
control of saccadic eye movements. As such, these results imply that prior expectations
are responsible for the preparation of a motor response to the stimulus. Similar results
were obtained by de Lange, Rahnev, Donner, and Lau (2013), who used MEG with human
participants, and showed that prior expectations based on pre-stimuli cues affect the build
up oscillatory activity in the motor cortex. Related results were described by Albright
(2012), who showed how, in monkeys, prior expectation activates MT neurons even be-
fore the stimulus occurs. Likewise, by using FMRI with humans, Puri, Wojciulik, and
Ranganath (2009) showed that prior to stimulus onset, baseline activity in Fusiform Face
Area (FFA) and Parahippocampal Place Area (PPA) was affected by prior expectation.
The literature just mentioned are consistent with a view that prior expectations affect
baseline activity in sensory and motor areas prior to the stimulus onset. On the other
hand, in a study using NHPs by Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, Hopp, and Shadlen (2011), it
was shown that the rate of firing of LIP neurons — as described above, LIP is known to
integrate sensory signals towards a decision threshold — increased with increasing match
between the prior expectation and the actual observed stimuli. This implies that prior ex-
pectation may affect the accumulation of evidence to reach a decision threshold, and not
just affect the bias or baseline activity of the neural decision variable. Results obtained
by Cravo, Rohenkohl, Wyart, and Nobre (2013), based on EEG analysis of human partici-
pants, also point to the role of prior expectation in affecting the efficiency of information
accumulation, specifically by modulating the signal-to-noise gain of visual processing.
Behaviourally consistent results with human subjects have been reported by Dunovan,
Tremel, and Wheeler (2014), who demonstrated using a DDM that the primary role of
prior expectation is to bias the rate of evidence accumulation favouring the more probable
stimulus category.
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1.3 Aims and outline of the thesis
Decision making, and perceptual decision making in particular, can be understood both
theoretically and neurologically as a process of an accumulation of evidence to some
threshold, at which point a commitment to a choice is made. This process can be ex-
amined in human subjects by analysing EEG data during perceptual decision making and
identifying temporal components that are the neural signatures of the accumulation-to-
bound decision making (see Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2006a, 2006a;
Ratcliff et al., 2009b). It may also be statistically modelled using, for example, DDM
(see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff et al., 2004; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff &
Van Dongen, 2011). Taken together, these provide us with a theoretical and experimental
framework for the study of the neuroscience of human decision making.
Using this framework, we will investigate two related topics in the neuroscience of
human decision making: How does learning affect perceptual decision making, and how
does prior expectation interact with learning to affect decision making.
• Chapter 2 will describe our studies of the role of learning on perceptual decision
making. As mentioned above, there are competing hypotheses about the nature
and location of perceptual learning in the brain. The traditional view has been the
early hypothesis that perceptual learning affects the sensory areas of the brains, for
example, by modifying the receptive fields and interconnectivity of cells in primary
sensory areas (see, e.g., Karni & Sagi, 1991; Sagi & Tanne, 1994; Recanzone et al.,
1992, 1993). However, more recently Law and Gold (2008b) have argued that that
learning affects how sensory representations are interpreted by the higher areas in
the brain involved in decision making.
In the experiments described in Chapter 2, we will test if the account proposed by
Law and Gold (2008b) also applies to human perceptual learning. We will do so
by carrying out EEG recordings while subjects engage in a two-alternative forced
choice visual object classification task, which they perform each day over the course
of three days. We then use single-trial EEG analysis to describe how the tempo-
ral dynamics of decision making change as a consequence of perceptual learning.
In particular, we will test how the early and late temporal components described
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in Philiastides and Sajda (2006); Philiastides et al. (2006a, 2006a); Ratcliff et al.
(2009b) are affected by training. We hypothesize that if the account proposed by
Law and Gold (2008a) holds in humans, the late but not the early component should
increase in strength and occur earlier in time with each day of training. This result
would be consistent with a faster and move efficient accumulation of evidence.
• Chapter 3 deals with a specific mechanistic account of how learning affects percep-
tual decision making. This work follows from the work of Law and Gold (2009);
Kahnt et al. (2011) who have applied RL to the study of perceptual learning. They
argue that perceptual learning can be driven by a reinforcement signal that generates
a selective readout of the sensory neurons that are most informative for any given
perceptual decision. In Chapter 3, we apply related RL models to our perceptual
learning results from the main experiment described in Chapter 2
• Chapter 4 will describe our studies of the interaction of prior expectation and learn-
ing on decision making. The behavioural task in the experiments described there
will follow an identical paradigm used in our experiments described in Chapter 2:
Subjects will perform a perceptual discrimination task, i.e., face/car discrimination,
over the course of three days, using two different levels of stimulus noise. However,
in addition, at the start of each trial one of three different cues will be presented.
Each of these cues has an associated probability of the upcoming stimulus being
a face or a car. We predict that when these cues are fully learned, consistent with
Hanks et al. (2011), the late temporal component, but not the early temporal com-
ponent, will increase its magnitude and occur earlier in time with the increasing
match between the prior expectation and the actual observed stimulus. Follow-
ing Dunovan et al. (2014), we predict a decrease in reaction time and an increase
in accuracy with the increasing match between prior expectation and the observed
stimulus. We also predict that the effects just mentioned will emerge gradually over
the course of the three days. In other words, they will be relatively weak on the
first day, stronger by the second, and strongest by the third. Finally, we predict
that there will be an interaction between the effects of cue probability and training
day. In particular, the effect of the prior expectation will decrease with increased
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training. This particular prediction derives from Bayesian principle that prior infor-
mation should influence decision making more when sensory evidence is weaker
(e.g. Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006). If these predictions are
met, they will show that learning affects decision making both by increasing the ef-
ficiency of the integration of sensory information but also by increasing the strength
of top down expectations, (see, Summerfield & de Lange, 2014, for a review).
• Chapter 5 provides a Hierarchical Drift Diffusion model (HDDM) of the data from
the main experiments described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. As mentioned above,
the DDM is a sequential sampling model of decision making (see Ratcliff & Smith,
2004; Ratcliff et al., 2004; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Van Dongen,
2011). In this Chapter, we will model the response speed and choice data from the
main experiments described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 using a HDDM. With re-
spect to the first experiment, our particular aim is to determine how learning affects
perceptual learning by examining which parameters of the diffusion model vary
with training. With respect to our Chapter 4 experiment, our particular aim is to
determine how prior probability of the upcoming stimulus, as revealed by the pre-
stimulus cue, affects perceptual decision making by examining which parameters
of the diffusion model vary with experimental predictor variables, but particularly
with the pre-stimulus cue.
21
Chapter 2
Perceptual learning alters
post-sensory processing in human
decision making1
2.1 Introduction
Perceptual learning involves any long-lasting improvements in our ability to detect, dis-
criminate or identify sensory stimuli (see, e.g., Goldstone, 1998; Law & Gold, 2008a).
As described in more detail in Chapter 1, the underlying neural plasticity of perceptual
learning is still not well established. The objective of the study described in this chapter
is to use electrophysiological data to obtain evidence either in favour of or against certain
hypotheses about the nature of neural plasticity in perceptual learning.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are at least three major competing hypotheses about
the nature and location of perceptual learning in the brain. Learning may occur early
in the perceptual system, such as in primary visual cortex. Alternatively, learning may
occur at intermediate levels in the perceptual system, for example, higher areas of the
visual cortex. Finally, learning may occur late in, or even beyond, the perceptual system,
1This work has been published as Diaz, J. A., Queirazza, F., & Philiastides, M. G. (2017). Perceptual
learning alters post-sensory processing in human decision making. Nature Human Behaviour, Issue 1,
Article Number: 0035. Some additional analyses that is not covered in this thesis can be found in this
paper.
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specifically involving changes in the perceptual decision making system. Of these three
hypotheses, the dominant view has been the early hypothesis that perceptual learning af-
fects the sensory areas of the brains, for example, by modifying the receptive fields and
interconnectivity of cells in primary sensory areas (see, e.g., Karni & Sagi, 1991; Sagi
& Tanne, 1994; Recanzone et al., 1992, 1993). However, recent primate based electro-
physiology experiments (e.g., Law & Gold, 2008b) have provided compelling evidence
against this dominant view. These results strongly imply that perceptual learning does
not change how sensory information is represented in the brain, but rather how sensory
representations are interpreted, particularly by the higher areas in the brain involved in
decision making.
In the study described in this chapter, we test if this particular theoretical account
of perceptual learning also applies to human perceptual learning. We do so by carrying
out EEG recordings while subjects engage in a two-alternative forced choice visual object
classification task, which they perform each day over the course of three days. We then
use single-trial EEG multivariate discriminant analysis (see Section 2.2.5 for technical
details) to provide a comprehensive account of how the temporal dynamics of decision
making change as a consequence of perceptual learning. In this, we closely follow a
paradigm established in previous studies using single trial EEG analysis of two alternative
forced choice visual classification tasks (e.g., Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et
al., 2006a; Ratcliff et al., 2009b; Philiastides et al., 2006a). In these studies, the same (or
similar) two-alternative forced choice task was used, and using the same EEG discriminant
analysis that we use here, Philiastides et al identified two temporally distinct neuronal
components that discriminated between the stimulus categories: an early component that
occurred around 170 ms after stimulus presentation and a late component that occurred
around 300 ms post-stimulus.
Philiastides and Sajda (2006); Philiastides et al. (2006a); Ratcliff et al. (2009b); Phil-
iastides et al. (2006a), established the following body of results that provide a comprehen-
sive account of the neural significance of the early and late temporal EEG components:
• In Philiastides and Sajda (2006), it was shown that compared to the early compo-
nent, the late component was a better predictor of behaviour. Specifically, a choice
probability analysis indicated that there was a strong correlation between the neural
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responses of the late component, but not the early one, and the subjects’ behavioural
judgements.
• In Philiastides and Sajda (2006); Philiastides et al. (2006a), it was shown that the
late component, but not the early one, systematically shifted later in time with per-
ceived task difficulty. For example, as noise increased in the stimuli, the onset time
of the late component, but not the early one, occurred progressively later in time.
• In Ratcliff et al. (2009b), the late component was shown to be a significantly better
predictor than the early component of trial-by-trial changes in the rate of evidence
accumulation (i.e. drift rate) in a DDM.
• In Philiastides et al. (2006a), while the magnitudes of the early component were
unaffected when the face and car stimuli were colored red or green and the task
was switched to colour discrimination, the magnitudes of the late component were
reduced almost to zero.
Taken together these findings indicate that the early component encodes the incoming
sensory evidence, whereas the late component indexes post-sensory, decision-relevant ev-
idence. These previous findings are very important for present purposes as they establish
a body of facts against which to evaluate whether perceptual learning influences earlier
versus later stages of decision making.
In the study described in this chapter, we will test how activity associated with each
of these early and late EEG components is affected by training. We hypothesize that if
perceptual learning primarily alters post-sensory encoding of decision evidence, as seen
in NHPs (Law & Gold, 2008a), discrimination performance for our late but not the early
component should systematically increase across the three training sessions. We specifi-
cally hypothesize that single-trial amplitudes of the late decision-related components will
increase as a function of learning and systematically move backward in time consistent
with a faster and move efficient accumulation of evidence. Moreover, our ability to exploit
single-trial variability in the EEG will offer a mechanistic characterization of these effects
by establishing whether improvements in discrimination are a result of gain modulation
(i.e. amplification of the differential response) of the component amplitudes, a reduction
in the trial-to-trial variability (i.e. noise) of the component amplitudes, or both.
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2.2 Materials and Methods
2.2.1 Subjects
14 Subjects (7 Women and 7 men, age range 23-28 years) participated in this study. All
were right handed, reported normal vision and no history of neurological problems. In-
formed consent was obtained from all participants in accordance with the guidelines of
the Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology from Glasgow University. The study was
approved by the College of Science and Engineering Ethics Committee at the University
of Glasgow (CSE01353).
2.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were selected from the stimulus set described in e.g., Philiastides and Sajda
(2006, 2007). The stimulus set was generated as follows. A set of 20 images of faces
and 20 images of cars were selected from the Face Database of the Max Planck Institute
of Biological Cybernetics2 (Troje & Bülthoff, 1996; Blanz & Vetter, 1999). Each image
was 512 × 512 pixels, with 8 bits per pixel, and there were equal numbers of frontal
and side (up to 45◦) views. All images were equated for spatial frequency, luminance,
and contrast. They all had identical magnitude spectra and their corresponding phase
spectra were manipulated using the weighted mean phase (Dakin, Hess, Ledgeway, &
Achtman, 2002) technique to generate a set of images characterized by their percentage
phase coherence. For each image, a set of 13 noisy variants were created. The noise levels
were described in terms of coherence and ranged uniformly from 20% (lowest coherence,
highest noise) to 50% (highest coherence, lowest noise level). As such, in this stimulus
set there were a total of 2 × 20 × 13 = 520 images. We present examples of the stimuli
used in Figure 2.1.
We selected two levels of sensory evidence for this study (32.5% and 37.5% phase
coherence) that are known to yield performance spanning the psychophysical threshold,
based on previous studies (Philiastides, Ratcliff, & Sajda, 2006b; Philiastides & Sajda,
2006).
2Available at http://faces.kyb.tuebingen.mpg.de.
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Figure 2.1: Examples of a face image (upper row) and a car image (lower row), each at 5 coherence
levels: From left to right, their coherence values are 30%, 35%, 40%, 45% and 50%.
A Dell Precision Workstation (Intel Core 2 Quad) running Windows 7 (64 bit) with an
ATI FirePro 2270 graphics card and PsychoPy 1.80 presentation software (Peirce, 2007)
controlled the stimulus display. Images were presented on a Dell 2001FP TFT monitor
(resolution, 1600 x 1200 pixels; refresh rate, 60 Hz).
2.2.3 Behavioural Task
Subjects were presented with the stimuli just described and preformed a two alternative
forced choice classification task whereby they classified each image as either a face or a
car. Subjects sat a distance of 75 cm from the computer monitor and each image subtended
approximately 6x6 degrees of visual angle. On each trial, a blank screen was displayed
for a random duration that ranged uniformly between 1.00 to 1.50 seconds. The stimulus
image was then presented for 50 milliseconds and subjects were given up to 1250 mil-
liseconds to make their classification response, which was done using a USB button box
using their right hand’s index (for face response) and middle (for car response) fingers.
Subjects received visual feedback for each response. For a correct response, a tick was
presented. For an incorrect response or if the subject did not respond within the 1250
interval, a cross was presented. The feedback duration lasted 500 milliseconds. The trials
were presented in 4 blocks of 72 trials, with a 60 second rest period between each block.
The entire experiment lasted approximately 20 minutes. In Figure 2.2a, we provide the
task diagram of the behavioural task.
Each subject performed this task on three consecutive days. In other words, there were
42 experimental testing sessions in total, i.e. 14 subjects each tested on three separate
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days, with the experiment taking place at the same time on each day so that there was 24
hours between each session for all subjects. On the first day, subjects performed a practice
session of the face/car classification task but with a different set of face and car images.
2.2.4 EEG Data Acquisition
Subjects performed the task on three consecutive days, in a dark and soundproof room.
As they performed the task, their EEG was recorded with a 64 channel Ag/Agcl scalp
electrode actiCAP EEG system (Brain Products GmnH, Gilching, Germany). The active
ground electrode was placed just below Pz electrode of the International 10-20 system
method. The active references electrode was placed on the left mastoid. The impedance
was always below 5kOhm for each subject on each day.
The EEG signal was acquired at 1000hz at an analogue band pass of 0.02-250hz. The
EEG data was re-referenced to the average of all channels. Prior to beginning the ex-
periment on each day, subjects performed an eye-movement calibration task. They were
instructed to blink naturally at a white cross at the centre on the screen of the computer,
and after a few seconds they made a right-left, up-down, movement following the white
cross. The timing of these visual cues was recorded with the EEG. These eye blinks
and movement artefacts were removed by using a principal component analysis based
approach described in Parra, Spence, Gerson, and Sajda (2005). Finally, we baseline cor-
rected the EEG data, with the baseline interval defined as the 100 ms prior to stimulus
onset.
2.2.5 Single Trial EEG Data Analysis
We preformed single trial discriminant analysis in order to describe how the temporal dy-
namics of decision making changes as a consequence of perceptual learning. Here, we
closely followed the paradigm established in previous studies by Philiastides et al (see,
for example, Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2006a, 2006a; Ratcliff et
al., 2009b) that was used to identify the neural signatures of perceptual decisions. This
method provides a non-invasive means to study the temporal evolution of perceptual de-
cision making. In this approach, a single-trial analysis of the EEG signal is performed as
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follows. The EEG activity at time t on a single trial, i.e. trial i is denoted by ~xit . Note
that ~xit is a column vector with as many elements, denoted by K, as there are EEG elec-
trodes. In our case, K = 64. Corresponding to~xit , we have zi, which is a binary variable
that indicates some cognitive or perceptual characteristic of trial i. For example, in a two
alternative forced choice visual discrimination task, zi could indicate the identity of the
visual stimulus shown on trial i. Our aim is to now find a basis vector ~wt that best dis-
criminates the EEG vectors on those trials for which zi = 0 from the EEG vectors on the
trials for which zi = 1. Each~xit can be projected onto ~wt to give use a scalar variable
yit = ~w′t~xit .
Note that yit is a summary representation of the activity in~xit that best discriminates one
class (denoted by zi = 0) from the other class (denoted by zi = 1). The value of ~wt can be
found by logistic regression. In particular, by finding ~wt that maximizes
Lt =
N
∏
i=1
pziit (1− pit)1−zi,
where
pit =
1
1+ exp(−yit) ,
and
yit = ~w′t~xit .
From what we have just described, ~wt is a weighting vector of the EEG activity~xit . In
other words, yit is a weighted sum of the EEG activity ~xit with the weighting coefficients
given by ~wt . We may also obtain a neuroanatomical interpretation of ~wt by treating yit as
a source and viewing~xit as derived from the value of yit as follows:
~xit =~atyit +~εit .
Here, ~at is a coupling vector that multiplies the discriminating component yit to give us
the (non-noise) contribution of the discriminating component to the sensory activity ~xit .
As described in, e.g., Parra et al. (2002, 2003), the value of ~at can be calculated by a
least-squares solution as follows:
~at =
Xtyt
y′y
,
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where Xt is the K ×N matrix formed by concatenating the column vectors ~xit , for all
i ∈ 1 . . .N trials, and yt is the N× 1 vector formed by concatenating yit for all i ∈ 1 . . .N
trials. This~at is known as the sensor projection (e.g., Parra et al., 2003) or scalp projection
(e.g., Parra et al., 2002; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006) that can be visualized as scalp maps
that show the neuroanatomical significance of the discriminating component.
Accordingly, we used a logistic regression based multivariate discriminant analysis to
identify the EEG patterns that reliably distinguish between the two alternative stimulus
types in the forced choice task. This analysis was applied separately to each subject on
each day as follows. For any trial i for an arbitrary subject on an arbitrary day,~xit denotes
the K = 64 dimensional EEG signal at timepoint t ∈ {−100,−90 . . .− 10,0,10 . . .1000}
after the stimulus onset in that trial. Note that the timepoints are in steps of 10ms apart.
The set of δ +1 signals [
~xit−δ/2 · · ·~xit+δ/2
]
,
with δ = 50, were treated as δ + 1 independent observations of the EEG signal at post
stimulus timepoint t. For each~xit , we define a classifier label as
zit =
1 if the stimulus of trial i is a face,0 if the stimulus of trial i is a car.
We can quantify the performance of the discriminant analysis classifiers by the area
under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which we label as Az. Thus, for
each subject on each day and at each time point t, we have an Az value. The significance
of this Az statistic was computed using bootstrapping whereby we randomly permute clas-
sification labels.
In more detail, the ROC curve allows us to quantify the performance of any binary
classifier. Recall that, as noted on page 28, yit is a summary representation of the EEG
activity that best discriminates one of our two classes from the other. This yit determin-
istically maps to a probability — specifically, the probability that the class to which the
EEG activity corresponds is the one coded as class 1 — by the equation
pit =
1
1+ exp(−yit) .
Thus, in general with logistic regression, for every pattern of stimulus activity, we have
a probability that this activity represents or is indicative of class 1. With this probability
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value, we can then choose any threshold 0 ≤ Φ ≤ 1 to create a decision rule to classify
any stimulus as belonging to, or corresponding to, class 0 or 1 as follows:
classification decision for stimulus it =
0, if pit ≤Φ,1, if pit >Φ
For the classifier defined by any particular value ofΦ, there will be a false positive rate
and a true positive rate. The false positive rate is the number of false positives (stimuli
classified as 1 when their true class is 0) divided by the number of true negative cases (the
number of stimuli that truly belong to class 0). The true positive rate is the number of true
positives (stimuli correctly classified as 1) divided by the number of true positive cases
(the number of stimuli that truly belong to class 1). As an example, consider the fictitious
data presented in the following table:
stimulus truth p Φ= 0.10 Φ= 0.30 Φ= 0.50 Φ= 0.70 Φ= 0.90
1 -0.88 0 0.87 1 1 1 1 0
2 -0.75 1 0.85 1 1 1 1 0
3 1.38 0 0.29 1 0 0 0 0
4 0.24 1 0.63 1 1 1 0 0
5 0.11 1 0.67 1 1 1 0 0
6 1.20 0 0.34 1 1 0 0 0
7 -0.46 1 0.80 1 1 1 1 0
8 0.64 1 0.51 1 1 1 0 0
9 0.42 1 0.58 1 1 1 0 0
10 0.78 0 0.47 1 1 0 0 0
False positive rate 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.00
True positive rate 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.00
In this example, our stimulus is one-dimensional data and each stimulus belongs to class 0
or 1, which is shown in the column labelled truth. We then fit a binary logistic regression
to this data, and then obtain a predicted probability, for each stimulus, that it belongs
to class 1. This is given by p in the table. Now, we create a classification rules as just
defined using the thresholds Φ = 0.10, Φ = 0.30, Φ = 0.50, Φ = 0.70, Φ = 0.90. For
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each threshold, there is obviously a false positive rate and a false negative rate. We can
see, for example, that when Φ = 0.10, all cases are classified as belonging to class 1,
leading to a true positive rate of 1.00 (i.e., all truly positive cases are correctly classified
as belonging to class 1), but also a false positive rate of 1.00 (i.e., all truly negative cases
are incorrectly classified as belong to class 1). On the other extreme, when Φ= 0.90, all
cases are classified as belonging to class 0, leading to a true positive rate of 0.00 (i.e.,
all truly positive cases are incorrectly classified as belonging to class 0), but also a false
positive rate of 0.00 (i.e., no truly negative cases are incorrectly classified as belonging to
class 1).
The ROC space is simply a 2 dimensional space, specifically a unit square, i.e., (0,1)×
(0,1), where the x-axis represents the false positive rate and the y-axis represents the true
positive rate. Any classifier defined a threshold in the manner just described, can be
represented by a point in this space. For example, when Φ= 0.70, the false positive rate
is 0.25 and the true positive rate is 0.33, and so this classifier can be represented in the ROC
space by the point (0.25,0.33). The ROC curve is then simply the curve through the ROC
space defined by the set of points in ROC space corresponding to the classifiers defined
by the continuum of thresholds from Φ = 0.00 to Φ = 1.00. This curve will necessarily
start at the point (0.00,0.00) and terminate at (1.00,1.00). A curve close to identity line,
i.e., where the y value is equal to the x value, indicates the logistic regression, on average,
discriminates approximately at chance. On the other hand, an ROC curve extends close
to the upper left value of the ROC space indicates that the logistic regression, on average,
discriminates well between the two classes. Thus, we can quantify the performance of the
logistic regression based discrimination analysis by calculating the area under the ROC
curve, and we’ll denote the value of this area by Az. If Az is close to 0.50, it indicates that
the discrimination analysis is poor. On the other hand, if Az is close to 1.00 it indicates
that the discrimination analysis is highly accurate.
In order to assess the significance of the Az value for any logistic regression, we can
apply a permutation test, also known as a bootstrapping test (Parra et al., 2005). In this
method, we randomly permute the class labels that are applied to the stimuli, and then
recalculate the logistic regression discrimination analysis and its Az value. This produces
a set of sampled Az that we will denote by A˜1z , A˜
2
z . . . A˜
B
z , where B is the number of per-
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mutations we apply. To obtain a p = 0.05 significance level for our Az, we find the 95th
percentile value of A˜1z , A˜
2
z . . . A˜
B
z , i.e. the value above which lie 5% of the samples. In other
words, if the null hypothesis were true, and the class labels are essentially random, the
probability of observing an Az value as or more extreme than the 95th percentile value
of our permutation samples is 0.05. As such, any observed Az that is greater than this
threshold can be regarded as significant as the 0.05 level.
2.2.6 Multilevel Regression Analyses
In the analysis of the behavioural and EEG data, we use multilevel, or random effects, gen-
eral and generalized linear models (Gelman & Hill, 2007). Given that we use multilevel
models extensively below, we will now provide a general introduction to them.
In order to better appreciate the details of the multilevel models that we use, it is
useful to consider the following simplified example. Assume that in an experiment, each
of J subjects perform a speeded visual classification task, e.g., a face/car discrimination
task, a total of n times. In total, therefore, across all subjects, we will have N = J× n
experimental trials. The reaction times across these trials can be labelled y1,y2 . . .yN ; the
true identity of the visual stimulus on each trial, i.e, whether it was a face or car, can be
represented by the binary variables x1,x2 . . .xN , with each xi ∈ {0,1}; and the identity of
the subject on each trial can be represented by h1,h2 . . .hN , with each hi ∈ {1 . . .J}.
If there was absolutely no inter-subject variability in the relationship between the stim-
ulus identity xi and reaction time yi, and assuming normally distributed trial by trial vari-
ability in reaction time, we could model this data simply by
yi ∼ N(b0+b1xi,σ2), i ∈ {1 . . .N},
which is equivalent to
yi = b0+b1xi+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), i ∈ {1 . . .N}.
We can then use, for example, maximum likelihood estimation to infer the values of the
parameters b0, b1 and the trial by trial variance parameter σ2.
32
On the other hand, if there is inter-subject variability in the relationship between xi
and yi, a multilevel model of this relationship is
yi ∼ N(φ0[hi]+φ1[hi]xi,σ2), i ∈ {1 . . .N},
φ0[ j] ∼ N(b0,τ20 ), φ1[ j] ∼ N(b1,τ21 ), j ∈ {1 . . .J}.
Here, we are explicitly modelling inter-subject variability in the linear relationship be-
tween xi and yi in terms of normally distributed variation around the linear coefficients
b0 and b1. The parameters describing these variations are τ20 and τ
2
1 , respectively. Note
that in the limiting cases of τ20 → 0 and τ21 → 0, meaning no inter-subject variability, this
multilevel model is identical the previous non-multilevel model above.
Given that φ0[ j] may be rewritten as φ0[ j] = b0 + β0[ j], where β0[ j] ∼ N(0,τ20 ), and
φ1[ j] = b1+β1[ j], where β1[ j] ∼ N(0,τ21 ), the above multilevel model is equivalent to
yi = b0+b1xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+β0[hi]+β1[hi]xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2),
β0[ j] ∼ N(0,τ20 ), β1[ j] ∼ N(0,τ21 ), j ∈ {1 . . .J}.
Note that here, the random effects coefficients have a mean of zero. As such, this
multilevel model effectively models the relationship between xi and yi by a global linear
equation b0 + b1xi that is subject to zero-mean normally distributed random variation
across subjects. The global or fixed effects equation b0 + b1xi therefore represents the
average population relationship between xi and yi, and is often the particular focus of an
analysis.
It should also be noted that model fitting in multilevel models involves, for example,
maximum likelihood estimation of the following parameters: b0, b1, τ20 , τ
2
1 , and σ
2. As
such, the estimated values of β0[ j] and β1[ j], for j ∈ {1 . . .J}, play a role analogous to
the values of εi, for i ∈ {1 . . .N} in that they describe the random variation observed on
individual trials. They are generally not explicitly analyzed unless attention needs to be
paid to an individual data point or individual subject.
The inclusion of the random effects terms is to properly account for the inter-subject
variability around these average effects, and we do so primarily so that the statistical sig-
nificance of the average effects is calculated correctly, with failure to properly account for
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inter-subject variability leading to inflated Type I error rates (Aarts, Verhage, Veenvliet,
Dolan, & van der Sluis, 2014, for further discussion of the necessity of multilevel analysis
in neuroscience). In this sense, multilevel general linear models can be viewed as playing
a similar to repeated-measures Anova models. However, they allow us to overcome the
known statistical inadequacies of repeated-measures Anova analyses, (Baayen, Davidson,
& Bates, 2008, for further discussion).
The significance of a single variable, or set of variables, in the multilevel regression
models may be tested using a log likelihood ratio test. For example, to test the significance
of a size K′ subset of all K predictor variables (i.e. K′⊆K), we compare the log-likelihood
of the model with all K predictors against the log-likelihood of the model without the K′
subset. If we denote the log-likelihood of the model with all K predictors by L1 and the
log-likelihood of the model with the K′ subset byL0, then under the null hypothesis that
all coefficients corresponding to the K′ predictors are simultaneously zero,
−2× (L0−L1)∼ χ2df=∆θ
where ∆θ is the difference in the number of parameters in the two models. In other
words, under the null hypothesis, −2 times the difference of the log likelihoods of the
two models is distributed according to a χ2 distribution whose degrees of freedom is ∆θ .
The parameter counts in each model are based on both the number of predictors as well
as the size of the covariance matrix (Bates, 2010). For example, consider the following
three multilevel linear models:
• Example multilevel model I:
yi = b0+β0[hi]+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), β0[ j] ∼ N(0,τ20 ), j ∈ {1 . . .J},
• Example multilevel model II:
yi = b0+b1xi+β0[hi]+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), β0[ j] ∼ N(0,τ20 ), j ∈ {1 . . .J}.
• Example multilevel model III:
yi = b0+b1xi+β0[hi]+β1[hi]xi+ εi,
εi ∼ N(0,σ2), β0[ j] ∼ N(0,τ20 ), β1[ j] ∼ N(0,τ21 ), j ∈ {1 . . .J}.
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Model I has three degrees of freedom, corresponding to the one fixed effect intercept
term, the one random effects intercept term, and the residual variance term. Model II has
four degrees of freedom, three corresponding to those terms also in Model I, and then
an additional degree of freedom corresponding to fixed effect slope term. Model III has
five degrees of freedom, four of which correspond to those terms also in Model II, and
then an additional degree of freedom corresponding to the random effects slope term. It
should also be noted that it is possible to model the correlation between random intercepts
and random slope terms. In this case, there is one additional degree of freedom in the
model corresponding to the covariance between the random intercept and random slope.
In general, if we have h random effects variables, if we allow for non-zero correlation
between each of these, the random effects collectively take h×(h+1)2 degrees of freedom.
Note that the likelihood ratio test just mentioned can always be used to test the signif-
icance of a categorical variable with L levels, which is coded using L− 1 binary dummy
codes, or an interaction between two categorical variables with L and L′ levels, which can
be coded using (L−1)× (L′−1) binary dummy codes.
The likelihood ratio test affords us a general means to test hypotheses. As mentioned,
it can be used to test hypotheses related to the role of individual predictor variables, in-
cluding categorical predictor variables, or sets of predictor variables. It can also be used
identically with multilevel and non-multilevel general linear or generalized linear (for
example, binary logistic models) models. For this reason, it is our default means for hy-
pothesis testing and model comparison. In some analysis, other methods of hypothesis
tests are also possible. For example, in some cases, to assess whether a particular pre-
dictor variable has a reliable effect on an outcome variable, we may use the p-value for
the null hypothesis test that the coefficient for the predictor is significantly different to
zero. Equivalently, we may calculate whether the, for example, 95% confidence interval
for the predictor contains the value of zero. In many cases, tests of this nature will lead to
identical or near identical results to the corresponding likelihood ratio test. However, de-
pending on circumstances (for example, the type of statistical model, the type of predictor
variable, etc), and depending on the assumptions of the models and the assumptions of
the tests, the results of these different hypothesis test and model comparison methods may
not be identical. This is, in principle, inevitable given that there ultimately many different
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ways of statistically testing hypotheses or comparing models, and no one of them is a
definitive method.
We fit all multilevel linear and logistic regression models using the lme4 package
http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html
in the R statistical language
http://www.r-project.org.
2.3 Behavioural analysis results
In Figure 2.2b-c, we have plotted the average accuracy and average response times on
each day of training as a function of the coherence level in the stimulus. On 1.5% of
trials across all subjects and training days, subjects did not respond within the 1250ms
response interval, and these were excluded from the analysis. For the trials for which
choices were made, we calculated the average accuracy on each day and for each of
the levels of coherence, averaging over the trials and all subjects. These are plotted in
Figure 2.2b. For trials with correct responses, we calculated the average reaction times on
each day and each of the two levels of coherence, again averaging over all trials and all
subjects. These are shown in Figure 2.2c.
We modelled the accuracy data using a multilevel logistic regression analysis, and
modelled the reaction times for accurate responses using multilevel linear regression. In
these analyses, the predictor variables were the coherence of the stimulus (treated as a
binary variable with values "low" and "high") and training day (treated as a continuous
variable whose values range from 1 to 3), and the interaction of coherence level and
training day. The identity of the subject was treated as a random effect varying the slope
and intercept of the regression. More formally, for the accuracy analysis, we used the
following model:
log
(
P(zi = 1)
1−P(zi = 1)
)
= b0+b1x1i+b2x2i+b3x1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+β0hi +β1hix1i+β2hix2i+β3hix1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
β j ∼ N(0,Σ), for j ∈ 1 . . .J,
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Figure 2.2: Experimental design and behavioural analyses. Schematic representation of the
experimental paradigm (a) . Subjects had to categorize a noisy image presented for 50 ms as a
face or a car and indicate their choice with a button press within 1,250 ms following the stimulus
presentation. Feedback was then presented for 500 ms (a tick or a cross, for a correct or an
incorrect response, respectively) followed by an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) that varied randomly
between 1 and 1.5s. Subjects performed this task on three consecutive training days. A sample
face image (upper row) and car image (lower row) at the two levels of phase coherence used in the
task (32.5% and 37.5%) are shown on the right. Shown in (b) are the proportion of correct choices,
and shown in (c) are the mean reaction times (RTs), as a function of the three training days (Day
1: blue; Day 2: green; Day 3: red) and the two levels of phase coherence of the stimuli, averaged
across subjects. Faint lines represent individual subject data. Error bars represent standard errors
across subjects.
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where zi is a binary variable indicating the accuracy of the subject on trial i, and where
x1i and x2i represent the value of the coherence variable and the value of the training day
variable on trial i, respectively. For the reaction time analysis, we used the following
model:
yi = b0+b1x1i+b2x2i+b3x1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+β0hi +β1hix1i+β2hix2i+β3hix1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for i ∈ 1 · · ·N β j ∼ N(0,Σ), for j ∈ 1 . . .J,
where yi signifies the reaction time of the subject on trial i, and the predictor variables
x1i and x2i are identical to those of the logistic regression model for accuracy. (Note that
in both models, to avoid notational clutter, we denote the coefficients of the fixed and
random effects using identical symbols, i.e. b0,b1,b2,b3 and β0, β1, β2, β3, respectively.).
In order to better appreciate the details of these two multilevel models, it useful to
consider the arrangement of the data used in both models:
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Here, each of J subjects perform a speeded visual classification task, e.g., a face/car dis-
crimination task, a total of n times. In total, therefore, across all subjects, we will have
N = J×n experimental trials. As such, zi is a binary variable indicating the accuracy of
the subject on trial i; yi is a continuous variable indicating the reaction time of the subject
on trial i; x1i is a binary variable indicating the coherence value of the stimulus presented
on on trial i; x2i is a continuous variable indicating the training day (i.e., 1, 2 or 3) on
trial i; finally, hi is a categorical variable, i.e. hi ∈ {1 . . .J}, indicating the identity of the
subject on trial i.
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Note that subject identity, signified by hi, is not a predictor variable, but is a grouping
variable, or random effect variable, in the multilevel model. In other words, we can un-
derstand the multilevel model as providing a distinct logistic or linear regression model
for each individual subject, i.e. J distinct regression models. In each of these J regression
models, we have three predictors: coherence, training day and the interaction thereof.
However, these J regression models are coupled to one another due to the fact that the
coefficients for each of these predictors are assumed to be sampled from a global distri-
bution.
For each analysis, we used a log-likelihood ratio test, as described above, to test for
the main effects and interaction effects. For accuracy, there were significant main effects
for coherence level (χ2df=1 = 28.08, p < 0.01) and the day of the session (χ
2
df=1 = 19.37,
p < 0.01). There was no interaction between coherence level and training day (χ2df=1 =
0.16, p = 0.68). For reaction time, there were significant main effects for coherence level
(χ2df=1 = 21.24, p < 0.01) and the day of the session (χ
2
df=1 = 8.92, p < 0.01). There was
no interaction between coherence level and training day (χ2df=1 = 0.38, p = 0.54). Note
that for each one of these analyses, the degrees of freedom of the χ2 statistic for the log-
likelihood ratio test is df= 1. This is because we always compare the log-likelihood of the
full model with a model with one less parameter. For example, to assess the interaction
effect in the accuracy analysis, we compare the log-likelihood of the logistic regression
model shown above to the log-likelihood of the following model:
log
(
P(zi = 1)
1−P(zi = 1)
)
= b0+b1x1i+b2x2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+β0hi +β1hix1i+β2hix2i+β3hix1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
β j ∼ N(0,Σ), for j ∈ 1 . . .J.
As such, there is one less parameter, i.e. b3, in the smaller model3.
3As explained in Section 2.2.6, page 35, there may be alternative methods of testing some hypotheses
of this nature. However, our default method for hypothesis testing will be the log-likelihood ratio test using
the χ2 statistic as this is the most generally and widely applicable method available.
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2.4 EEG analysis results
The onset times of the early and the late components are obtained independently for each
subject on each day. They are found by identifying the time-point corresponding to the
peak4 Az value in time windows from around 100ms-250ms (early component window)
and 250ms-500ms (late component window), see Philiastides and Sajda (2006). In all
cases, the late component was never within 100ms of the response time of the subject.
For each subject on each day, having recorded the time of the early and late components,
we then obtained the Az values of these early and late component times.
In Figure 2.3a, we show an example trajectory of the y discriminating variable (intro-
duced and described in Section 2.2.5, page 28) for the early (dashed lines) and late (solid
lines) component windows for one example subject. In Figure 2.3b, we have plotted the
Az values of the discrimination analysis as a function of each time point in the trial on
each day. In Figure 2.3c, we have plotted the Az values of early and late components as a
function of day, averaged over subjects. In Figure 2.3c, we also show the scalp topologies
of the early and late components (calculated using the method described in Section 2.2.5,
page 28). As can be seen, the late component’s regions of highest activity are in more
parietal and occipitoparietal areas, while the early component’s regions of highest activ-
ity are more central. These results are in line with the topologies of the early and late
components in, for example, Philiastides and Sajda (2006). The onset times of the early
and late components are shown as a function of day for each subject in Figure 2.3d.
2.4.1 Analysis of peak Az values
We analyzed the effect of the temporal component (treated as a binary variable with two
levels, i.e., "early" and "late"), training day (as before, treated as a continuous variable
with values in the range 1 to 3), and the interaction of temporal component and training
4Whenever we use the term component onset time, we generally are referring to the time-point of the
peak of this component.
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Figure 2.3: Post-sensory effects of perceptual learning. Single-trial discriminator amplitudes
(y) for the early (dashed lines) and late (solid lines) component windows for faces (black) and cars
(grey) at 37.5% phase coherence from a representative subject on the third training day (a). The
component amplitudes are shown as histograms on the right, with a cutoff (the thick black line)
to separate trials into positive versus negative amplitudes, indicating a higher likelihood of a face
and a car trial, respectively. (b) Multivariate discrimination performance (Az) during face-versus-
car outcome discrimination of stimulus-locked EEG responses across the three training days (Day
1: blue; Day 2: green; Day 3: red), averaged across subjects, showing the presence of the early
and late components. The dotted line represents the average Az value leading to a significance
level of P = 0.01, estimated by using a bootstrap test. Faint lines represent individual subject data.
(c) Average discriminator performance and scalp topographies for the early (magenta) and late
(cyan) components across the three training days estimated at the time of subject-specific maxi-
mum discrimination. Faint lines represent individual subject data. Error bars represent standard
errors across subjects. (d) Average onset times for the early (magenta) and late (cyan) components
across the three training days. Faint lines represent individual subject data. Error bars represent
standard errors across subjects.
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day, on the value of the Az peak using the following multilevel linear regression model:
Azi = b0+b1x1i+b2x2i+b3x1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+β0hi +β1hix1i+β2hix2i+β3hix1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for i ∈ 1 · · ·N β j ∼ N(0,Σ), for j ∈ 1 . . .J.
where i ∈ {1 · · ·N} indexes the data-points, N = 14×3×2= 84 (i.e., two components on
each day for each subject), Azi is the value of the peak of the Az value, x1i ∈ {1,3} is the
training day, x2i ∈ {0,1} is the early or late temporal component.
As before, we used a log-likelihood ratio test to test for the main effects and interac-
tion effects. There was a significant main effect of component (χ2df=1 = 5.04, p = 0.02),
a significant main effect of day (χ2df=1 = 7.61, p = 0.01), and a significant interaction
between training day and component (χ2df=1 = 7.46, p = 0.01)
5. Note that in the above
model, the coefficients b1 and b2 are the coefficients for the main effect of training day
and the main effect of temporal component, respectively, while the coefficient b3 is the
interaction effect for training day and temporal component. In particular, b3 gives the
change in slope of the effect of training day when we go from the early temporal compo-
nent to the late temporal component. The estimated value of b3 = 0.03, t(40.99) = 2.77,
p < 0.016. The significant value for b3 here shows that the effect of training in the late
component is significantly greater than that of the early component. In more detail, the
maximum likelihood estimate of b1 is 0.003, with its parametric bootstrap based 95%
confidence interval being (−0.01,0.02)7. On the other hand, the maximum likelihood
estimate of b3 is 0.03, as mentioned already, with its parametric bootstrap based 95%
5Note that as described in Section 2.2.6, and as was the case with the analyses described in Section 2.3,
for each one of these analyses, the degrees of freedom of the χ2 statistic for the log-likelihood ratio test is
df= 1. This is because we always compare the log-likelihood of the full model with a model with one less
parameter.
6The t-tests obtained from the multilevel model are for null-hypothesis tests on the coefficients b1,
b2, b3, just as they would be in, for example, a non-multilevel general linear model. However, given the
nature of these multilevel models, the Welch-Satterthwaite approximation, which is calculated using the R
package https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lmerTest/lmerTest.pdf, is used to calculate
the degrees of freedom. This approximation usually results in non-integer degrees of freedom.
7Note that the confidence interval for b1 contains 0.00. This has happened despite the fact that the
model with day as a predictor is a significantly better model, as measured by log-likelihood, than the model
without day. This occurs simply because the effect of day on the outcome variable is close to zero for the
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confidence being (0.01,0.04). Thus, the maximum likelihood estimate of the slope of
the effect of training day in the early component is 0.003, while for the case of the late
component it is 0.003+0.03≈ 0.03.
Collectively, these results show that the Az value for the late component, but not the
early one, increased significantly in magnitude over the course of training.
2.4.2 Analysis of component onset times
Using an identical multilevel analysis to that used to analyze peak Az values, we modelled
the effect of temporal component, training day, and their interaction, on the onset times of
the temporal components. Using a log-likelihood ratio test as before, there was a highly
significant main effect of day, χ2df=1 = 21.56, p < 0.01; a highly significant main effect
of component, χ2df=1 = 51.30, p < 0.01; a highly significant interaction between day and
component, χ2df=1 = 51.75, p < 0.01. The maximum likelihood estimate of b3 is −26.07,
t(41.00) = −9.88, p < 0.01. As in the case of the Az peak analysis, this shows that the
onset time of the late component occurs significantly earlier as an effect of training than
does the early component.
The maximum likelihood estimate of b1 is −3.21, with its parametric bootstrap based
95% confidence interval being (−9.00,2.22). The maximum likelihood estimate of b3
is −26.07, with its parametric bootstrap based 95% confidence being (−31.34,−20.44).
Thus, the maximum likelihood estimate of the slope of the effect on onset time of the
training day in the early component is −3.21, while for the case of the late component it
is −3.21−26.07 =−29.28.
2.4.3 Analysis of the discriminating component y
The improvement in subjects’ visual discrimination that results from training over the
three days, as evidenced by the behavioural data alone is consistent with multiple alterna-
tive underlying mechanisms. In particular, when viewed from the point of view of stan-
dard signal detection theory, improvements in discrimination as a result of learning could
early component, but non-zero for the late component. The effect of day on the outcome variable for the
early component is given by b1, while the effect of day on the outcome variable for the late component is
b1+b3.
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Figure 2.4: Enhanced readout of post-sensory decision evidence. (a) A schematic illustration
of possible effects of learning on the distribution of single-trial discriminator amplitudes in the
course of learning. Top: increases in the distance between the mean response for faces and cars.
Bottom: reduction in the variance of the face and car responses. Both examples lead to a smaller
overlap (more separation) between the face and car distributions. (b) Changes in the mean distance
between the face and car distributions for the late component across the three training days (1:
blue, 2: green, 3: red). (c) Changes in the variance of the face and car distributions for the late
component across the three training days. The faint lines in b and c represent individual subject
data, while the error bars represent standard errors across subjects.
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be caused by either increasing the perceptual separability of the two stimulus classes, or
alternatively by decreasing the noise and variability in the signals. We illustrate these
two possibilities in the Figure 2.4a, respectively. Analyzing the y discriminating compo-
nent, which effectively represents the neural decision variables, can potentially provide
valuable insight into which of either of these two possibilities is underlying the effect of
learning on perceptual decision making.
The average difference in the late discriminating component y for faces and cars as a
function of coherence and days is shown in Figure 2.4b. Likewise, the average standard
deviation of the late discriminating component as a function of coherence and days is
shown in Figure 2.4c.
Separately for the early and late components, we used a multilevel linear model to
analyze how the difference between the discriminating component for faces and for cars
varied as a function of coherence and days, modelling inter-subject variability in these
effects as random effects. For these two analyses, we used a multilevel linear model iden-
tical in form those used to analyze the magnitude and onset of the temporal components,
i.e.
yi = b0+b1x1i+b2x2i+b3x1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+β0hi +β1hix1i+β2hix2i+β3hix1ix2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for i ∈ 1 · · ·N β j ∼ N(0,Σ), for j ∈ 1 . . .J.
where, in this model, yi signifies the difference in the values of the discriminating com-
ponent, while x1i ∈ {1,3} signifies the training day, and x2i ∈ {0,1} signifies the level of
coherence of the stimulus.
For the early component analysis, there was a significant effect for coherence χ2df=1 =
16.10, p < 0.01, but not for day χ2df=1 = 0.11, p = 0.74 nor for the interaction of day and
coherence χ2df=1 = 0.44, p = 0.51. For the late component, on the other hand, there was a
significant effect of day χ2df=1 = 6.72, p < 0.01, and coherence χ
2
df=1 = 11.52, p < 0.01,
but no interaction between the two χ2df=1 = 0.03, p = 0.86.
An identical multilevel analysis was then used to analyze the effect of training and
coherence on average standard deviation of y. For the early component, there was no
significant effect of day χ2df=1 = 0.24, p = 0.62, coherence χ
2
df=1 = 1.13, p = 0.29, or
interaction χ2df=1 = 1.65, p= 0.20. Likewise for the late component, there was no signifi-
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cant effect of day χ2df=1= 2.76, p= 0.10, coherence χ
2
df=1= 0.38, p= 0.53, or interaction
χ2df=1 = 0.25, p = 0.61.
In sum, from these analyses, the main results are that the average distance between
the discriminating components for faces and cars increases with learning. We do not,
however, observe any significant change in the average standard deviation with learning.
2.4.4 Prediction of behavioural responses by early versus late
component
We analyzed how well the values of the early and the late components predict the sub-
jects’ behavioural responses on each trial. For each trial from each subject, we will use
ri ∈ {0,1} to indicate if the response of the subject is “face” (ri = 1), or “car” (ri = 0).
Likewise, on each trial, we have yearlyi and y
late
i , which are the values of y decision variable
from the discriminant analysis at the early component and late components, respectively.
We used multilevel analyses to see if yearlyi or y
late
i is a better predictor of behavioural
responses. Two models are used. In one, only yearlyi is used to predict behavioural re-
sponses. In the other, only ylatei is used to predict behavioural responses. Then, the model
fit statistics of the two models are compared. All data, across all subjects and all days,
are used. We index the individual trials by i, i.e. i ranges from 1 to J× 3× 288, where
288 is the number of trials per subject per day and J is the number of subjects. On trial i,
hi ∈ {1 . . .J} indicates the identity of the subject. A multilevel logistic regression of how
the probability of a face response varies as a function of yearlyi is
log
(
P(ri = 1)
1−P(ri = 1)
)
= αhi +βhiy
early
i
where
α j ∼ N(a,τ2a ), β j ∼ N(b,τ2b )
are random effects on the intercept and slope that account for inter-subject variability in
the model. The corresponding multilevel logistic regression of how the probability of a
face response varies as a function of ylatei is
log
(
P(ri = 1)
1−P(ri = 1)
)
= αhi +βhiy
late
i .
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Fitting these two models using R, and calculating the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), we obtain
• BIC for early model: 14046.44.
• BIC for late model: 13087.51.
The BIC is defined as follows:
−2LL+ log(n)K,
where K is the number parameters in the model. Note that a lower BIC value indicates
better model fit. In particular, according to Kass and Raftery (1995), we can calculate the
approximate log of the Bayes Factor comparing the early model to the late model by
log(Bayes Factor)≈−(BIClate− BICearly)/2.
A widely used rule (see, for example Kass & Raftery, 1995) is that if 2×log(Bayes Factor)>
10, this is very strong evidence that the late model is a better model of response choice
than the early one. As such, our model comparison result is
−(BIClate− BICearly)/2 = 479.47
and so 2× log(Bayes Factor) = 958.93, which is clearly much greater than 10 and so is
very strong evidence that the late component is a predictor of the subjects’ responses than
is the early component.
In a complementary analysis, using the R package MCMCglmm that implements a Bayesian
inference in multilevel model, we fit the model
log
(
P(ri = 1)
1−P(ri = 1)
)
= a+bearlyhi z
early
i +b
late
hi z
late
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+αhi +β
early
hi
zearlyi +β
late
hi z
late
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
,
α j ∼ N(0,τ2a ), β earlyj ∼ N(0,τ2be) β latej ∼ N(0,τ2bl)
where zearlyi and z
late
i are standardization of the y
early
i and y
late
i , defined as follows:
zearlyi =
yearlyi −〈yearlyi 〉
sd(yearlyi )
zlatei =
ylatei −〈ylatei 〉
sd(ylatei )
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Figure 2.5: Probability of face response as a function of the decision variable. For each
of the 14 subjects, the probability of a face response was modelled as a function of either the
(standardized) early or late decision variable, using logistic regression. The points shown are
the average, across subjects, probabilities of a face response at values of the decision variable
−2.50,−1.00,0.00,1.00,2.50. Also shown are the standard errors for these predictions. The
curves are the average curves obtained from logistic regression analyses across all subjects.
Using these standardized variables, we can compare the compare β early and β late as both
predictors are on a similar scale8. We provide a plot of the probability of a face response
as a function of the standardized decision variable in Figure 2.5.
The Bayesian analysis allows us to easily calculate interval estimates for the coeffi-
cients and for differences in the coefficients. These interval estimates, known as High
Posterior Density (HPD) intervals, can be interpreted as roughly analogous to confidence
intervals. The estimates and 95% HPD intervals for bearly and blate are
Coefficient 95% HPD Interval
bearly 0.88 (0.75,1.01)
blate 1.24 (1.07,1.45)
8In general, two coefficients in a regression model are not comparable unless the predictor variables to
which they correspond have the same scale.
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The average difference blate− bearly is 0.37 and the 95% HPD interval on this difference
is (0.15,0.59), indicating that the standardized value of the late component is a reliably
better predictor of the probability of a “face” or “car” response than is the standardized
value of the early component.
2.5 Discussion
In this work, we offer the first evidence from time-resolved electrophysiological signals in
humans linking perceptual learning with post-sensory processing during a perceptual cat-
egorization task. Specifically, we showed that improvements in behavioural performance
were accompanied primarily by late enhancements in decision-related evidence. In par-
ticular, we demonstrated that single-trial amplitudes of a late EEG component indexing
decision evidence (Philiastides et al., 2006b; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Ratcliff et al.,
2009b; Lou, Li, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2014) were amplified in the course of learning,
such that these representations became more robust to noise (rather than a reduction in
noise as such). In contrast, a temporally earlier component encoding sensory (stimulus)
evidence - even in the absence of a face/car decision task (Philiastides et al., 2006b) -
was not affected by training. These findings suggest that it is the strengthening of the
connections between early sensory encoding and downstream decision-related processing
that are driving perceptual learning in our task.
Crucially, we also showed that the onset of the late component (which on average
coincides with the onset of decision evidence accumulation (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013;
O’Connell et al., 2012; Philiastides, Heekeren, & Sajda, 2014) systematically moves ear-
lier in time with training. This finding is particularly interesting since we have previously
observed comparable temporal shifts in this component while manipulating task/stimulus
difficulty (Philiastides et al., 2006b; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2009b).
We view this as additional evidence that our learning effects on the late component lead
to changes in perceptual sensitivity. More specifically, the earlier the onset time of the late
component, the stronger the behavioural improvements. In other words, speed and accu-
racy improve with each day of learning, see Figure 2.2b-c, and the late component occurs
earlier each day, see Figure 2.3d), consistent with a decrease in perceived task difficulty.
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These temporal changes are also in line with a faster and more efficient accumulation of
evidence as often predicted by sequential sampling models of decision making (Ratcliff
& Smith, 2010; Ratcliff, Smith, & McKoon, 2015; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004) (for example,
increases in the drift-rate and decrease in nondecision time variability). We return to this
topic, and model these accumulation of evidence effects directly, in Chapter 5.
Research on perceptual learning has recently focused on the extent to which perceptual
learning is due to improvements in sensory abilities that are (informationally and tempo-
rally) earlier than the decision process itself or due to improvements in post-sensory and
decision-related processing. Consistent with the former account, several psychophysics
studies have demonstrated that perceptual learning is often highly specific to the location
and other properties of the stimuli (Ball & Sekuler, 1987; Crist et al., 1997; Fahle & Edel-
man, 1993; Fiorentini & Berardi, 1980; Karni & Sagi, 1991; Poggio et al., 1992; Sagi &
Tanne, 1994) implying specificity to the trained retinal location (Fahle, 2004, 2005). Sim-
ilarly human FMRI studies offered evidence of activity enhancements in retinotopic areas
corresponding to the trained visual fields (Schwartz et al., 2002) and increased responses
along the whole hierarchy of early visual areas that correlated with improvements in be-
havioural performance following training over the course of several weeks (Furmanski et
al., 2004; Jehee, Ling, Swisher, van Bergen, & Tong, 2012). These results are further
corroborated by EEG recordings in humans showing post-training improvements in early
visually-evoked components over occipital electrode sites (Bao, Yang, Rios, He, & Engel,
2010; Pourtois, Rauss, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2008; Censor, Bonneh, Arieli, & Sagi,
2009) and electrophysiological recordings in NHPs linking behavioural performance with
improvements in perceptual sensitivity in primary sensory areas (Ghose et al., 2002; Yan
et al., 2014).
In contrast, other psychophysical studies proposed that perceptual learning can also
arise from changes in how sensory signals are read out or interpreted by decision-making
mechanisms (Petrov, Dosher, & Lu, 2005; Dosher & Lu, 1999; Lu, Liu, & Dosher, 2010)
rather than from changes in primary sensory areas as such. Neural evidence in sup-
port of this interpretation comes from electrophysiology studies on NHPs (Law & Gold,
2008b, 2009) demonstrating that perceptual learning on a motion discrimination task af-
fects downstream decision accumulator areas, rather than regions encoding the sensory
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evidence (that is, motion direction). Specifically, accumulator neurons improved respon-
siveness to the decision evidence in the course of learning (as reflected in steeper evidence
accumulation slopes), with these improvements being proportional to the animals’ perfor-
mance on the task. Correspondingly, recent FMRI studies in humans started to explore the
effect of learning on the activity and connectivity patterns of higher-level ventral tempo-
ral (Kuai et al., 2013; S. Li et al., 2009) and decision-related regions (Baldassarre et al.,
2012; Chen et al., 2015; Kahnt et al., 2011; Lewis, Baldassarre, Committeri, Romani, &
Corbetta, 2009).
These seemingly discrepant accounts of the temporal locus of perceptual learning
may be reconciled by considering differences in the experimental demands of the task at
hand. For example, a recent theoretical account proposed a unified two-stage model of
perceptual learning (Shibata, Sagi, & Watanabe, 2014). According to this model, there
are two distinct types of plasticity underlying perceptual learning: feature-based plasticity
and task-based plasticity. On the one hand, feature based plasticity affects early sensory
processing stages and occurs with mere exposure to stimuli, regardless of whether the
stimuli are relevant to the task or not. Task-based plasticity, on the other hand, can be
thought of as a higher-level processing stage arising from direct and active involvement in
a behavioural task. In this formulation, the relative contribution of the two plasticity types
to the overall enhancement in performance hinges largely on the training procedures, the
stimuli and the intricacies of the task used in learning (W. Li, Piëch, & Gilbert, 2004).
More specifically, a distinction could be drawn between tasks that involve learning
of relatively primitive stimulus features such as orientation, spatial frequency or contrast
and those employing more complex stimuli such as objects and faces (T. Watanabe &
Sasaki, 2015). Although learning of highly primitive features could occur locally at the
level of early sensory processing, more complex stimuli (made up of a combination of
primitive features) might require active involvement of downstream higher-level sensory
or decision-related areas. In our design, for instance, complex object categories are used.
In addition, phase discrimination, which is shown to involve processes beyond early visual
cortex (Perna, Tosetti, Montanaro, & Morrone, 2008), is required to perform the task
reliably. Our findings thus appear to rely heavily on the enhancement of the relevant
stimulus representations during post-sensory, rather than early sensory processing.
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In summary, our study provides insights into the neurobiology of perceptual learning
and offers strong support to the notion that neuronal plasticity can occur at multiple time-
scales and locations, depending on task demands and context. As such our findings can
help revise existing theories of perceptual learning focusing only on early sensory pro-
cessing and provide the foundation upon which future studies continue to interrogate the
neural systems underlying perceptual decision making.
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Chapter 3
A reinforcement learning account of
the effect of learning on perceptual
decision making
3.1 Reinforcement learning accounts of perceptual
learning
As described in Chapter 1, RL (see Sutton & Barto, 1998, for general introduction) is
a major subfield of machine learning that describes algorithms that adapt behaviours to
maximize rewards and minimize punishments. RL has its origins in the study of classical
conditioning and operant conditioning in behaviourist psychology and is still applied to
the study of human and animal behaviour (see, for example, Wise & Rompre, 1989;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Schultz, 1998; O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley,
& Dolan, 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Hyman, Malenka, & Nestler, 2006; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2012; Huys, Guitart-Masip, Dolan, & Dayan, 2015; Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016).
Law and Gold (2009) have applied RL to the study of perceptual learning. They argue
that perceptual learning can be driven by a reinforcement signal that generates a selective
readout of the sensory neurons that are most informative for any given perceptual deci-
sion. In Law and Gold (2008a), which we describe in Chapter 2 as the basis for the work
we present there, Law and Gold (2008a) trained NHPs to decide the direction of motion
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in a RDK and then respond with an eye movement saccade. In their study, Law and Gold
(2008a) describe how the monkeys learn an association between the correct saccadic re-
sponse and the motion of the RDK, even when the motion signal was relatively weak.
As we describe in Chapter 2, the improved perceptual learning corresponded to changes
in LIP neurons. The LIP area is known to involve decision making and reward process-
ing. Law and Gold (2008a) propose that RL signals establish functional connections from
sensory neurons in the MT area to a LIP decision neurons. These LIP neurons interpret
the sensory information in order to determine the correct eye movement response. Law
and Gold (2008a) further argue that during perceptual learning, RL signals continue to
strengthen the connections between the most informative sensory neurons and the LIP
area.
Law and Gold (2008a) model the above described process as follows. First, the MT
area neurons are modelled as a set of n = 7200 neurons, each of which respond to a
specific direction of motion uniformly distributed from 0◦ to 360◦. The direction-of-
motion signal of these n neurons at time t is represented by
xt1,x
t
2 . . .x
t
i . . .x
t
n.
The LIP area accumulates these signals at time t into one cumulative variable vt as follows:
vt =
n
∑
i=1
wtix
t
i
where
xti = motion driven activity of neuron i at trial t
and
wti = weight given to neuron i at trial t.
If vt is positive, this represents an average rightward motion. If vt is negative, this repre-
sents an average leftward motion.
The weight vector
wt = wt1,w
t
2 . . .w
t
i . . .w
t
n,
is initially, i.e. at time t = 0, random. The update of the weight vector from trial t to trial
t+1 is as follows:
wt+1 = wt +∆wt .
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In other words, we have 
wt+11
wt+12
...
wt+1n
=

wt1
wt2
...
wtn
+

∆wt1
∆wt2
...
∆wtn
 (3.1)
Here, ∆wt is based on difference between expected and actual reward. In particular,
∆wt = αCt× (rt− et)xt
where α is a learning rate, and Ct the directional response that is made at time t, i.e.
Ct ∈ {−1,1}, with Ct =−1 being a left response and Ct = 1 being a right response. Given
that vt is the motion-direction response at time t, with positive values of vt indicating more
rightwards movement and the negative values of yt indicating more leftwards movement,
then Ct is defined as follows:
Ct =Φ(vt > 0),
where Φ(·) is a threshold function that takes on the value of 1 is its argument is positive
and −1 if its argument is negative.
Crucially, on each trial, the monkey gets a reward rt depending on whether its response
is correct or not. If the response is correct, the reward is signified by rt = 1 and if the
response is incorrect, the reward is rt = 0. Finally, the term et is the expectation of a
reward at time t. This is given by
et =
1
1+ e−β |vt |
.
Note that as the absolute value of vt increases et increases. Its rate of increase is controlled
by the free parameter β . Therefore, et represents the confidence that a reward will be
obtained and this rises when the cumulative signal vt becomes increasingly positive or
increasingly negative (signifying, respectively, stronger rightward and stronger leftward
motion).
On each trial t, after each weight update, the weight vector is re-normalized by divid-
ing each wti by
wti← wti
/√∑ni=1(wti)2
wamp
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where wamp was a chosen constant. This guarantees that on all trials, the sum of the
squared weight vector will always be equal to wamp. The normalization occurs at each
trial t and applies to the vector of n = 7200 weights at each trial t.
3.1.1 Extension of Law and Gold (2008a) by Kahnt et al. (2011)
Kahnt et al. (2011) have extended the work of Law and Gold (2008a) to make it appli-
cable to work with humans and neuroimaging experiments. We illustrate this model in
Figure 3.1. As with Law and Gold (2008a), Kahnt et al. (2011) represent the input stim-
ulus at time t by xt . In this case, however, xt is a scalar rather than a vector quantity. It
represents the orientation of the perceptual stimulus in a visual orientation discrimination
task done by humans in an FMRI study. Analogously, to the vt of Law and Gold (2008a),
in Kahnt et al. (2011), the decision variable at time t
vt = xt ·wt ,
which is clearly a weighting of the input stimulus.
In Law and Gold (2008a), we saw that the behavioural response was a deterministic
function of the decision variable vt . In the case of Kahnt et al. (2011), the binary response
is probabilistic. In particular, the probability of right is given by
pt =
1
1+ e−β (vt−c)
,
and so the probability of left is given by 1− pt . The reward at time t, i.e., rt takes on
the value of 1 is the response is correct and zero if the response is incorrect. The reward
prediction error at time t is
δt = rt− et ,
where et is the expectation of a reward at time t and is given by
et =
1
1+ e−β |vt−c|
.
The weight variable is then updated as
wt+1 = wt +α ·δt ,
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Stimulus Decision variable Perceptual choice
Update perceptual weight Reward prediction Reward (feedback)
Reward prediction error
Figure 3.1: Kahnt’s reinforcement learning model of perceptual learning. The subject’s de-
cision variable at time t, vt , is a weighting of the sensory information, which in our case is
xt ∈ {−2,−1,1,2}, weighted by wt . The DVt is then converted into probability of a response.
The higher this probability, the higher the probability that subject makes a "face" response. The
lower this probability, the higher the probability that subject makes a "car" response. The model
updates the weight on each iteration based on whether the subject is correct or not in their response.
where α is the learning rate. Note that in this model, there are 4 free parameters: the
learning rate α , the sensory gain parameter β , the sensory offset parameter c, and the
initial value of the weight, i.e. w0.
3.2 Modelling face versus car perceptual learning
Following Kahnt et al. (2011), we use a RL model to model how feedback leads to in-
creased accuracy of responses over the trials in the learning task described in Chapter
2.
Assuming that the stimulus presented on trial t is denoted by xt , then following the
Kahnt et al. (2011) model, the probability of “face” response is
pt = P(response = face|trial = t) = 11+ e−β ·(vt−c) , where vt = xt ·wt .
In our case, the xt stimulus variable codes high coherence faces, low coherence faces, low
coherence cars, and high coherence cars as the values 2,1,−1,2, respectively1. Starting
1In coding our stimuli as such, we are making simplifying assumptions such as that the perceived dif-
ference between the low and high coherence faces is the same as the perceived difference between the low
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with a constant value of the weight variable trial t = 0, our RL model updates the value of
w1,w2,w3 · · ·wT exactly as in Kahnt et al. (2011):
wt+1 = wt +α ·δt
where
δt = rt− et , et = 11+ e−β ·|vt−c| .
Here, rt signifies the feedback that they receive on trial t, i.e. rt = 0 if they are correct and
rt = 1 if they are incorrect. As with Kahnt et al. (2011), we have free parameters, α , β , c,
w0.
Model performance was quantified in terms of the discrepancy between the behavioural
accuracy of the subject and the model’s accuracy, i.e.,
Ω, |Subject accuracylow−Model accuracylow|+|Subject accuracyhigh−Model accuracyhigh|.
Here, the accuracies are calculated separately for the low coherence trials, i.e. where
xt ∈ {−1,1}, and the high coherence trials, where xt ∈ {−2,2}, with these accuracies for
the model calculated by
Model accuracylow = ∑
{t : xt=1}
pt + ∑
{t : xt=−1}
qt ,
Model accuracyhigh = ∑
{t : xt=2}
pt + ∑
{t : xt=−2}
qt ,
with pt being the model’s probability of a “face” response, defined above, and qt = 1− pt
being the model’s probability of a “car” response.
As in Kahnt et al. (2011), the variables α , β , c and w0 were free parameters that
had to be optimized for each model. This was accomplished by finding the values that
minimized Ω by an exhaustive search over a grid of value ranges for each variables.
In particular, for each subject on each of the three days of learning, we searched α
over a grid of N = 30 values from 0.001 to 2.00; we searched β over a grid of N values
from 0.001 to 5.00; we searched c over a grid of N values from −2 to 2.00; we searched
and high coherence cars, and also that all the face and car stimuli can be represented on a one-dimensional
continuum. Although we acknowledge that these are simplifying assumptions, and as such, we must be
mindful of these when drawing any substantive conclusions from the model, nonetheless in any computa-
tional modelling, simplifying assumptions are inevitable.
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w0 over a grid of N values from 0.001 to 5.00. We chose these ranges, and the number of
values of these ranges, after extensive experimentation with different possibilities.
3.3 Results of modelling face versus car perceptual
learning
The average (with standard error in brackets) of free parameters over subjects are as fol-
lows, where we also present the average error Ω per day:
day α β c w0 Ω
1 0.34 (0.10) 3.93 (0.27) -0.03 (0.02) 0.86 (0.07) 0.02 (<0.01)
2 0.62 (0.16) 3.58 (0.42) -0.14 (0.12) 0.60 (0.09) 0.03 (0.01)
3 0.63 (0.13) 3.84 (0.35) 0.03 (0.04) 1.04 (0.32) 0.03 (0.01)
We found a highly significant correlation between the behavioural accuracy of each
subject on each day of training and the average accuracy of the model (r= 0.95, p< 0.01),
see Figure 3.2a. Also, in Figure 3.2, we show the relationship, for one representative
subject over the three days of learning, between the RL model’s decision variable (Fig-
ure 3.2b) and the time course of the early temporal component’s y variable (Figure 3.2c)
and the late temporal component’s y variable (Figure 3.2d). From these plots, we note that
there is an apparently stronger resemblance between the RL model’s decision variable and
the late y variable than with the early y variable.
3.3.1 Analysis of the y variable
The primary focus of our analysis was to determine if there was a relationship between
the decision variable in the RL model and the y decision variable that was obtained from
the single trial EEG analysis. In Figure 3.3, we provide a plot of the relationship between
the RL model’s decision variable and the early and late component values for each subject.
In order to assess whether there was a closer correspondence between the RL model’s
decision variable and the early or late y variable, we perform a model comparison. The
following multilevel linear regression of how the vt varies as a function of yearlyt was used:
vt = αht +βht y
early
t + εt
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Figure 3.2: Reinforcement learning model for perceptual choices. (a) Scatter plot showing the
correlation between the performance of all subjects and models, over the three training days and
the two levels of stimulus phase coherence (low and high). (b) An example of trial-wise values
of the decision variable from the RL model over the three days (from blue, green to red) for one
subject (288 trials per day). (c) Individual y variable from the early temporal component for a
representative subject over the course of the three training days (from blue, green to red), with
288 trials per day. (d) Individual y variable from the late temporal component for a representative
subject over the course of the three training days (from blue, green to red), 288 trials per day.
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Figure 3.3: Reinforcement learning model for perceptual choices for each subject. Correlation
between the RL model’s decision variable with the y variable for the early temporal component
and for the late temporal component, for all 14 subjects, averaged over all trail.
where
α j ∼ N(a,τ2a ), β j ∼ N(b,τ2b )
are random effects on the intercept and slope that account for inter-subject variability in
the model. A similar multilevel linear regression of how the decision variable varies as a
function of ylatet was then estimated:
vt = αht +βht y
late
t + εt
where the random effects are defined as above. Fitting these two models using R (lme4
package), we obtain
• BIC for early model: 51652.01.
• BIC for late model: 51525.85.
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As before, we calculate the log Bayes factor as
−(BIClate− BICearly)/2 = 63.07
and so 2×log(Bayes Factor)= 126.15. As noted on in Section 2.4.4 (page 47), using the
widely used rules presented in Kass and Raftery (1995), if 2× log(Bayes Factor)> 10,
this is very strong evidence in favour of the late component being a better predictor than
the early component of the RL model’s decision variable.
3.4 Extensions
The model and analysis we have presented here have been extended by F. Queirazza, M.
Philiastides and Diaz, J., and the results were presented in Diaz et al. (2017). In what
follows, we describe this model following the description in Diaz et al. (2017)2.
In the new model, as was the case above, perceptual decisions were driven by a de-
cision variable denoting the subject’s hidden representations of the association between
sensory evidence and stimulus category. The strength of the decision variable was mod-
ulated by dynamic updates of category-specific perceptual weights based on feedback
information, thereby accounting for potential differences in learning trajectories between
the stimulus categories. Compared with previous work just described that used a single
stimulus-invariant perceptual weight (Law & Gold, 2009; Kahnt et al., 2011), the in-
troduction of category-specific perceptual weights was designed to capture subject-wise
choice biases, in that subjects might have a choice bias towards cars or faces and likewise
might display an increasing ability to recognize cars or faces throughout the task.
In addition, the perceptual weights comprised signal and noise weights. While the
former were designated to enhance stimulus representations in the course of learning, the
latter accounted for the interference exerted by the antagonistic stimulus against the ac-
quisition of the correct sensory associations. Thus, in this model, perceptual learning is
expected to occur through gradually increasing signal weights as well as gradually de-
creasing noise weights. Compared with previous reinforcement-learning-like perceptual
models (Law & Gold, 2009; Kahnt et al., 2011), this better captures instances whereby
2The purpose of presenting these additional analyses is because they based on some different modelling
details, and as such they may provide some valuable new perspectives on the analyses just described.
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improved task performance depends both on greater ability to recognize a given stimu-
lus and on greater ability to rule out the antagonistic stimulus. In other words, on a face
trial, subjects might correctly choose face partly because they are able to identify face-like
features and partly because they are able to recognize that there are no car-like features.
As perceptual learning progresses, the estimates of signal and noise weights grow
apart. As a result, the readout of sensory evidence is increasingly enhanced, reflecting the
improving ability to discriminate between perceptual stimuli in the course of training.
This model was fitted to individual participant data and found a highly significant
correspondence between the model’s accuracy predictions and actual behaviour (r=0.88,
p < 0.01; see Figure 3.4 a). Consistent with an enhanced readout of sensory evidence, a
subject-wise gradual build-up in the trial-by-trial estimates of the decision variables was
observed (see Figure 3.4 b). Correspondingly, a gradual increase in the model’s signal
weights were observed (see Figure 3.4 c). Between-day comparisons (1 versus 2, and 2
versus 3) of subject-wise mean decision variables (paired t-test: 1 vs 2 t(13)=6.77, p <
0.01; 2 vs 3 t(13)=-2.36, p=0.02; see Figure 3.4 d, e), and aggregate perceptual weights
(signal weights: paired t-test: 1 vs 2 t(13) =-6.74, p < 0.01; 2 vs 3 t(13) =-2.36, p=0.02;
noise weights: paired t-test: 1 vs 2 t(13)=6.74, p < 0.01; 2 vs 3 t(13)=2.35, p=0.02)
revealed a significant effect of learning as observed in behaviour.
To offer neurobiological validity to the model, the single-trial decision variables es-
timated by the model were compared with the EEG component amplitudes that were ob-
tained in the accompanying EEG experiments, described in Chapter 2. It was predicted
that if the brain computes a version of the model-based decision variables to drive choices
then one should observe a systematic amplification of the decision variable with train-
ing and a significant correlation with our late EEG component shown to index decision
evidence. To this end, another regression analysis was run whereby the single-trial ampli-
tudes of our early and late components were used to predict the model’s decision variables.
It was found that our late component was both a reliable predictor of the model’s decision
variables (Figure 3.4 f; t-test, t(13)=21.81, p < 0.01) and a significantly better predictor
than the early component (Figure 3.4 f; paired t-test, t(13)=3.06, p=0.01).
Second, trials were separated into four bins (quartiles) based on the model-predicted
magnitudes of the prediction error (PE) signal, which is thought to guide learning. A
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Figure 3.4: Extended reinforcement learning model for perceptual choices. (a) Scatter plot
showing the correlation between the performance of individual subjects and models, over the
three training days and the two levels of stimulus phase coherence (using the winning model).
(b) Individual trial estimates of the model’s decision variable for a representative subject over
the course of the three training days, superimposed on the amount of stimulus-defined sensory
evidence (black trace). (c) Signal (positive) and noise (negative) perceptual weights for faces
(solid lines) and cars (dashed lines) over the three training days for the same subject shown in b.
(d) Average magnitude of the model’s decision variables across subjects over the course of the
three training days. Individual subject data are also shown as point estimates. (e) Average signal
(positive) and noise (negative) perceptual weights for faces (brightly coloured bars, left) and cars
(faintly coloured bars, right) over the three training days. Individual subject data are also shown as
point estimates. (f) Average regression coefficients (betas) reflecting the trial-by-trial association
between the model’s decision variables and the amplitudes of the early and late EEG components
estimated over all training days. Individual subject data are also shown as point estimates.
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single-trial discriminant analysis was then run on feedback-locked EEG data between the
very low and very high PE trial groups (that is, the middle two quartiles as were kept as
’test’ data). This analysis revealed a centroparietal EEG component peaking on average
at 354 ms post-feedback (Figure 3.5a). The timing and topography of this component are
consistent with previous work on feedback-related processing in the human brain using a
probabilistic reversal learning task (Fouragnan, Retzler, Mullinger, & Philiastides, 2015;
Philiastides, Biele, Vavatzanidis, Kazzer, & Heekeren, 2010). To test whether this EEG
component was parametrically modulated by the magnitude of the PE signal, discrimi-
nator amplitudes (y) were computed for trials with intermediate magnitude levels (those
left out from the original discrimination analysis). Specifically, the spatial filter of the
window that resulted in the highest discrimination performance for the extreme PE mag-
nitude levels was applied to the EEG data with intermediate values. It was expected that
these ’unseen’ trials to show a parametric response profile such that the resulting mean
component amplitude at the time of peak discrimination would proceed from very low
< low < high < very high PE magnitude. Using this approach, it was demonstrated that
the mean discriminator output for each quartile increased as a function of the model’s PE
magnitude (all pair-wise t-test comparisons across adjacent trial groups: p values <0.01;
Figure 3.5b), thereby establishing a concrete link between the model’s PE estimates and
the feedback-related EEG component.
Taken together, these findings provide further evidence that perceptual learning en-
hances decision-related evidence, probably through a reinforcement-learning-like mech-
anism.
3.5 Discussion
The RL model of the behavioural data has implications for our understanding of the re-
lationship between general reward based learning and decision making mechanisms in
perceptual learning. Law and Gold (2009) show that the results reported in Law and Gold
(2008a) can be explained in terms of RL. They modelled the connections between the sen-
sory neurons in the MT area and the decision making centre of LIP, and used a RL signal
to modify the connections between these two areas. This explanation was corroborated
65
aP< 0.01A z
0.7
0.6
0.5 −1
0
1
1 2 3 4
b
0 400 800
Feedback-locked time (ms) PE magnitude (quartiles)
y 
Figure 3.5: Electrophysiological correlates of prediction error (PE). (a) Multivariate discrimi-
nator performance (Az) during very low versus very high PE magnitude trials on feedback-locked
EEG responses averaged across subjects and days revealing a late PE component. Discriminator
performance and component peak times were comparable across the three days. The dotted line
represents the average Az value leading to a significance level of p = 0.01, estimated using a boot-
strap test. Faint lines represent individual subject data. Inset: average scalp topography associated
with the PE component, estimated at the time of subject-specific maximum discrimination. (b)
Mean discriminator amplitude (y) for the PE component, binned in four quartiles based on model-
based estimates of the magnitude of the PE, showing a clear parametric response along the four
trial groups. Quartiles 1 and 4 were used to train the classifier, while quartiles 2 and 3 contain
‘unseen’ data with intermediate PE magnitude levels. Individual subject data are also shown as
point estimates.
by the work of Kahnt et al. (2011) who trained subjects on in a visual discrimination task
where feedback was given. Their behavioural results are well modelled by a RL model
that changes how the sensory information is interpreted.
Consistent with previous accounts (Law & Gold, 2009; Kahnt et al., 2011) we also
showed that the learning-induced behavioural improvements in the visual discrimination
task that we presented in in Chapter 2 and Diaz et al. (2017) could be reliably explained in
terms of a RL mechanism. More specifically, we showed that a model that uses a predic-
tion error signal (Rushworth, Mars, & Summerfield, 2009; Schultz et al., 1997; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006) to continuously adjust
the stimulus specific perceptual weights on the sensory evidence (Guggenmos, Wilbertz,
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Hebart, & Sterzer, 2016) led to amplification of the relevant stimulus representations in
the course of training (making them more robust to noise). We further demonstrated that
trial-by-trial changes in our late EEG component shown to index decision evidence reli-
ably tracked the amplification of sensory information predicted by the model. These re-
sults imply that perceptual learning involves an enhanced readout of sensory information
during decision making likely via a RL-like process, endorsing the view of a domain-
general learning mechanism (Rushworth et al., 2009). Although it is true that our task
did not involve any explicit reward as a reinforcer, we view the implicit rewarding nature
of correct response as a ’teaching signal’ for strengthening the neural representation of
sensory contingencies (Guggenmos et al., 2016).
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Chapter 4
The neural signatures of the role of
prior expectation in perceptual
decision making
4.1 Introduction
In natural environments, perceptual stimuli do not occur in isolation or independently of
their temporal and spatial context. As such, prior expectation — or the expectation of the
properties or identity of a stimulus based on its temporal or spatial context – will affect
the speed and accuracy of perceptual decision making. This has been repeatedly demon-
strated behaviourally (e.g., Bar, 2004; Oliva & Torralba, 2007; Fiser & Aslin, 2002).
However, as we have described in Chapter 1, the neurobiological mechanisms underlying
how expectations affect perceptual decision making are not well understood. In particular,
there is an open question concerning whether prior expectation affects the baseline activ-
ity or the evidence accumulation in an accumulation-to-bound decision making system,
i.e. one that could be modelled by a sequential sampling model. As we have described in
more detail in Chapter 1, studies with human and NHPs done by Basso and Wurtz (1998);
de Lange et al. (2013); Albright (2012); Puri et al. (2009) point to the locus of prior ex-
pectations being related to changes in baseline activity of the decision making systems.
However, in a study using NHPs by Hanks et al. (2011), it was shown that the rate of
firing of LIP neurons — known to integrate sensory signals towards a decision threshold
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— increased with increasing match between the prior expectation and the actual observed
stimuli. EEG results with human subjects by Cravo et al. (2013) also point to the role of
prior expectation in affecting the efficiency of information accumulation, specifically by
modulating the signal-to-noise gain of visual processing. Behaviourally consistent results
with human subjects have been reported by Dunovan et al. (2014), who demonstrated that
the primary role of prior expectation is to bias the rate of evidence accumulation favouring
the more probable stimulus category.
On the basis of the work described in for example Philiastides and Sajda (2006); Phil-
iastides et al. (2006a); Ratcliff et al. (2009b); Philiastides et al. (2006a), and from our
work in Diaz et al. (2017) and in Chapter 2 of this thesis, we argue that there are two
main temporal EEG components in perceptual decision making. The early component
is involved in sensory encoding, while the late component is the neural signature of the
post-sensory, decision-relevant evidence. As such, and if prior expectation affects in-
formation accumulation for decision making, in a perceptual decision making task, we
should observe the late temporal component, but not the early one, being affected by the
prior probability of the stimulus as indicated by a pre-stimulus cue. Importantly, we also
expect an interaction between prior probability of the stimulus and learning. In particular,
we predict that as the role of cues become more fully learned, the late temporal compo-
nent, but not the early temporal component, will vary with the increasing match between
the prior expectation and the actual observed stimulus. In other words, on those trials
where the pre-stimulus cue predicts the stimulus that does in fact occur (e.g., when the
cue predicts a face and a face image occurs, or when the cue predicts a car and a car image
occurs), we should see stronger values in the late temporal component compared to those
trials where the pre-stimulus cue predicts a stimulus that does not then occur (e.g. when
the cue predicts a face but a car image occurs, or when the cue predicts a car but a face
image occurs). By contrast, we do not predict any such effect on the early component.
Therefore, the aim of the present research is to investigate the neural signatures of
the effect of prior expectation in perceptual decision making. This will be accomplished
using a combination of single-trial EEG analysis, regression modelling of speed and accu-
racy response data, and also diffusion modelling of these behavioural results (following
Dunovan et al., 2014). In this chapter, we will present the results of the EEG analysis and
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speed and accuracy regression modelling. In Chapter 5, on the other hand, we provide the
full details of the diffusion modelling.
In the behavioural task, we will follow an identical paradigm used in our previous
studies: Subjects will perform a perceptual discrimination task, i.e., face/car discrimi-
nation, over the course of three days; two different levels of stimulus noise will be used.
However, in addition, at the start of each trial one of three different cues (see below for de-
tails) will be presented. Each of these cues has an associated probability of the upcoming
stimulus being a face or a car.
In terms of the behavioural responses, we predict a decrease in reaction time and an
increase in accuracy with the increasing match between prior expectation and the ob-
served stimulus. We also predict that the effects just mentioned will emerge gradually
over the course of the three days. In other words, the will be relatively weak on the first
day, stronger by the second, and strongest by the third. Finally, we predict that there will
be an interaction between the effects of cue probability and training day. In particular, the
effect of the prior expectation will be decrease with increased training. This particular
prediction derives from Bayesian principle that prior information should influence deci-
sion making more when most when sensory evidence is weaker (e.g. Bogacz et al., 2006).
More importantly, however, on the basis of the EEG single-trial analysis, we predict that
when these cues are fully learned, consistent with Hanks et al. (2011), the strength and
variability of the late temporal component, but not the early temporal component, will
vary with the increasing match between the prior expectation and the actual observed
stimulus.
4.2 Materials and Methods
4.2.1 Subjects
16 Subjects (5 men and 11 women, age range 21-35 years) participated in this study.
Each subject performed the experiment on three consecutive days. This entailed that
there were a total of 48 EEG testing sessions. All participants were right handed, reported
normal vision and no history of neurological problems. Informed consent was obtained
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from all participants in accordance with the guidelines of the Institute of Neuroscience
and Psychology from Glasgow University.
4.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were selected from the same stimulus set described in e.g., Philiastides and
Sajda (2006, 2007) and that were used in the experiments described in Chapter 2 and in
the pilot experiments of this chapter. As such, we will not repeat their details here, but
see Section 2.2.2 on Page 25.
4.2.3 Behavioural Task
The behavioural task is shown in Figure 4.1a. Subjects were presented with the stimuli
just described and preformed a two alternative forced choice classification task whereby
they classified each image as either a face or a car. Subjects sat a distance of 75 cm from
the computer monitor. At the start of each trial, a text-based cue was displayed for a
duration of 750 ms. There were three different cues: 30C/70F, 50C/50F, 70C/30F. Each
one stated the probability that the upcoming stimulus would be either a Face or a Car. For
example, 30C/70F indicates that the probability of Car is 30% and the probability of a
Face is 70%. After the cue, a blank screen was displayed for a random duration that ranged
uniformly between 1.0 to 1.5 seconds. The stimulus image was then presented for 50
milliseconds and subjects were given up to 1250 milliseconds to make their classification
response, which was done using a USB button box using their right hand’s index (for face
response) and middle (for car response) fingers. No feedback was given about whether the
response was correct or incorrect. The trials were presented in 5 blocks of 72 trials, with a
60 second rest period between each block. The entire experiment lasted approximately 25
minutes. Each subject performed this task on three consecutive days. With the experiment
taking place at the same time on each day so that there was 24 hours between each session
for all subjects. On the first day, subjects performed a practice session of the face/car
classification task but with a different set of face and car images.
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Figure 4.1: Experimental design and behavioural analysis. (a) Schematic representation of
the experimental paradigm. The behavioural task in the EEG experiment involved verifying if
noisy stimuli were either faces or cars. Subjects had to categorize a noisy image presented for
50 ms as a face or a car and indicate their choice with a button press within 1,250 ms following
the stimulus presentation. Prior to stimulus onset, a cue was shown that had a fixed probability
of being followed by a face or car stimulus, followed by an inter-stimulus interval that varied
randomly between 1 and 1.5s. Subjects performed this task on three consecutive training days. A
sample face image (upper row) and car image (lower row) at the two levels of phase coherence
used in the task (32.5% and 37.5%) are shown on the right. (b) Average accuracy as a function of
pre-stimulus cue for the two stimulus types (face: blue; car: red), two coherence levels (high &
low) over the three days of learning across all 16 subjects. (c) Average reaction time for accurate
responses as a function of pre-stimulus cue for the two stimulus types (face: blue; car: red),
coherence level (high & low), and three training days across all 16 subjects.
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4.2.4 EEG Data Acquisition
Subjects performed the task on three consecutive days, in a dark and soundproof room.
As they performed the task, their EEG was recorded with a 64 channel Ag/Agcl scalp
electrode actiCAP EEG system (Brain Products GmnH, Gilching, Germany). The active
ground electrode was placed just below the Pz electrode of the International 10-20 system
method. The active references electrode was placed on the left mastoid. The impedance
was always below 5kOhm for each subject on each day. The EEG signal was acquaired in
an identical manner to that described in Section 2.2.4 on Page 27.
4.2.5 Single Trial EEG Data Analysis
We preformed single trial discriminant analysis in order to describe how temporal dynam-
ics of decision making changes as a consequence of perceptual learning. Here, we fol-
lowed the identical procedure described in the experiments in Chapter 2, which was based
closely on the paradigm that has been established in previous studies by Philiastides et al.
to identify the neural signatures of perceptual decisions. Given that we have described
this procedure in depth above, we will not repeat its details here, but see Section 2.2.5 on
Page 27.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Behavioural analysis
In the analysis of the behavioural data, see Figure 4.1b-c (page 72), the model fit measure
that we will use here is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). AIC is defined as follows:
−2logL+2Q,
where L is the likelihood of the model at its maximum likelihood estimator and Q is
the number of parameters in the model. AIC can be seen as an approximation to cross-
validation (see, e.g., Fang, 2011). Cross-validation is a measure of out-of-sample model
generalization that holds-out a sub-sample of the data and assesses how well a fitted model
can predict the held-out data. Usually, multiple alternative held-out data-sets are used,
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with each one being predicted by the model fitted to the not held-out data. The overall
predictive accuracy measure is then based on the average over the predicted accuracy cal-
culated on each alternative held-out data-set. Being an approximation to cross-validation,
AIC can be used as a measure of how well any given model will generalize to new data
that is assumed to have been generated by the same probabilistic generative process that
generated the original data set . Like other so-called information criteria such as BIC or
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC), the higher the value of AIC, the poorer the model
fit measure. In other words, lower values of AIC indicates better model fit.
In all analyses, whether of the accuracy or reaction time, there are 4 main predictor
variables: stimulus type, cue probability, coherence level, and day of learning. There are
potentially many interaction between these predictors: one four-way interaction, 4 three-
way interactions, 6 two-way interactions, and 4 main effects. Some or many of these
interactions may be redundant. In order to identify a minimal model without redundant
predictors, we use a backward elimination process. Starting with the full model, i.e. the
model with all possible interactions, we calculate its AIC value, and then drop higher-
order interaction terms if doing so does not lead to any substantial increase in the AIC
value. We then proceed to drop the next highest interaction terms and so on until no
change in AIC occurs when any additional term is dropped. Note that an increase in AIC
of 4 or more is required for the dropped term to be seen as non-redundant. In this, we are
following the general advice of Burnham and Anderson (2003).
Accuracy analysis
In Figure 4.1b,we plot the average accuracy per cue for high and low coherence trials and
for faces and cars.
In the following table, we show the AIC of the full logistic regression model for accu-
racy, and the same model with the four-way interaction term dropped.
Full model Drop 4-way interaction
10984 10983
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Clearly, dropping the 4-way interaction does not lead to an increase in the AIC value
and so the model without the 4-way interaction is preferred. We now drop the three-way
terms individually and calculate the AIC values of the resulting models:
Full three-way model Drop stim x prob x coh Drop stim x prob x day
10983 10981 10983
Drop stim x coh x day Drop prob x coh x day
10982 10981
From this, we see that dropping all three-way interaction terms also does not lead to
any increase in AIC, and so all of these terms can be treated as redundant and dropped
with loss of model effectiveness.
Full two-way model Drop stim x prob Drop stim x coh Drop stim x day
10980 11053 11048 10994
Drop prob x coh Drop prob x day Drop coh x day
10979 10978 10978
Here, we see that the pairwise interaction between stimulus and probability, stimulus
and coherence, stimulus and day all result in a notable increase in AIC and as such need
to be preserved in the model. On the other hand, we may drop, without loss, the pair-
wise interaction between probability and coherence, probability and day of learning, and
coherence and day of learning.
Proceeding with this reduced model, the coefficients for the fixed effect terms are as
follows:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 2.43 0.26 9.39 < 0.01
stimulusface -0.99 0.21 -4.64 < 0.01
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probability -1.59 0.25 -6.41 < 0.01
coherencelow -0.14 0.08 -1.80 0.07
day 0.50 0.05 10.04 < 0.01
stimulusface:probability 2.81 0.32 8.70 < 0.01
stimulusface:coherencelow -0.91 0.10 -8.65 < 0.01
stimulusface:day -0.26 0.06 -4.13 < 0.01
This analysis reveals the effect of cue probability on accuracy. There is a significant
increase in the probability of an accurate response for the car stimuli as the probability of
car stimuli on the upcoming trials, as indicated by the cue, increases, i.e. coefficient for
the “probability” coefficient (with car being the base category for the stimulus variable) is
-1.59, p< 0.01. Note that the negative slope shows that as the probability of the upcoming
stimulus being a face increases, which means the probability of the upcoming stimulus
being a car decreases, the accuracy of recognizing a car decreases. Likewise, there is a
significant change in this effect of the cue probability for the face stimuli. In particular, the
slope changes from -1.59 to (-1.59 + 2.81) = 1.22, and this change is significant, p< 0.01.
Also of note is that there is an increase in accuracy with each day of learning. This occurs
for car stimuli, with the coefficient being 0.50, p < 0.01. For face stimuli, the coefficient
changes to (0.50 + -0.26) = 0.23, and the 95% confidence interval for this new slope is
from 0.11 to 0.36. There is also a general decrease in accuracy for face stimuli, with the
coefficient being -0.99, p < 0.01.
Reaction time analysis
In Figure 4.1c, we show the average reaction time as a function of our three predictor
variables, using only the data from accurate trials.
Given that 88% of trials were answered accurately, we will focus our analysis on only
the accurate trials. As for the accuracy analysis, we begin our analysis by dropping re-
dundant terms. For this, we will take advantage of the step command in the lmerTest
R package that allows for automatic backward elimination of terms in linear random ef-
fects models (Note that this was not an option for use with the random effects logistic
regression for the accuracy analysis above).
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Below, we show the coefficients of the optimal model that results from this elimination
procedure:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -0.47 0.03 18.81 -13.63 < 0.01
stimulusface 0.05 0.01 15114 4.57 < 0.01
probability 0.16 0.01 15113 10.56 <0.01
coherencelow 0.01 <0.01 15124 1.51 0.13
day -0.08 <0.01 15108 -37.60 <0.01
stimulusface:probability -0.36 0.02 15110 -17.01 <0.01
stimulusface:coherencelow 0.08 0.01 15120 11.41 <0.01
These results closely parallel those of the accuracy analysis. This analysis clearly
shows the effect of the cue probability on reaction time. There is a significant decrease in
reaction time for the car stimuli as the probability of car stimuli on the upcoming trials,
as indicated by the cue, increases, i.e. coefficient for the “probability” coefficient (again
“car” is the base category for the stimulus variable) is 0.16, p< 0.01. Likewise, there is a
significant change in this effect of the cue probability for the face stimuli. In particular, the
slope changes from 0.16 to (0.16 + -0.36) = -0.21, and this change is significant, p< 0.01.
As before, there is an average decrease in reaction with each day of learning. This occurs
for both face and car stimuli, with the coefficient for car being -0.07, p < 0.01, and there
is no change to this effect for face stimuli. We note also that there is a significant increase
reaction time with low coherence images for face stimuli, with the interaction effect being
0.07, p < 0.01.
4.3.2 EEG Analysis
We carried out a face versus car, stimulus onset locked, discrimination analysis. This
is the identical kind of discrimination analysis that was done for the first project, i.e. as
described in Chapter 2. The Az value that shows how well the EEG signal discriminates
between face and car stimuli at each millisecond after the onset of the stimulus is show
in Figure 4.2a. Note, the darker lines show the average over all the subjects. In the
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background, we show the Az values from the discrimination analysis from each individual
subject. Although any individual line is difficult to make out clearly, the purpose of this
is to show the variation in Az time-series across subjects.
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Figure 4.2: Effects of prior information on perceptual learning and decision making. (a)
Multivariate discriminator performance (Az) during face-versus-car outcome discrimination of
stimulus-locked EEG responses across the three training days (1: blue; 2: green; 3: red), aver-
aged across all 16 subjects, showing the presence of the early and late components. Faint lines
represent individual subject data. (b) Average discriminator performance and scalp topographies
for the early (blue) and late (light red) components across the three training days estimated at
the time of subject-specific maximum discrimination (Az). Faint lines represent individual sub-
ject data. (c) Boxplots showing the average discriminator performance for the early (blue) and
late (light red) components across the three training days estimated at the time of subject-specific
maximum discrimination (Az). (d) Boxplots showing the average onset times for the early (blue)
and late (light red) components across the three training days.
As can be seen, there are two1 peaks or temporal components on each day (the boot-
strap calculated threshold for significance at the p < 0.01 level is 0.55). These are iden-
1It may be arguable that there is, in fact, a third component in this figure, e.g., around 500-600ms. This
is largely an artifact of the averaging process over all the subjects on all the days because some components
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tical to the components that we have described in details in Chapter 2 and in Diaz et al.
(2017). The first is the early temporal component and this occurs around 200 ms. As
described previously, this is related to the sensory encoding found in previous work (see,
e.g., Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2006a; Ratcliff et al., 2009b; Phil-
iastides et al., 2006a). The other temporal component is the late temporal component and
this occurs around 400 ms. As described previously, this is related to post-sensory deci-
sion making (see, e.g., Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2006a; Ratcliff et
al., 2009b; Philiastides et al., 2006a).
From this discrimination analysis, for each subject on each day, we extract the Az
value and onset time of both the early and the late peak. We will first analyse whether the
Az value changes with day of learning for both the early and late components. We then
analyse how the onset times of the early and late components differ.
Change in component magnitude by day
In Figure 4.2c, we provide boxplots of the distributions of Az values for the early and late
components on each of the three days of the experiment. In Figure 4.2b, we provide the
same information via line plots with the scalpmaps superimposed.
We statistically analyse the change the Az value by performing, for the early and late
component, a separate random effects linear regression with day of learning as the pre-
dictor variable and varying intercept random effect for each subject. Specifically, for both
the early and the late components, we use the following model:
Azi = β0+β1xi+ γ[subjecti]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
where Azi is the Az value for a particular observation, xi is the value of the day for that
observation, and subjecti is the subject for that observation. We assume that the γ values
are normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation of σsubject. We then assess
whether there is a significant effect of day for the early and late components.
for some subjects on some days occur a bit later than others. We can observe stronger early discrimination
in some subjects than in others. However, we do not observe that the early component moves earlier in time
like we have observed for the late temporal component in both experiments. These are simply individual
differences for the early temporal component.
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The fixed effects coefficients for the late component analysis are:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.66 0.02 40.37 30.02 <0.01
day 0.02 0.01 29 2.91 0.01
and for the early component analysis, the corresponding results are:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.59 0.02 38.61 25.67 <0.01
day 0.01 0.01 29 0.61 0.54
From this, we observe that the Az value for the late component rises by approximately
0.02 per day, and that this is a significant effect, t(29) = 2.91, p = 0.01. For the early
component on the other hand, the Az value rises by approximately 0.01 per day, but this
is not a significant effect, t(29) = 0.61, p = 0.54.
Change in component onset time by day
In the Figure 4.2d, we provide boxplots of the distributions of the onset times of the early
and late components on each of the three days of the experiment. To statistically analyse
the change in onset times per component, we again use random effects linear regression
models, and perform separate analyses for the early and the late components. This model
has an identical form to the one used for the analysis of the Az values. i.e. day of learning
is the predictor variable and there is a varying intercept random effect for each subject.
Specifically, for both the early and the late components, the model is the following:
yi = β0+β1xi+ γ[subjecti]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
where yi now represents the onset value for a particular observation, with xi being the
value of the day for that observation, and subjecti is the subject for that observation.
Again, we assume that the γ values are normally distributed with mean 0 and standard
deviation of σsubject. We also again assess whether there is a significant effect of day for
the early and late components.
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The fixed effects coefficients for the late component analysis are:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 491.10 20.59 33.20 23.85 <0.01
day -22.67 6.67 29 -3.40 <0.01
and for the early component analysis, the corresponding results are:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 199.30 5.87 42.47 33.94 <0.01
day ≈ 0.00 2.32 29 <0.01 1.00
From this, we observe that the onset time for the late component changes by approxi-
mately -22.70 per day, and that this is a significant effect, t(29) =−3.40, p =< 0.01. For
the early component on the other hand, the onset time changes by almost exactly 0 per
day, and clearly this is not a significant effect, t(29)≈ 0.00, p = 1.00.
Change in discrimination variable by cue
As described in detail in Chapter 2, in this discrimination analysis, we used a logistic re-
gression based multivariate discriminant analysis to identify the EEG patterns that reliably
distinguish between face and car stimuli. In particular, during each time window t in all
the experimental trials for a given subject on a given day, our aim was to find a K = 64
dimensional vector ~wt such that
P(zt = face) =
1
1+ e−yt
, where yt = ~w′t~xt ,
maximizes the probability of a correct classification of the stimulus. Note that here,~xt is
the K = 64 dimensional EEG signal at time t. The yt is a scalar quantity that we refer to
as the discriminating variable at time t. As can be seen, it is simply a weighted average
of the entire EEG signal at time t that will maximally enhance those patterns in the EEG
signal that reliably distinguish between the processing of face and car stimuli. In other
words, yt is 1d summary of all the EEG activity at time t that is relevant to discriminate
face from car stimuli.
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Here, we analyse how the difference of y variable on the face and car trials changes
with the predictive value of the cue, and whether this differs between the early and late
components. The difference between the y variable on the face and car trials, measured
at the early and the late component, is effectively a measure of the strength of those
components because the greater the difference between the yt on the face and car trials,
the better the EEG signal discriminates between face and car stimuli.
For each subject, on each day, we obtain the y variable value for face and for car
stimuli at the early and late component time points, and then calculate the difference
between them. We then assess how this difference changes with the cue’s predictive
value. The cue’s predictive value is how well the cue predicts the stimulus on any given
trial. For each, if on a particular trial, the cue is 70F/30C, and the stimulus on that trial
is a face, then the cue’s predictive value is 0.70. Likewise, if the stimulus on a particular
trial is a car and the cue is 30F/70C, then again the cue’s predictive value is 0.70.
We use a random effects linear regression to predict the average difference between y
variable for faces and y variable for cars as a function of predictive strength of cue and day
of learning and their interaction. We perform two separate analyses, one for the y variable
at the early component time and one for y variable at the late time. Here, we provide the
AIC values for these two separate analyses:
Early component model Late component model
60.77 36.47
As can be seen, the AIC value for the model based on the late component is lower
and hence is a better fit than the early component model. In other words, there is a
stronger relationship between the predictive power of the cue, i.e. the closeness of the
match between the cue and the stimulus, and the strength of the late component than
between the predictive power of the cue and strength of the early component.
We use a similar approach to see how the average standard deviation of the y vari-
able varies with the cue and how this differs between the early and late components.
We analyse standard deviations for identical reasons to those illustrated in, for example,
Figure 2.4b-c (page 44) and explained in Section 2.4.3 (page 43). In other words, any im-
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provements in learning can possibly be explained by decreasing the noise and variability
in the neural decision variable.
Again, we use a random effects linear regression to predict how the average standard
deviation of the y variable for both faces and cars varies as a function of predictive strength
of cue and day of learning and their interaction. Again we perform two separate analyses,
one based on y values at the early component time and one based on y at the late time.
Here, we provide the AIC values for these two separate analyses:
Early component model Late component model
-286.40 -334.90
As can be seen, as was the case for the differences between yt values, the AIC value for
the model based on the late component is lower. In other words, there is a stronger rela-
tionship between the predictive power of the cue and the variability of the late component
than between the predictive power of the cue and variability of the early component.
Analysis of the discriminating component and behavioural responses
In the analysis we describe in this section, we focus specifically on how the early or late
y variable relates to the subject’s behavioural response. Our aim in this analysis is to
determine how the y variable varies with the cue on each day. We then compare this
change with the change in a probability of a face response as a function of the cue.
In the Figure 4.3a, we show the y variable (shown on the y-axis) at the early and late
component times during the face trials and the car trials, and show how these vary as a
function of the cue probability on those trials.
We then compare the y variable values to the probability of the subject making a
response of ‘face’ on any given trial. The probability of a face response as a function of
the cue value is plotted in Figure 4.3b. In comparing the y variable and the probability of a
face response, we aim to discover if the y variable at either the early or the late component
times is correlated with the subject’s behavioural response.
We perform separate analyses for the early and the late components, In both cases,
the analysis is based on a random effects linear regression model similar to what we used
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Figure 4.3: Discrimination variable varies with pre-stimulus cue in perceptual decision mak-
ing. (a) Illustrates the change in y discriminating variable at the early and late component times
as a function of the pre-stimulus cue, stimulus type (face; car), and days across 16 subjects. (b)
The average probability that the subject will response ‘face’ as function of the pre-stimulus cue,
stimulus type, and days across 16 subjects.
above. Specifically, for this analysis, our model is
fi = β0+β1yi+ γ[subjecti]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
where fi is the probability of ‘face’ response by a given subject on a given trial, yi is the
average value of that subject’s y variable at either the early or late component time on a
trial on the same day, and having the same stimulus, and the same cue probability as the
trial corresponding to fi.
In order to compare how well the y variable at the early component time versus the yt
at the late component time predicts the probability of a face response, we evaluate the fit of
both models. In both models, the outcome variable, i.e. fi, is the same, so we can evaluate
the predictive ability of the early and the late components easily by simply evaluating
model fit. In both cases, we provide the AIC (defined above), the Bayesian Information
criteria (BIC), and the Deviance. The AIC is defined and described on Page 73. BIC, on the
other hand, is defined and described on Page 47. As mentioned, BIC is an approximation
of the model’s log marginal likelihood and as such can be used the approximate the Bayes
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factor comparing two models. We also report the Deviance. Deviance is simply -2 times
the log of the likelihood function at its maximum likelihood value, i.e.
−2logL.
The AIC, BIC, and Deviance of models are interpreted in relative terms, with the model
with the lower value being the preferred model.
The AIC, BIC and Deviance of the two models are as follows:
BIC AIC Deviance
early component -97.84 -112.10 -120.10
late component -169.20 -183.50 -191.50
In all cases, we see that the y variable value at the late component time is a markedly
better predictor of the probability of a face response. These differences are all on the order
of ≈ 70. Given that either AIC or BIC differences of over 10 are considered substantial
evidence in favour of the lower model, there is no question that the discriminating variable
at the late component time is more highly related to the behavioural response.
Single-trial EEG discrimination analysis: Predictive versus non-informative
cues
EEG single trial discrimination analysis may be applied not just to discriminating between
the two type of stimuli, but between any two mutually exclusive classifications of all tri-
als. In particular, we may perform a discrimination analysis to identify the EEG temporal
components of the recognition of pre-stimulus cues. The aim of this analysis is to deter-
mine if there is a post-cue but pre-stimulus change in neural activity. This would imply
a change in baseline activity prior to stimulus onset, as described by Basso and Wurtz
(1998); de Lange et al. (2013); Albright (2012); Puri et al. (2009).
In order to do this, we divide all trials into two class: trials where there is a predic-
tive pre-stimulus cue, trials where there is a non-informative cue. The 50F/50C cue that
we have used in our analysis is clearly non-informative. In other words, it provides no
predictive information about the upcoming stimulus. On the other hand, the 70F/30C and
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30F/70C both provide usable information about the upcoming stimulus. Both tell us that
there is a high probability of a particular stimulus occurring, and a low probability of the
other stimulus.
Here, we perform a EEG discrimination analysis between the 50F/50C trials versus
the 70F/30C and 30F/70C trials2 . Furthermore, we perform this discrimination analysis
on the cue-onset locked trials. In other words, we perform the discrimination analysis
over the period of the processing of the pre-stimulus cue rather than the processing of
the stimulus itself. Other than the change the discrimination classes, and the definition of
the trial onset time and duration, the procedure for this predictive versus non-informative
discrimination analysis is the same. In other words, for each subject on each day and each
time window t in the trial we aim to find a K = 64 dimensional vector wt that maximizes
P(zt = 70F/30C) =
1
1+ e−yt
, where yt = ~w′txt ,
or the probability of correctly classifying each cue as either predictive or non-informative.
In the Figure 4.4a, we show the Az values from onset of the pre-stimulus cue to 1400ms
later, on each day of training. As above, we show the average over the subjects in the
darker lines and the lighter lines show the Az values for the individual subjects, which
allows us to see the extent of inter-subject variability. What is clearly evident in this
discrimination analysis is a single peak at around 200ms. Moreover, this peaks appears
to increase in magnitude and occur later in time with each training day. In Figure 4.4b,
we plot the average EEG activity, where we average over all trials and all subjects on
each day, over the frontal electrode Fp2. This electrode was chosen as frontal site had
highest activity in the scalpmap for the discriminator (as can be seen in the scalpmaps in
Figure 4.4c. There is a clear negative (note, following convention, the y-axis is reversed
such that negative values extend upwards) deflection in the EEG activity at this site at
approximately the same time as the EEG discrimination component in Figure 4.4a.
In Figure 4.4c, we show the Az values at the peak component on each day. Again,
the dark line is the average, with the lighter lines being the individual subjects. We su-
2Note that while it is, in principle possible to also compare, for example, 70F/30C versus 30F/70C
trials, in practice, this is problematic because of the insufficient number of trials of each class. More
importantly, our immediate focus here is on informative versus non-informative cues, rather than cues with
equally informative values.
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Figure 4.4: Post-cue & pre-stimulus change in neural activity during perceptual decision
making. (a) Multivariate discriminator performance (Az) during informative vs non-informative
discrimination of stimulus-locked EEG responses across the three training days (1: blue; 2: green;
3: red), averaged across all 16 subjects. Faint lines represent individual subject data. (b) The
cue-onset locked average EEG activity at frontal electrode site Fp2. This frontal site was chosen
as frontal sites had highest activity corresponding to the discriminator. The EEG activity at this
electrode was averaged over all trials and over all subjects on each day. (c) Average discrimi-
nator performance and scalp topographies for the peak of the component seen in (a), across the
three training days. Colour lines represent the 16 individual subject data. (d) Average pre-stimuli
(30/70;70/30) vs neutral (50/50) onset time for the component (black line) across the three learning
days. Colour lines represent the 16 individual subject data.
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perimpose the scalpmaps at the peak times on each day. These scalpmaps show higher
activation in the attention areas.
We analyse whether there is a significant increase in the Az value with training by
using a linear random effects regression. Similarly to above, our model here is:
Azi = β0+β1xi+ γ[subjecti]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi,
where xi is the value of the training day, and γ[sub jecti] is a random effect for the subject,
with these random effects assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation σγ . The coefficients for the fixed effects are as follows:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.61 0.02 39.40 25.11 <0.01
day 0.02 0.01 29 1.85 0.07
As can be seen, the effect of training on the magnitude of the peak is only marginally
significant. We can confirm this by, in addition, performing a log-likelihood ratio test
comparing the fit of this model to the null. This too is only marginally significant: χ2(1)=
3.36, p = 0.07.
In Figure 4.4d, we plot the peak onset times of the component per day. Here, the
darker line is the average, and also shown are the lines for each subjects. To asses whether
the peak occurs later in time with training, we again employ a random effects linear
regression. It has an identical form to the regression model for the Az value, with the
only difference being that the outcome variable is now the component peak time rather
than its Az value. The coefficients of the fixed effects are as follows:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 219.60 9.65 31.97 22.76 <0.01
as.numeric(day) 12 3.05 29 3.94 < 0.01
As can be seen, the effect of training on onset time is significant. We can also confirm
this by performing a log-likelihood ratio test comparing the fit of this model to the null.
This too is significant: χ2(1) = 12.85, p < 0.01.
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4.4 Discussion
The main results from this study can be summarized as follows:
1. We have obtained strong evidence that both the speed and accuracy of perceptual
decisions increased with the increasing predictive power of the pre-stimulus cue.
This effect is observed at both noise levels, for both types of stimuli, and on all
days of learning.
2. On the basis of the behavioural data, although speed and accuracy both improve
significantly with each day of learning, the role of the predictive power of the pre-
stimulus cue on perceptual decision making does not appear to change over the
course of the three days of learning.
3. From the single-trial EEG analysis, we have replicated our main results described
in Diaz et al. (2017) and Chapter 2. In particular, we have again identified two
temporal components to perceptual decision making; and early and late component.
The strength of the late component, but not the early one, increases with each day
of learning. Likewise, the late component, but not the early one, occurs at earlier
onset times as learning proceeds.
4. The predictive power of the cue affects the average distance between y decision
variable for faces and cars at the late component time more than at the early com-
ponent time. Likewise, the predictive power of the cue affects the average standard
deviation of y variable more during the late component than during the early com-
ponent time.
5. The correlation between the y decision variable and the probability of a face re-
sponse is greater during the late component time than during the early component
time.
6. We have observed a temporal component at around 200ms after the onset of the
cue that signifies whether the cue is informative or non-informative. There is a
marginally significant increase in the strength of this component over the three days.
It occurs significantly later in time as learning proceeds.
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We will now discuss each one of these findings in turn.
The behavioural results clearly demonstrate that the prior expectations based on pre-
stimulus cue affect perceptual decision making. As the probability of the upcoming stimu-
lus according to the cue increases, so too does the speed and the accuracy of the perceptual
decision. We observe this effect on speed and accuracy on every day of the experiment,
and it equally affects the recognition of the face and the car stimuli, and at all noise levels.
The importance of this result is that it confirms that the behavioural experiment worked as
planned. The phenomenon that we expected to observe based on the work of, for example,
Palmer (1975); Davenport and Potter (2004); Auckland et al. (2007); Saffran et al. (1996);
Aslin et al. (1998); Fiser and Aslin (2002); Bar (2004); Oliva and Torralba (2007), and
others, was indeed observed. As such, we may interpret the EEG and other results with
more confidence knowing that the experimental paradigm was methodologically sound.
One important unexpected result that emerged from the behavioural analysis was that
the effect of the pre-stimulus cue did not change over the course of the three days. This
emerged clearly from the regression analysis of both the speed and the accuracy data.
In both of those analyses, the effect of cue did not interact with the effect of training
day. There were clear and strong main effects of both cue and day, but, for both the
reaction time and the accuracy analysis, the models with the interaction between these two
predictors had higher AIC values than the corresponding models without the interactions.
This was an unexpected result as we predicted that there would be a decrease in the
effect of the cue with increased training. As described above, this was predicted from the
Bayesian principle that prior information should influence decision making more when
sensory evidence is weaker (e.g. Bogacz et al., 2006). According to our explanation of
the results presented in Chapter 2, which equally hold here, training leads to a faster and
more efficient accumulation of information. As such, sensory evidence will be stronger
by, for example, the third day of training compared to the first. Hence, the effect of the
prior should be relatively weaker on Day 3 than Day 1. However this effect was not
observed. Moreover, we did not observe any interaction, either in the accuracy or the
reaction time analyses, between the cue and the level of noise of the stimulus. Again,
such an interaction is directly predicted by the Bayesian account of perceptual decision
making whereby the prior probability of a stimulus becomes less informative the stronger
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the sensory evidence in favour of the stimulus. While this results may be taken as a
falsification of the Bayesian model, it is also arguable, however, that these effects were
not observed simply due to low statistical power of the experiment. There were only 16
subjects in this experiment, and hence only relatively large statistical effects would have
have power in this situation. Interaction effects will be, by necessity, more subtle than
main effects and hence would require larger sample sizes to observe.
The single-trial EEG analysis replicated the main findings that we reported in Chapter
2 and Diaz et al. (2017). In particular, the early and late temporal components were
observed here as before. Likewise, we also observed again how the late component, but
not the early one, became stronger and occurred earlier in time with increasing training
over the three days. This replication is obviously a reassuring result and is a reflection on
the robustness of the main results were reported in Chapter 2 and Diaz et al. (2017). This
is especially the case given that there was an additional variable being manipulated in this
experiment.
As explained previously, The y discriminating variable can be viewed as the EEG
measured accumulation to bound decision variable. In other words, it plays a role similar
to the stochastic variable in a sequential sampling model, such as a DDM, that moves
towards one or another threshold on the basis of accumulating sensory evidence. As we
described in Chapter 2 for discrimination between two perceptual classes to be effective,
the average of the y variable when it represents each of the two classes should be further
apart, and there should be less variability in the y values. We expect, therefore, that if
the late component and not the early component is being affected the prestimulus cue, we
ought to see the distance between the y values for faces and cars becoming further apart,
and the standard deviation of these values becoming narrower, during the late component
time period and not during the early component. There was a stronger prediction of the
difference between the y variable values for the two classes on the basis of the cue during
the late component than during the early one. Likewise, there was a stronger prediction of
the standard deviation change with the cue during the late component time than the early
component time. In a related result, we showed that how the cue affects the y variable
parallels how the cue affects the probability of making a face response, but that this only
occurs at the late component time and not the early component time.
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The significance of these two results is that they point to the effect of the cue on
perceptual decision as taking places at the late component time and not the earlier one.
This result is consistent with the cue affecting the accumulation of the decision to reach
a threshold, rather than affecting the pre-stimulus baseline activation. In other words, it
is consistent with how prior expectation affects evidence accumulation, as revealed by,
for example, Hanks et al. (2011); Cravo et al. (2013); Dunovan et al. (2014), and is less
consistent with the baseline activation hypothesis as forwarded by, for example, Basso
and Wurtz (1998); de Lange et al. (2013); Albright (2012).
Finally, we have observed a EEG component that discriminates between informative
and non-informative cues that occurs roughly 220ms after the onset of the pre-stimulus
cue (see Figure 4.4a, with the corresponding average EEG activity in Figure 4.4b). This
component may be related to increased attentional focus that occurs when the cue is infor-
mative as opposed to when it is non-informative. Indeed, this temporal component may
also be related to a component described in Philiastides et al. (2006a). This component
arose in a single-trial analysis that discriminated between easy and difficult trials, and
occurred at approximately 220ms after stimulus onset. It was argued in Philiastides et al.
(2006a) to be an attentional component. In our case, our post-feedback component also
occurs at 220ms after the cue onset. This is further indication therefore that this may be
an attention related component.
A final point to discuss is how pre-stimulus cues compare with correct/incorrect feed-
back on trials. In the experiments described in this chapter, subjects performed a very
similar task to what was described in Chapter 2. The only differences between the two
sets of experiments is that in the experiments described here, subjects obtained a pre-
stimulus cue that indicated (probabilistically) the upcoming stimulus identity, while in
the experiments in Chapter 2, subjects obtained post-stimulus feedback concerning their
accuracy. In both studies, we observe clear behavioural evidence for learning. In both
cases, this is manifested both in terms of accuracy and reaction time. Moreover, across
the two studies, the learning effects are roughly comparable. We may take this is evidence
that feedback plays as much a role in learning as does the pre-stimulus cue.
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Chapter 5
Hierarchical diffusion model
analysis of perceptual decision
making
5.1 Drift diffusion models
The DDM is a mathematical model of decision making under time constraints. To under-
stand how the DDM works, it is helpful to start with a very simple mathematical model,
namely the random walk, which is in fact the basis of the DDM.
Consider a variable x ∈ R that takes on different integer values at discrete time steps,
i.e. at times t = 0, t = 1, t = 2, . . .. At time t = 0, we will set x to some integer value z.
We’ll denote the value of x at any time t by xt , and so x at time t = 0 is denoted x0. After
that and then for all t ∈ {1,2 . . .}
xt+1 =
xt +1,with probability p,,xt−1,with probability 1− p.
In other words, x starts with the value of z and then moves either 1 higher or 1 lower along
the number line at each tick of some clock. We can now place two barriers at integer
values on the number line. We’ll denote these by al and au, with al being lower than the
starting value z and a being above this starting value, i.e. al < z < a− u. Whenever the
x variables reaches one of these barriers, it stops and does not change its value. In other
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words, al and au are absorbing barriers. If x reaches au first, another random variable y
takes on the value of 1, while if x reaches al first, y takes the value of 0.
On the basis of what we’ve just described, we can describe the process of the random
walk. The variable x always starts at z and then randomly moves up or down in steps of
1. It moves up with probability p and moves down with probability 1− p. Continuing
like this, eventually it will reach one of the two barriers, and then the process terminates.
Clearly, because taking a step up or down is random, it could always reach the upper or
the lower barrier first. Likewise, it could reach either barrier relatively quickly or wander
up and down for some time before he reaches one or the other. See Figure 5.1 for a
further illustration of this random walk process. Note that there are a set of parameters
that control the random walk process, i.e., p, z, al , au. If these are set to constant values,
then there will always be a constant probability of first crossing the upper or the lower
barrier, and also there will always be a fixed probability distribution over how long it
takes to each one barrier or another.
We can now extend this process as follows. First, and without loss of generality, we
can always set al to be 0, and then rename au to a, and so the starting position is always
0 < z < a. Then, instead of taking a step of one unit at each tick of the clock, we instead
take a step size of
∆,
√
τ,
at every τ time interval. We also define p as
p, 1
2
(
1+µ
√
τ
)
,
and so
1− p, 1
2
(
1−µ√τ) .
Now, in the limit of τ → 0, the above random walk process converges to a DDM with a
drift rate of µ , an upper barrier of a, and initial starting point of z. In other words, the
DDM is a continuous time version of the random walk. To be more precise, the DDM is
random (or stochastic) process on a 1d space and in continuous time, i.e. the value of the
variable changes smoothly or continuously in time, and does not just take discrete steps
at discrete time points (or ticks). The rate of change of the random variable in the DDM is
dxt
dt
∼ N(µ,1),
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Figure 5.1: Diffusion model as random walk In this figure, we illustrate a simple concept under-
lying the DDM, namely the random walk. Consider a man standing at the center of a line on the
floor. At each tick of the clock, he takes a step randomly to the left or to the right. He does this
by, at each time step, flipping an unfair coin whose bias to come up heads is exactly p. If the coin
comes up Heads, he steps left; if it comes up Tails, he steps right. As such, the probability that he
steps left at any time is always exactly p, and the probability that he steps right is always exactly
1− p. Starting in the centre of the line, flipping the coin at each time step, and then stepping left
or right each time, he eventually reaches the left or the right end of the line. Once he does so, he
stops and remains there forever. Shown here are six repetitions of this random walk. For example,
on the first repetition, shown in the leftmost column of figures, the man starts in the centre, steps
to his left, then to his right, and again then to his right again, again, again. At this point, he has
reached the rightmost edge of the line. On the second repetition, shown in the second column, he
starts in the center and then steps to his right, then left, left, right, left, and does not reach either
side in the depicted steps. In the third repetition, he reaches the right side by the third step. And
so on.
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where N(µ,1) signifies a normal distribution with a mean of µ and variance of 11.
According to the DDM with parameters a, µ , and z, the probability of first reaching
the upper barrier is
P(y = 1) =
exp(−2zµ)−1
exp(−2aµ)−1
The probability density function over the time to reach the upper barrier is
P(t|y= 1)= f (t)= pi
a2
exp
(
(a− z)µ− µ
2
2
t
)
1
P(y = 1)
∞
∑
m=1
sin
(
pim(a− z)
a
)
exp
(
−1
2
pi2m2
a2
t
)
,
and the probability to reach the lower barrier is identical to the above function if we
substitute µ for −µ and z for a− z.
In the DDM, it is common to also add a fourth parameter known as the non-decision
time, which we will denote here by t∆. The effect of this parameter is simply to shift the
probability density function f (t) forwards in time. In other words, with the non-decision
time parameter included we now have
P(t|y = 1) =
0, if t < t∆,f (t− t∆), if t ≥ t∆.
A figure illustrating the role of the parameters is shown in Figure 5.2.
5.1.1 Drift diffusion models of decision making
The above mathematical model can be used as a model of speeded decision making in
a two-alternative forced choice task. According to this perspective, the choice that is
made in this task and the response time taken to make this choice can be modelled by the
probability of crossing the upper or lower barrier in a DDM. The random diffusion of the
decision variable x represents the accumulation of evidence for one or the other of the two
alternative choices. Different settings of the parameters make one choice or another and
the response times for these choices are more or less likely. We will now explain these in
turn.
1Setting the variance of the Normal distribution to be 1, rather than allowing it to be a variable σ2 that
takes on different values does not limit the generality of the DDM. The variance of the drift rate is coupled
to the value of a and µ , so that an identical DDM will result for any value of the variance if the value of a
and µ are adjusted. As such, we can set the variance to a constant value, and it is convenient to set it to
exactly 1 to simplify the probability distributions for time to reach the barriers, etc.
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Figure 5.2: An illustration of the DDM parameters. Here, the random walk trajectory is an
example of single diffusion process from a starting location z. The distance between the two
barriers is a. The average drift rate is given by µ . The non-decision time is given by t∆. At the
top and bottom are two probability density functions showing the probability of crossing the upper
and lower barriers first, respectively.
• Drift rate, i.e. µ: If there is, on average, more evidence in favour of choice y = 1,
then the drift rate µ will be positive and the diffusion process will be more likely
to evolve over time in the positive direction, and so hit the upper barrier at a first.
If there is more evidence in favour of the choice y = 0, then the drift rate µ will
be negative and the diffusion process will be more likely to evolve over time in the
negative direction, and so hit the lower barrier at 0 first. In general, the greater the
absolute value of the drift rate, i.e. |µ|, the faster the decision variable will reach
a barrier. As such, assuming constant values of the remaining parameters, the drift
rate µ controls the probability of reaching one barrier or the other first and controls
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the distribution over the how long it takes to reach each barrier. Put in terms of
decision making, this entails that the drift rate controls the probability of making a
response y = 1 or y = 0, and on average how quickly these decisions are made.
• Increasing the value of a trades off speed for accuracy. The larger the value of a,
assuming z begins equidistant between 0 and a, then if µ > 0, the decision variable
is always more likely to hit a before it hits 0, and vice versa if µ < 0. With increas-
ing a, the time taken to reach either barrier will increase, but it is less likely that the
decision variable will cross 0 first if µ > 0, or cross a first if µ < 0. As such, a is
the speed-accuracy trade-off parameter.
• The starting position z controls how close the diffusion model is to each one of the
two barriers when it begins. As such, it represents a baseline bias in favour of the
response represented by the barrier it is closest to. Put another way, the starting
position represents the a priori evidence in favour of one response over the other
before any sensory information is observed. For this reason, z is often also called
the bias of the DDM.
• The non-decision time t∆ represents the time taken for non-decision related pro-
cesses, particularly sensory encoding time and motor response time. In other words,
before evidence for one response or the other can even begin to accumulate, the sen-
sory information must be encoded. Likewise, even after a decision has been made,
it takes a non-zero amount of time to execute a motor response such as pressing a
key on the keyboard. These processes are assumed to be constant values in any de-
cision and so are represented simply by a shift to the right in the probability density
function over response time.
5.1.2 Modelling behavioural data with drift diffusion models
Let us imagine that we have a choice and reaction time data from a behavioural experi-
ment. For example, we could have n choices and reaction times all from one participant
in one experiment where the participant’s task is to determine if a noisy image is a face or
98
a car. The behavioural data that we have is
y1,y2 . . .yi . . .yn, t1, t2 . . . ti . . . tn,
where yi is the choice at trial i and ti is the reaction time at trial i. We also have predictor
variables
s1,s2 . . .si . . .sn, q1,q2 . . .qi . . .qn,
where si codes the identity of the stimulus at trial i, i.e., whether the stimulus is actually a
face or car, and qi represents the level of noise in the stimulus on trial i.
Recall that the common approach to statistical analysis of data like would be use to
general or generalized linear models. For example, it would be common to model the
response data using binary logistic regression, such as
log
(
P(yi = 1)
P(yi = 0)
)
= α+βssi+βqqi, for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n},
or to model the reaction times using general linear models as follows,
ti = α+βssi+βqqi+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n}.
(Note that in the above two equations, we used α , βs, and βq in both. This is not to say that
we assume that the coefficients in both models are identical. We are simply (over-)using
the same labels to avoid a proliferation of symbols.)
Statistical modelling of response data with a DDM is essentially an extension of this
process. In particular, we model
yi, ti ∼ ddm(µi,zi,ai, t∆i), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n},
where ddm(µi,zi,ai, t∆i) is a DDM with drift rate µi, starting position zi, upper barrier
position (and so inter-barrier distance) ai and non-decision time t∆i. In other words, we
model the choice yi and the reaction time ti at any given time as a sample from a DDM
with parameters µi,zi,ai, t∆i.
We can now model the parameters on each trial as a function of the predictors. For
example, we could model µi using a general linear model such as
µi = α+βssi+βqqi+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n}.
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What we are saying by this is that, for each trial i, the choice yi and the reaction time ti is
a sample from a DDM with parameters µi,zi,ai, t∆i, and where each µi is a general linear
model of the two predictors si and qi.
In the above example, for simplicity we assumed that the starting position, inter-
barrier distance, and non-decision times were known constants. Of course, in practice,
we rarely if ever know the values of these parameters. Also, these values need not be
constants across all trial. Thus, in general, we would provide probabilistic models for
these parameters, and how they vary from trial to trial, too. To do so, it is first convenient
to re-parameterize the starting position z as a proportion of the inter-barrier distance, i.e.
instead of dealing with the parameter z, we instead deal with b = za . Note that with this
transformation, b ∈ (0,1). With this change, our new model is
yi, ti ∼ ddm(µi,bi,ai, t∆i), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n},
with, as before,
µi = α+βssi+βqqi+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n}.
Now we also provide probabilistic models for b, a, and t∆. For example, we would use a
logistic regression model for the value of bi. For example,
bi = α+βssi+βqqi, for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n}.
For the inter-barrier distance ai, a suitable model could be
ai ∼ N[0,∞)(α+βssi+βqqi,σ2i ), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n},
where N[0,∞) signifies a half-normal distribution from 0 to ∞, i.e., an other Normal distri-
bution but where the probability of a value being less than 0 is 0, and so with probability
1, all values are non-negative. Similarly, we could model the non-decision time by
t∆i ∼ N[0,∞)(α+βssi+βqqi,σ2i ), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n}.
(Note that we are again over-using the symbols α , βs, βq, σ2 for the coefficients in all of
the above models simply to avoid a proliferation of symbols.)
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5.1.3 Hierarchical diffusion models
Just as we employed hierarchical or multilevel or random-effects regression models in
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, so too can we extend the DDM to be a HDDM2 This allows us to
model inter-participant or inter-stimulus variability in the effect of the predictors on the
observed data. For example, in the above model, we modelled the drift rate by
µi = α+βssi+βqqi+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n}.
However, this was under the assumption that the participant on all of the n trials was the
same. Normally, of course, we will have multiple subjects and we do not usually wish
to assume that the effect of the predictors on the choice and reaction time variables is
identical across different subjects. To allow for variability, the multilevel approach could
assume
µi = αsubjecti +βs,subjectisi+βq,subjectiqi+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2), for all i ∈ {1,2 . . .n},
where
α j ∼ N(α0,τ2α), βs, j ∼ N(βs,0,τ2βs), βq, j ∼ N(βq,0,τ2βq) for j ∈ 1 . . .J
In other words, we are assuming subject-specific coefficients, for all J subjects, that are
themselves drawn from population general probabilistic models. Using the sample prin-
ciples, we can just as easily apply the hierarchical modelling approach to the models for
bi, ai, and t∆i.
5.1.4 Bayesian inference using Gibbs sampling
For all the HDDM statistical analysis we employ here, we implement our models in the
Just Another Gibbs Sampler (JAGS) (Just Another Gibbs Sampler) developed by Martin
Plummer and others, and available under GNU Public Licence at
http://mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net.
2This type of analysis is a relatively recent innovation. Methodological papers that describe this analysis
and provide software implementations include, for example, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, and Lee (2011);
Wiecki, Sofer, and Frank (2013), while empirical studies in the general field of cognitive neuroscience that
have used the HDDM for analyses include Zhang and Rowe (2014); Dunovan et al. (2014).
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JAGS is a probabilistic modelling language that automatically derives a Gibbs sampler
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) that allows samples to be drawn from the posterior
distribution over all unknown variables, i.e. parameters, latent variables, etc., in the prob-
abilistic model, and this allows us to infer the probable values of these unknowns from
the data. In other words, JAGS allows us to perform statistical inference of parameters
etc. for arbitrary probabilistic models. The definition of the probability distribution in
the DDM that are implemented in JAGS were provided as extension modules by Joachim
Vandekerckhove and others, and also available under GNU Public Licence at
https://sourceforge.net/projects/jags-wiener.
5.1.5 Advantages of diffusion models
The standard approach to the analysis of reaction time and choice behavioural data is ei-
ther identical to or similar to the methods we have used for analysing reaction time and
accuracy in, for example, Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. There, we analyse reaction times
using (multilevel) linear regression models and separately we analyse accuracies using
(multilevel) logistic regression. Diffusion models, and sequential sampling models gen-
erally, offer advantages over these methods. For example, viewed solely as methods for
statistical analysis of reaction time and choice data, diffusion models make more realis-
tic assumptions about the nature of reaction times, and the relationship between reaction
times and choice or accuracies. For example, traditional methods often assume reaction
times are normally distributed around a mean that varies as a function of predictor vari-
ables. On the other hand, a diffusion model assumes that these reaction time distributions
are unimodal with a positive skew and long positive tail. It is well demonstrated that hu-
man reaction times have these characteristics (see, e.g., Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff et
al., 2004; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2011, for detailed reviews).
Likewise, while separate analyses of reaction times and accuracies assume that these two
outcome variables are independent of one another, it well appreciated that these are cou-
pled and can trade-off one another (see, for example Heitz, 2014, for a review of this
topic). Diffusion models treat reaction and choice or accuracy as two coupled outcome
variables whose distributions are determined by a common set of parameters, and where
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speed-accuracy trade-off in particular is determined by one of these parameters (that is,
inter-barrier distance). In addition, diffusion models also have mechanistic interpretations
in terms of neural processes. We have described the link between sequential sampling
models generally and the cognitive neuroscience of decision making in Section 1.0.2. For
example, with respect to our particular studies, properties of diffusion models, such as the
drift rate, have been shown by Philiastides et al. (2006b); Ratcliff, Philiastides, and Sajda
(2009a) to relate the late EEG temporal component that we have described throughout this
thesis (see Section 5.4 for more detail).
5.2 Diffusion model analyses of the effect of learn-
ing on perceptual decision making
In the present analysis, we model the response speed and choice data from our first project,
i.e. the project described in Chapter 2 and in Diaz et al. (2017), using a HDDM. Our par-
ticular aim is to determine how learning affects perceptual decision making by examining
which parameters of the diffusion model vary with training.
In this model, our outcome variables are the participant’s choice, i.e. face or car, on
each trial, and their reaction time to make the choice. These are modelled by first passage
times in the DDM: Crossing the upper barrier signifies the choice of face, and the lower
barrier signifies the choice of car. In the DDM, in general, the drift rate, inter-barrier
distance, bias, and the non-decision time can all, in principle, vary by day of learning
and by coherence on each trial. The model is a HDDM given that drift rate, inter-barrier
distance, bias, and the non-decision time all vary randomly by subject.
5.2.1 Model selection
We begin by considering a range of possible HDDM models. These differ from one another
in terms of which of the main predictor variables affect which of the main parameters of
the HDDM. In all models, we assume that the starting position is a fixed and known
constant. Specifically, we assume that the b = 0.5. This assumption is very commonly
made in drift-diffusion modelling (see, e.g., Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2018, Chapter 14),
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unless there is a definite and strong possibility that the starting point will systematically
vary with one of more predictor. In our case, because face and car are exactly equally
likely in the experiment across all days and across all participants, and also these stimuli
are generated using identical images, we should expect a symmetry in response to the two
classes, and so the starting point of b = 0.5 is a reasonable assumption.
We then consider the following 7 variants of HDDM. However, in all cases, we assume
the boundary separation values, the drift rate (for both face and car stimuli), and the non-
decision time varies randomly across subjects, and we model these hierarchically.
1. Drift rate (for both faces and cars) varies by the training day, and by the coher-
ence level. Boundary separation, and non-decision time are constant across these
predictors.
2. Drift rate varies by the training day, and by the coherence level. Boundary separa-
tion varies by day, but is constant for coherence. Non-decision time is constant by
both learning day and coherence level.
3. Drift rate varies by the training day, and by the coherence level. Boundary separa-
tion varies by coherence, but is constant for day. Non-decision time is constant by
both learning day and coherence level.
4. Drift rate varies by the training day, and by the coherence level. Boundary sep-
aration varies by coherence, and by day. Non-decision time is constant by both
learning day and coherence level.
5. Drift rate varies by the training day, and by the coherence level. Non-decision time
varies by day, but is constant for coherence. Boundary separation is constant by
both learning day and coherence level.
6. Drift rate varies by the training day, and by the coherence level. Non-decision time
varies by coherence, but is constant for day. Boundary separation is constant by
both learning day and coherence level.
7. Drift rate varies by the training day, and by the coherence level. Non-decision time
varies by coherence, and by day. Boundary separation is constant by both learning
day and coherence level.
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Note that in all cases, we assume that drift rate varies by day and by coherence. In other
words, we take it as given that the drift rate will vary by these two predictors, based on the
noticeable change in both accuracy and reaction time as a function of these two predictors.
Our main question, therefore, is whether boundary separation and non-decision time also
vary by one or other of the two main predictors.
For each model, we calculate the Watanbe Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC) (see
S. Watanabe, 2010) and use this for model evaluation. WAIC is calculated as follows:
n
∑
i=1
log
(
1
S
S
∑
s=1
P(yi|θ s)
)
−
n
∑
i=1
V Ss=1 (logP(yi|θ s)) ,
where yi is the observed data at observation i, θ s is a single sample from the posterior over
all parameters (i.e. θ generically denotes all parameters in the model). Here, we assume
n observations, and S samples from the posterior distribution over θ . The term V Ss=1(·)
signifies the variance of its arguments. WAIC is related to AIC in that it aims to provide
a close approximation to leave one out cross validation, without having to perform the
resource intensive repetitions of the model with different data-sets. However, it has been
shown by S. Watanabe (2010) that WAIC is a more widely applicable approximation to
leave one out cross validation. Moreover, WAIC is computed from MCMC samples and
does not require calculation of the maximum of the likelihood function. Note that by
choosing WAIC (or AIC or cross-validation) as the criterion for model selection, we are
defining the best model as the model with the best out-of-sample predictive error.
For each of the seven models defined above, we infer the posterior distribution over all
unknown variables using JAGS, and then from the samples, we calculate the WAIC. The
results are
WAIC model description
3271 drift ∼ day + coherence
3510 drift ∼ day + coherence; boundary ∼ day
3309 drift ∼ day + coherence; boundary ∼ coherence
3510 drift ∼ day + coherence; boundary ∼ day + coherence
3642 drift ∼ day + coherence; non-decision time ∼ day
3326 drift ∼ day + coherence; non-decision time ∼ coherence
3637 drift ∼ day + coherence; non-decision time ∼ day + coherence
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Figure 5.3: A graphical model illustration of the best fitting model of the effect of learning on
perceptual decision making. Illustration of the best fitting model for the data from the perceptual
learning experiment (see Diaz et al. (2017) or Chapter 2). This shows which predictors and other
observed variables affect or influence which parameters in the system, and how these affect the
accuracy and reaction time. Note that shaded nodes indicate observed data. Here, the bias variable
is shaded because we have modelled it as a fixed and known constant.
As can be seen, the model with the lowest WAIC, and so therefore the model we choose,
is the one where only the drift rate changes as a function of the main predictors, and
the boundary separation and non-decision time are constants. Recall, however, that the
effect drift rate, boundary separation, and non-decision time are all modelled as randomly
varying across subjects. In what follows, we provide further results for this best fitting
model alone. In Figure 5.3, we provide a graphical model illustration of this model.
5.2.2 Analysis of best fitting model
We begin by comparing the predictions of the model to the empirical data from the sub-
jects. In Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b, we provide scatter-plots comparing model predic-
tions to the subjects’ reaction times, for both stimuli classes, coherence levels, and days
of training, and for correct and incorrect reaction times. For the correct responses, the
correlation coefficient, using the robust correlation method named cov.rob in the MASS
R package, for the fits to the face and car stimuli are as follows:
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Car Face
0.74 0.80
For the incorrect responses, the correlation coefficient for the fits to the face and car
stimuli are as follows:
Car Face
0.62 0.74
In both cases, we can see that the models’ reaction time predictions always resemble the
empirical reaction for the different stimuli and on the different days. There are noticeably
closer fits, however, for the face stimuli compared to car stimuli.
In Figure 5.4c and Figure 5.4d, we show the 95% HPD intervals for the boundary
separation parameter and non-decision times, respectively, for each subject. In general,
the 95% HPD interval for a variable gives the range of values between which lies 95%
of the probability mass in a posterior probability distribution. In other words, it can be
interpreted like a confidence interval, specifically telling us that there is a 95% probability
that the true value of unknown variables lies in the defined interval. For each variable, the
set of HPD values show the extent of the inter-subject variability in that variable. In par-
ticular, for the boundary separation variable, the HPD intervals show how subjects differ
from one another in terms of their speed accuracy trade-off. For the non-decision time,
the variability shows how subjects differ considerably in their sensory-coding and motor
response times. In general, the fact that some subjects’ HPD interval are considerably
longer than others indicates the uncertainty we have about those subjects’ values for this
variable.
In Figure 5.4e, we show the posterior distribution over the drift rate for face and car
stimuli on the different days of learning and for the different coherence levels. As can be
seen, there is noticeable increase in the absolute value of the drift rate with each day of
learning. In other words, for faces the drift rate increases with training, and for cars, the
drift rate decreases. Recall, that a face response is modelled by crossing the upper barrier
in a DDM, while the car response is modelled by crossing the lower barrier. As such,
all face stimuli should correspond to positive drift rates and all car stimuli should have
107
B
eh
av
io
ur
al
 R
T
(in
co
rr
ec
t r
es
po
ns
es
)
Model predicted RT (incorrect responses)
Face
Face
Face
Face
Car
Coherence
1
2
1
2
3
0.5
0.5 0.5
0.7
0.6 0.6
0.9
0.7 0.7 0.80.8
Low coherence
D
rif
t r
at
e 
(f
ac
e 
st
im
ul
i)
D
rif
t r
at
e 
(c
ar
 s
tim
ul
i)
High coherence
a b
c
Training day Training day
2 2
2 3
1.5
-1
3
3
3
1.0
0.5
-2
0
e
d
Car Face
Model predicted RT (correct responses)
Coherence
1
2
Day
1
2
3
0.6 0.6
0.6
0.7
0.7 0.7
0.8
0.8 0.8
0.5
0.4
21
1
1
1
Subjects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
a
 (
b
o
u
n
d
a
ry
 s
e
p
a
ra
tio
n
)
1.0
1.3
1.6
Subjects
N
on
 d
ec
is
io
n 
tim
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 140
.2
8
0.
30
0.
33
0.
36
B
eh
av
io
ur
al
 R
T
(in
co
rr
ec
t r
es
po
ns
es
)
B
eh
av
io
ur
al
 R
T
(c
or
re
ct
 r
es
po
ns
es
)
Figure 5.4: Diffusion Model of the effect of learning on perceptual decision making. (a)
Illustration of model fit. The model’s predicted reaction times for stimuli (face; car), on each day
and for the different coherence levels are compared to the average reaction times of all subjects for
these variables. Here, we show reaction times according to the model and from the subject, where
the responses was correct. (b) Illustration of model fit. The model’s predicted reaction times for
stimuli (face; car), on each days and for the different coherence levels are compared to the average
reaction times of all subjects for these variables. Here, we show reaction times according to the
model and from the subject, where the response was incorrect. (c) Shows the 95% HPD interval
of the Boundary Separation (a) values for each subject. The orange dot represents the mean and
the blue line represents the HPD interval. (d) Illustrates the 95% HPD interval of the Non-Decision
times values for each subject. The orange dot represents the mean and the blue line represents
the HPD interval. (e) The violin plot represents the posterior distribution of the Drift Rate on
the different days, for the different coherence levels, and for face stimuli (top) and car stimuli
(bottom). Here, we use violin plots to illustrate the posterior distribution. Violin plots plot the
probability density using a symmetric shape. To understand the violin plot, imagine a vertical line
through the centre of each shape. The shape will be symmetric around this axis. The density on
shown on either side of this axis is the density plot for the variable.
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negative drift rates. As learning proceeds, we see that the absolute value of these drift
rates continue. We also note how the absolute values of the drift rates increase when the
stimuli have higher rather than lower coherence. These results demonstrate how efficiency
of information accumulation increases with training and with the decreasing noise in the
stimuli.
5.3 Diffusion model analyses of the effect of prior
information on perceptual decision making.
In this analysis, we model response speed and choice data from our second project, i.e. the
project described in Chapter 4, using a HDDM. Here, our particular aim is to determine
how prior probability of the upcoming stimulus, as revealed by the pre-stimulus cue,
affects perceptual decision making by examining which parameters of the diffusion model
vary with experimental predictor variables, but particularly with the pre-stimulus cue.
In this model, as above, our outcome variables are the participant’s choice, i.e. face or
car, on each trial, and their reaction time to make the choice. These are modelled by first
passage times in the DDM: Crossing the upper barrier signifies the choice of face, and the
lower barrier signifies the choice of car. In the DDM, in general, the drift rate, inter-barrier
distance, bias, and the non-decision time can all, in principle, vary by day of learning and
by pre-stimulus cue each trial. Again, and as above, the model is a HDDM given that drift
rate, inter-barrier distance, bias, and the non-decision time all vary randomly by subject.
Note that in this model, despite the fact that stimuli varied by coherence levels, we
chose not to model the effects of coherence explicitly. From the previous analysis de-
scribed above (for example, Section 5.2.1, page 108), it was clear that coherence had an
effect only on the drift rate. In particular, when coherence was low, the absolute value of
the drift rate was lower, and when the coherence was high, the absolute value of the drift
rate was greater. This is perfectly in line with expectations, i.e., when there is less noise,
there is a faster accumulation of evidence. And so it will undoubtedly be the case that
coherence would have the same effect on the drift rate in the present model. On the other
hand, coherence levels can not affect the bias, which is a diffusion model variable that we
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are including here, because bias is only affected by variables that are present prior to the
stimulus onset, such as pre-stimulus cue.
By not explicitly modelling coherence, we are not assuming that coherence plays no
role in the model. As mentioned, we do assume that it will affect the drift rate. However,
by not modelling it explicitly, we are effectively treating coherence level as a constant
variable across all trials, and so modelling its average effect on drift rate. We are choos-
ing not to model coherence explicitly in order to facilitate the analyses. Given that we
have new model variables and new predictor variables in this current model, not explic-
itly modelling all variables allows us to keep the models tractable. Specifically, we have
a new predictor variable, i.e., cue, and this will potentially affect the drift-rate and bias.
In initial MCMC simulations, where we included all the principal variables, we obtained
very poor convergence rates in the model. By not explicitly modelling coherence, how-
ever, convergence rates improved. Given that the primary focus of this current model is to
identify how the cue and day of training affect either the bias or the drift rate, by not ex-
plicitly modelling coherence and treating it as a constant variable, we will not be affecting
the general conclusions from this analysis. Thus, by not explicitly modelling coherence,
we may proceed with the current more complex model analyses, and yet not affect the
main conclusions about the role of the cue and day of training on the bias and the drift
rate.
5.3.1 Model selection
As above (see Section 5.2.1), we begin our analysis by considering a range of possible
HDDM models. In order to minimize the proliferation of models to consider, we restricted
attention to two main predictor variables, i.e., day of learning and pre-stimulus cue. We
also consider the interaction of these variables. In particular, we are interested in whether
the effect of pre-stimulus cue on perceptual decision making changes with training. We
then restricted our attention to how these two variables and their interaction affect the
drift-rate and the bias. We consider all possible models where one or more predictor
variable, possibly with an interaction, affect either drift rate or bias or both. This leads to
16 models. The WAIC for each model is shown in the following table:
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WAIC model description
3378.27 drift ∼ day; bias ∼ day
3234.82 drift ∼ day; bias ∼ cue
2939.01 drift ∼ day; bias ∼ cue + day
3449.46 drift ∼ day; bias ∼ cue + day + cue × day
4200.43 drift ∼ cue; bias ∼ day
3218.35 drift ∼ cue; bias ∼ cue
2928.38 drift ∼ cue; bias ∼ cue + day
3312.89 drift ∼ cue; bias ∼ cue + day + cue × day
3717.17 drift ∼ day + cue; bias ∼ day
2809.44 drift ∼ day + cue; bias ∼ cue
2680.16 drift ∼ day + cue; bias ∼ cue + day
3176.03 drift ∼ day + cue; bias ∼ cue + day + cue × day
3294.86 drift ∼ day + cue + cue × day; bias ∼ day
3553.38 drift ∼ day + cue + cue × day; bias ∼ cue
2734.23 drift ∼ day + cue + cue × day; bias ∼ cue + day
3362.32 drift ∼ day + cue + cue × day; bias ∼ cue + day + cue × day
As can be seen, the model with the lowest WAIC, and so the model we choose, shows that
both bias and drift rate vary by day and cue. A graphical model illustration of this best
fitting model is shown in Figure 5.5. Note that in all models, the drift rate, bias, boundary
separation, and non-decision time are modelled as varying randomly by participant.
5.3.2 Analysis of best fitting model
As before, we begin by comparing the predictions of the model to the empirical data
from the subject. In Figure 5.6a and Figure 5.6b, we provide scatterplots comparing
model predictions to the subjects’ reaction times, for both stimuli classes, pre-stimulus
cue levels, and days of training, and for correct and incorrect reaction times. For the
correct responses, the correlation coefficient for the fits to the face and car stimuli are as
follows:
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Figure 5.5: A graphical model illustration of the best fitting model of the effect of prior
information on perceptual decision making. A graphical model illustration of the best fitting
model for the data from the prior expectation experiment (see Chapter 4). This shows which
predictors and other observed variables affect or influence which parameters in the system, and
how these affect the accuracy and reaction time. The shaded nodes indicate observed values of the
data.
Car Face
0.87 0.83
For the incorrect responses, the correlation coefficient for the fits to the face and car
stimuli are as follows:
Car Face
0.78 0.80
In both cases, we can see that the models’ reaction time predictions are relatively accurate.
In all cases, we see that the models’ predictions always resemble the empirical reaction
for the different stimuli and on the different days.
As we did for the model for the first project, in Figure 5.6c and Figure 5.6d we present
the 95% HPD intervals for the boundary separation parameter and non-decision times, re-
spectively, for each subject. Here, as above, for the boundary separation variable, the HPD
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Figure 5.6: Diffusion Model of the effect of prior information on perceptual decision making.
(a) Illustration of model fit. The model’s predicted reaction times for stimuli on each day and
for each pre-stimulus cue are compared to the average reaction times of all subjects for these
variables. Here, we show reaction times according to the model and from the subject, where the
responses were correct. (b) The model’s predicted reaction times on each day and for each cue are
compared to the average reaction times of all subjects for these variables. Here, we show reaction
times according to the model and from the subject where the responses were incorrect. (c) Shows
the 95% HPD interval of the Boundary Separation (a) values for each subject. The orange dot
represents the mean and the blue line represents the HPD. (d) Illustrates the 95% HPD interval of
the Non-Decision times values for each subject. The orange dot represents the mean and the blue
line represents the HPD. (e) The 95% HPD of the Drift Rate for both face (top) and car stimuli
(bottom) as a function of pre-stimulus cue on each of the three days of learning. (f) The 95% HPD
for the Bias variable as a function of cue on each of the days of learning (1: blue; 2: green; 3: red)
across 16 subjects.
113
intervals show how subjects differ from one another in terms of their speed accuracy trade-
off. For the non-decision time, the variability shows how subjects differ considerably in
their sensory-coding and motor response times.
In Figure 5.6e, we show the 95% posterior HPD for the drift rate for face and car
stimuli as a function of the different cue levels, and for each of the three days of learning.
As can be seen, there is noticeable increase in the absolute value of the drift rate with each
day of learning. In other words, for faces, the drift rate increases with training, and for
cars, the drift rate decreases. As was the case for the analysis of the data from the first
project, these results demonstrate how efficiency of information accumulation increases
with training and with the decreasing noise in the stimuli. We also see here that as the
cue indicates a higher probability of the upcoming stimulus, the absolute value of the
drift rate increases. Thus, when as the cue progress from 30% probability of face to 50%
probability to 70% probability, the drift rate for face stimuli likewise increases. For car
stimuli, as the cue progresses from 30% probability of car to 50% probability to 70%
probability, the drift rate for car stimuli becomes increasingly negative.
In Figure 5.6f, we show the bias variable varies with cue probability and on each day
of learning. As can be seen, the bias increases towards a face response with the increasing
probability of a face stimulus according to the cue. We also notice a gradual rise in the
average face bias with each day of learning.
5.4 Discussion
The diffusion model analysis of the data from the first project, i.e. the project presented
in Chapter 2 and in Diaz et al. (2017), reveals that the locus of the effect of learning on
the increased speed and accuracy that we described in Chapter 2 is due to the increased
absolute value of the drift rate with learning. Note that the model comparison analysis for
the HDDM models revealed that the model fit when learning was included as a predictor
of both boundary separation and non-decision times was in fact poorer compared to when
these parameters were constant effects. This result alone is sufficient to establish that
learning does not reliably affect either the boundary separation or non-decision time in
the diffusion model. The only variable that learning does affect is the drift rate, and this
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effect is clearly visible in the posterior plots shown in Figure 5.4e. This result largely
corroborates results presented in Petrov, Van Horn, and Ratcliff (2011) who showed a
stimulus-specific increase in the drift-rate parameter in a perceptual learning experiment
over the course of multiple days. As such, our results provide a replication of some of
the main findings of Petrov et al. (2011) and so provide additional evidence, along with
the results presented in Chapter 2, confirming that the effect of learning on perceptual
decision making is to increase the speed and efficiency of evidence accumulation.
In addition to establishing the main effect of learning is to increase the drift rate, this
study corroborates results presented in Philiastides et al. (2006b); Ratcliff et al. (2009a).
Philiastides et al. (2006b) showed a correlation between the strength of the late component
and the mean drift rate in a diffusion model that was applied to six subjects at five different
phase coherence levels. Ratcliff et al. (2009a) divided trials on a face/car discrimination
task on the basis of the amplitude of the late temporal component. Doing so, they found
that there was positive correlation between the late component amplitude and the drift
rate in the diffusion model. Dividing the trials in terms of the amplitude of the early
component resulted in no correlation between the amplitudes of the early component and
the drift rate.
For the case of the data from the experiment concerning the role of prior expectation,
the model fit analysis here was focused on how the day of learning and the cue proba-
bility affects the drift rate and the bias. The model fit statistics clearly show that both
the drift rate and the bias are independently affected by the day of learning and the cue
probability. In neither case do we see any evidence in favour of an interaction of these two
predictor variables. While the model fit statistics are sufficient to establish a statistically
reliable effect of cue probability on both the drift rate and bias, the effect on drift rate is
both clearer and more straightforward. In other words, as the probability of the upcoming
stimulus increases, so too does the absolute value of the drift rate. This shows that prior
expectation as indicated by the pre-stimulus cue leads to a faster and more efficient accu-
mulation of evidence when making a decision. These results are consistent with Hanks
et al. (2011); Cravo et al. (2013); Dunovan et al. (2014), reviewed in Chapter 4, who
argued, using results from NHPs and human subjects, that the prior expectation increases
the accumulation of evidence to reach a decision threshold.
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In comparison to the effect of cue probability on drift rate, the effect of cue on bias is
less clear. While we observe that with increasing probability of a face response, there is an
increase in the bias towards faces, we do not observe an increasing bias towards cars when
the probability of car stimulus is high. In other words, there is always a bias in favour of
face stimuli and this increases as cue predicts face stimuli. This average bias towards the
face responses does not have an obvious explanation. Moreover, the rise, albeit limited,
in this average bias towards faces as training increases is also an anomalous result.
Comparing our results for these diffusion model simulations with those Dunovan et al.
(2014), the results are similar with respect to the drift rate. In both Dunovan et al. (2014)
and here, a clear result of drift rate increase with training is observed. However, Dunovan
et al. (2014) observed a much clearer effect of learning on bias. In our analysis, the effect
of learning on bias was less strong. It is worth noting as well that in the finding presented
in Philiastides et al. (2006b); Ratcliff et al. (2009a), the correspondence between the EEG
late temporal component is also observed only with respect to the drift rate.
5.4.1 Investigating the possible effects of outlier
One possible explanation of the relatively unexpected findings with respect to the bias
may have been due to an extreme influence caused by outliers. In particular, the distribu-
tion of reaction times necessarily assigns a probability density of zero to any reaction time
that occurs in the non-decision time interval. When fitting the model, therefore, the non-
decision time must be at most equal to the fastest reaction time. Occasionally, extraordi-
narily fast reaction times may occur by accident, for example, by a premature key-press
almost at the moment the stimulus presentation. Whenever, these reaction times occur,
they will necessarily lead to the non-decision time being reduced to an unrealistic value.
As a consequence, estimated value of all other parameters may also be affected.
In order to consider this possibility further, we plotted all reaction times by all par-
ticipants in our two data-sets. This is shown in Figure 5.7. As can be seen, in both
experiments, the distribution of the data is typical of the distribution of reaction times. In
particular, there is a considerable positive skew, i.e., a long tail of reaction times in the
positive/higher direction. Although some of these data will necessarily be far from the
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Figure 5.7: Plots of all reaction times to identify outliers. Here, we plot every reaction time by
each subject in each of our two experiments (a shows data from Experiment 1, b shows data from
Experiment 2). In all cases, the distribution of points is typical of reaction time data. In particular,
we see a considerable positive skew, i.e. there is a long tail of reaction times in the positive or
higher direction. None of the points in the positive tail can be regarded as outlier per se. On the
opposite tail, in the data from Experiment 2, there are a small number of points, shown in red, that
can be regarded as legitimate cases of outliers.
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mean, they do not constitute outliers per se. An outlier is defined generally as a point that
does not conform to a particular distribution.
For example, in a normal distribution, given that only around one half of 1 percent
of data will be beyond around 2.5 standard deviations from the mean, it is reasonable to
regard points much greater than this as a outliers. In other words, any points much greater
than this threshold can be regarded as not having arisen from the normal distribution that
describes the remainder of the data. Using the same reasoning, however, we can not easily
regard any points in the upper tail of the distributions depicted in Figure 5.7 as outlier be-
cause, by the nature of the highly skewed probability distribution of reaction times, there
will necessarily be a large number of points sparsely spread out in the positive direction.
Moreover, for the immediate practical problem we are investigating, as mentioned above,
it is fast reaction times are the potential source of anomalous results, and so in this respect,
large reaction times are not an immediate problem.
Turning our attention to the lower tail, there are no obvious cases of outliers in the
data from Experiment 1, which are depicted in Figure 5.7a. In particular, there are no
points that are more extreme than approximately 15ms faster than others. In other words,
across all subjects in this experiment, the very fastest reaction times are within 15ms
lower than the next fastest times. Given that the resolution of the reaction time recording
is approximately 15ms3, there is virtually no gap between the very fastest reaction times
and the next fastest ones, and the fastest reaction times are not anomalous and should not
be regarded as outliers.
In the data from Experiment II, i.e., the data depicted in Figure 5.7b, there are clearly
some outliers. Most noticeably there is the one extremely fast reaction time, hundreds of
milliseconds faster than the next fastest, in the case of Subject 15. Defining as an outlier
any reaction times faster by more than 30ms from the next fastest reaction times, we can
identify seven outliers. These are depicted in red in Figure 5.7b.
There are two important points to make out these outliers. First, there are very few
of them. Second, with the exception of perhaps a single point, they are not extreme. As
such, it is unlikely that their removal from the data will be of any practical consequence.
3PsychoPy uses the graphics card rate to record reaction times. We use a 60Hz graphics card, so the
resolution is close to 16ms.
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In order to test this, having removed these outliers, we than re-ran all 16 models, and re-
calculated the WAIC for each. As expected, there were no major differences in the pattern
of results, and in particular, the same models were identified as being the best fitting ones.
From this, we conclude that outliers are unlikely to have caused any adverse effect on the
main results reported in this chapter. In particular, we were concerned with any extremely
fast reaction times adversely affecting the parameter estimates. Because there may have
been only a single extra fast reaction time data point, with the other points that we have
identified as outliers being neither extremely fast, nor very much faster than other reaction
times by those participants, it is implausible that the presence of these few data points in
data-sets of tens of thousands are likely to have had any major effect on the results.
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Chapter 6
General conclusions
In psychology and neuroscience, decision making can be generally described as the com-
mitment to a classification of data, which is then usually followed by a voluntary response
or action. A special case of decision making is perceptual decision making, which is the
classification of sensory, or sensory-motor, information usually followed by an overt be-
havioural response. In any perceptual decision making, we experience auditory, visual
and other sensory information, classify that information as belonging of some category,
and then respond accordingly.
All decision making can be described from a statistical point of view: There is ob-
served data, a set of possible classifications of this data, and a reward or loss function
that gives the payoff or loss for any given choice. Bayes’s rule allows us to calculate the
probability that a given classification of the observed data is correct, and we then combine
that with the loss function to determine the expected reward or punishment for any given
decision that we make. This time course of this process of weighing evidence and mak-
ing a choice when the evidence is sufficient to indicate a high probability of a successful
classification can be modelled using sequential sampling models, such as the DDM (e.g.
Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff et al., 2004; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008;
Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2011). Sequential sampling models have proven effective in
modelling both the behavioural and neuroscientific aspects of decision making. In human
neuroscience using EEG recording, studies such as O’Connell et al. (2012); Kelly and
O’Connell (2013) and Philiastides and Sajda (2006); Philiastides et al. (2006a, 2006a);
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Ratcliff et al. (2009b) have proven effective in measuring the nature and time-course de-
cision making in the human brain.
In this thesis, our aim has been to address some open questions with respect to human
perceptual decision using the theoretical framework of sequential sampling models and
the experimental paradigm of measuring temporal components in single-trial EEG dis-
criminant analysis. As we have laid out in Chapter 1, the two open questions that we will
address in this thesis are how does learning or training affect perceptual decision making,
and how do prior experiences interact with learning to affect perceptual decision making.
6.1 The neural locus of perceptual learning
In Chapter 2, we provided evidence that perceptual learning arises from changes in higher
level brain areas that are related to decision-making, rather than from perceptually ear-
lier areas that are related to the encoding of sensory stimuli. Our results are premised on
previous single trial EEG analyses (Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2006a;
Ratcliff et al., 2009b) that have established that there are two major EEG temporal compo-
nents that correlate with perceptual discrimination behaviours: One component, the early
component, has been shown to be indicative of sensory processing, while the second late
temporal component has been shown to be the neural signature of the decision-related
part of the perceptual classification task. In Chapter 2 we have shown that the later EEG
temporal component but not the early one increases in strength and occurs earlier in time
as a function of perceptual learning. In particular, we show that for each extra day of
perceptual training, the area under the ROC curve (a value bounded between 0.5 and 1.0),
which quantifies the discriminating performance of the EEG components, significantly in-
creases for the late component but does not significantly change for the early component.
Likewise, the onset time of the late component occurs significantly earlier with every day
of training, while there is no significant change in onset time for the early component.
The primary significance of these findings lies in how they relate to the ongoing de-
bate about the neural locus and information processing stage at which perceptual learning
occurs. In particular, given that perceptual learning is inextricably related to perceptual
decision making — improvements in detecting, discriminating, identifying or respond-
121
ing to sensory stimuli all necessarily involve improvements in the speed and accuracy of
perceptual decision making — an open question is the extent to which perceptual learn-
ing is due to improvements in general decision making processes or due to improvement
in sensory abilities that are (informationally and temporally) prior to perceptual decision
making.
The traditional perspective on the nature and locus of perceptual learning is that it
arises early in the perceptual system. For example, well known seminal results from
psychophysics have demonstrated that perceptual learning is often highly specific to the
location and other properties of the stimuli (Fiorentini & Berardi, 1980; Poggio et al.,
1992; Fahle & Edelman, 1993; Karni & Sagi, 1991; Crist et al., 1997; Ball & Sekuler,
1987; Sagi & Tanne, 1994), implying that its plasticity is highly specific to the trained
retinal location (Fahle, 2004, 2005). In contrast to this traditional perspective, alternative
psychophysical studies have proposed that perceptual learning arises not from plasticity
in primary sensory areas, but rather from changes in how sensory signals are read out or
interpreted by decision-making mechanisms Dosher and Lu (1999); Petrov et al. (2005);
Lu et al. (2010). Indeed, results from NHPs (Law & Gold, 2008a, 2009) have provided
compelling evidence in support of this general hypothesis, demonstrating that perceptual
learning involves areas beyond the perceptual system, and in particular, decision making
centres of brain such as LIP and ACC.
The results that we have presented in Chapter 2 provide corroborating evidence for
the results obtained by (Law & Gold, 2008a) and show that their findings with primates
also extend to the human brain. In particular, we provide evidence in humans that per-
ceptual learning does not change how sensory information is represented in the brain,
but rather how sensory representations are interpreted, particularly by higher areas in the
brain involved in decision making. For example, the finding that the late decision-related
component increases as a function of learning and systematically moves backward in time
is consistent with a faster and move efficient accumulation of evidence and this is indica-
tive of the strengthening of the connections between early sensory encoding regions and
the final areas involving choice commitment.
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6.2 Reinforcement learning models of perceptual learn-
ing
Previous accounts of perceptual learning by Law and Gold (2009); Kahnt et al. (2011)
have showed that learning-induced behavioural improvements in perceptual decision mak-
ing could be reliably explained in terms of a reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto,
1998) mechanism. The behavioural and EEG results we present in Chapter 2 are also
compatible with this account. In Chapter 3, on the basis of a reinforcement learning
model identical to Kahnt et al. (2011), we described a highly significant correlation with
the behavioural error rates in the perceptual task. More importantly, we have established
that the reinforcement learning model’s decision variable corresponds more closely to the
y variable measured at the late component than at the early component. These results
imply that reward based feedback from decisions may play a vital role in the trial by trial
learning in perceptual tasks.
In addition, as described in Section 3.4, in Diaz et al. (2017), we provided an RL
model that is an extension of our initial model. The main innovation of this extended
model is that it includes both signal and noise weights. While the signal weights were
designated to enhance stimulus representations, the noise weights accounted for the inter-
ference exerted by the antagonistic stimulus against the acquisition of the correct sensory
associations. Thus, in this model, perceptual learning is expected to occur through grad-
ually increasing signal weights as well as gradually decreasing noise weights. Compared
with Law and Gold (2009); Kahnt et al. (2011), this better captures instances whereby
improved task performance depends both on greater ability to recognize a given stimulus
and on greater ability to rule out the antagonistic stimulus. For example, on a face trial,
subjects might correctly choose the face response either because they are able to identify
face-like features or else because they are able to recognize that there are no car-like fea-
tures, or else through some combination of both these two pattern recognition processes.
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6.3 The role of prior expectation in perceptual learn-
ing
In Chapter 4, our behavioural results clearly demonstrate that as the probability of the up-
coming stimulus according to the cue increases, so too does the speed and the accuracy of
the perceptual decision. On the basis of a discriminant analysis identical to that described
in Chapter 2, we also showed that how the pre-stimulus cue affects the late temporal com-
ponent parallels how the cue affects the probability of making a face response. Notably,
we did not find a similar correspondence between the probability of a face response and
the effect of the cue on the early component. The results in this chapter are consistent with
how prior expectation affects evidence accumulation, as revealed by, for example, Hanks
et al. (2011); Cravo et al. (2013); Dunovan et al. (2014). While these results are less
consistent with the baseline activation hypothesis as forwarded by, for example, Basso
and Wurtz (1998); de Lange et al. (2013); Albright (2012), we did observe a post-cue
pre-stimulus EEG component that is arguably related to attentional mechanisms. This lat-
ter result may imply that pre-stimulus cues also lead to a change in baseline activation of
sensory processes.
6.4 Drift diffusion models of perceptual learning
The diffusion model analysis of the data from Chapter 2 reveals that the locus of the
effect of learning on the increased reaction time and increased accuracy that we described
in that chapter is largely due to the increased absolute value of the drift rate with learning.
The model comparison analysis established that learning does not reliably effect either
the boundary separation or non-decision time in the diffusion model. The only variable
that learning does effect is the drift rate. These results are in line with results by Petrov
et al. (2011) who showed an increase in the drift-rate parameter in a perceptual learning
experiment. They also corroborate results presented in Philiastides et al. (2006b) that
showed a correlation between the strength of the late component and the mean drift rate
in a diffusion model, and by Ratcliff et al. (2009a) who found that there was positive
correlation between the late component amplitude and the drift rate in the diffusion model.
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For the case of the data from the experiment described in Chapter 4, the HDDM simu-
lations show that both the drift rate and the bias are independently affected by the day of
learning and the cue probability but we do not see any evidence in favour of an interaction
of these two predictor variables. We show that as the probability of the upcoming stimu-
lus increases, so too does the (absolute) value of the drift rate, and this implies that prior
expectation leads to a faster and more efficient accumulation of evidence when making a
decision.
6.5 Limitations, extensions, & future directions
Collecting more behavioural data: The behavioural data that we collected in our main
experiments was collected while the participants were being EEG recorded. Because col-
lecting EEG data is resource and time expensive, it was not possible to collect very large
amounts of data. However, if we were to restrict ourselves solely to the collection of the
behavioural data alone, it would be possible to collect larger amounts of behavioural data.
While behavioural data alone is obviously not sufficient to address our main questions,
larger amounts of behavioural data could be particularly valuable for some questions. For
example, all of the analyses using the DDM and HDDM described in Chapter 5 were based
solely on behavioural, and not EEG, data. Had we performed these experiments with
larger numbers of participants, we would have been able to perform improved analyses.
In particular, larger amounts of behavioural data would have been able to provide more
certainty concerning the parameters of the HDDM. It would have also provide more sta-
tistical power to allow us to better discriminate between the competing models that we
used. As it currently stands, on the basis of the model comparisons, some of the predictor
variables did not appear to affect some of the HDDM parameters. However, this may have
been a consequence of lack of statistical power due to the relatively low numbers of par-
ticipants. The general problem of lack of statistical power in neuroscience, particularly
cognitive neuroscience, studies has been recently described in Button et al. (2013).
Alternative behavioural tasks and EEG analyses: An alternative EEG experiment that
could be used to investigate the temporal processes of perceptual decision making is based
on the experimental paradigm described in Kelly and O’Connell (2013); O’Connell et al.
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(2012). Using a continuously flickering, but gradually changing visual stimulus, it has
been claimed that this method has the potential to identify a supra-modal accumulation-
to-bound decision making variable that manifests itself a CPP ERP. Although we have
performed pilot experiments using this method (not described in this thesis), we have
not fully explored the potential of this method to provide a complementary experimental
paradigm for the study of the temporal dynamics of perceptual decision making.
Extensions to developmental studies: We have investigated how learning affects percep-
tual decision making. An important related question is the developmental trajectories of
the perceptual decision making system. In other words, how does the temporal dynamics
of perceptual decision making change from childhood to adulthood. This topic is related
to studies of development changes in decision making studied using DDM models (e.g.,
Ratcliff, Love, Thompson, & Opfer, 2012). In principle, the main experimental paradigm
that we have used, using a similar visual discrimination task, and modelled and analysed
using a combination of single trial EEG analysis and HDDM computational models could
be equally well employed using children and ages between childhood and adulthood.
6.6 Conclusion & main contribution to the field of
perceptual learning and decision making
The present thesis presented the empirical findings and computational modelling from
two major studies that investigated the neural signatures of perceptual decision making.
The aim was to address two open question concerning human perceptual decision mak-
ing: how does learning affect perceptual decision making and how do prior expectations
interact with learning to affect perceptual decision making.
Our first study provided insights into the neurobiology of perception learning by show-
ing that the locus of learning can be in higher level brain areas that are related to decision-
making rather than necessarily arising in areas that are related to the encoding of sensory
stimuli. Specifically, this study showed that perceptual learning involves larger changes
in decision related stages of perceptual processing compared to the sensory processing
stages. Moreover, it showed that these decision-related stages increase in importance as
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a function of learning and systematically occur earlier in time, which is consistent with a
faster and more efficient accumulation of relevant decision evidence. This particular re-
sult is also corroborated by drift diffusion modelling of the behavioural data, which shows
a clear effect of learning on the efficiency of the accumulation of evidence for decision
making. It also showed that behavioural improvements as a function of perceptual learn-
ing can be explained with a simple reinforcement learning model. This result has impli-
cations of our understanding of the relationships between general reward-based learning
and decision-making mechanism in perceptual learning. Overall, this study provides crit-
ical insights into the neurobiology of perceptual learning and offers strong support to the
notion that neuronal plasticity can occur at multiple time-scales and locations, depend-
ing on task demands and context. As such our findings can help revise existing theories
of perceptual learning focusing only on early sensory processing and provide the foun-
dation upon which future studies continue to interrogate the neural systems underlying
perceptual decision making (see, Diaz et al., 2017).
From our second study, we have provided insights into the neural signatures of the
effect of prior expectations on perceptual decision making in a learning task. This study
both corroborates and extends our first study. We showed that there is a relationship
between the predictive power of pre-stimulus cues and the strength of the decision related
stages, but not the sensory processing stages, of perceptual learning. Also in this study,
the drift-diffusion modelling shows that prior expectation affects both drift rate and the
bias, which means that the pre-stimulus information can lead to a faster and more efficient
accumulation of evidence during perceptual processing.
In summary, this thesis has provided compelling evidence that perceptual learning
alters post-sensory processing in human decision-making and likewise that how prior ex-
pectations affect decision making is through its effect on post-sensory processing. Taking
together, our results represent a step toward a more theoretical and experimental frame-
work of the study of the neural signatures of human decision making in the context of
perceptual learning.
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Appendix A
Pilot experiments from Chapter 2
A.1 Overview
Before embarking on the main experiment, we carried out a set of 5 separate pilot exper-
iments. Of the 5 pilot experiments, 2 form what we call below Pilot experiment set I, and
two form Pilot experiment set 2. We call the fifth experiment, the Main pilot experiment.
The main purpose of these pilot experiments is to verify if the accuracy and the speed
of response increases over days, and whether these accuracy and speed effects increase
with learning, and finally to see if there is any significant effect of the role of feedback on
learning. In total, 34 subjects were used in these pilot experiments and each subject was
tested on each of three consecutive days, giving a total of 102 experiment sessions. In all
pilots, the stimuli and the general behavioural paradigm were identical.
Performing pilot studies is generally a necessary step to obtain a good experimental
design. They provide us with vital insight into how the eventual main experiment is likely
to proceed. Of particular importance in these pilot studies, however, was to investigate ex-
perimental settings, especially the ideal level of noise to use with the stimuli. Ultimately,
we were looking for stimuli and noise levels that would lead to the clearest indication of
perceptual learning in our subjects, as seen in both the subjects’ speed and accuracies.
Thus, in the different pilot experiments, the main difference between them lies in the
number of distinct noise levels and the actual values of these noise levels.
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A.2 Materials & methods
A.2.1 Stimuli
The stimuli used for this main experiments were drawn from the same set of stimuli
described in the pilot experiments description in Chapter 2.
A.2.2 General behavioural paradigm
Trials in the pilot experiments were presented in 4 blocks of either 80 or 120 trials each.
On each trial, a blank screen was displayed for a random duration that ranged uniformly
between either 1100 and 1600 milliseconds or 1000 to 1500 milliseconds. The image
stimulus was then presented for a fixed duration of 100 milliseconds. A blank screen
was then redisplayed. Subjects were given up to 1250 milliseconds to make the response,
which they did using the arrow keys (⇐ for face,⇒ for car). After a response, or after the
timeout interval had elapsed, the experiment proceeded to the next trial. In some cases,
as explained below, feedback after each trial was provided. Each experiment session was
completed within approximately 20 minutes. Each subject performed this task on three
consecutive days. They did so at approximately the same time of day on each day so that
there was approximately 24 hours between each session.
A.2.3 Pilot experiment set 1
In the first set of pilot experiments, 3 levels of stimulus coherence were used. For one
group of 5 subjects, the coherences levels were levels 25%, 30% and 35% for face images,
and levels 30%, 35% and 40% for car images. For a second group of 6 subjects, the
coherences levels were levels 27.5%, 32.5% and 37.5% for faces, and again levels 30%,
35% and 40% for cars. The two image categories, each with 20 different instances at
3 different levels of coherence gave 2 × 20 × 3 = 120 unique images used as stimuli in
these experiment. Each image was presented 4 times in total, giving 480 trials per session.
These trials were presented in 4 blocks of 120 trials each, with a rest period of 60 seconds
between blocks. The task design of this pilot experiment set, and pilot experiment set 2,
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Figure A.1: The task design pilot experiment sets 1 & 2. The subjects’ task was to indicate
whether the briefly shown noisy image was either a face or car. Responses had to be made within
the allowed interval of 1250ms.
are shown in Figure A.1. Descriptions of the stimuli of this pilot experiment set, and pilot
experiment set 2, are shown in Figure A.2.
A.2.4 Pilot experiment set 2
In the second set of pilot experiments, 2 levels of coherence were used. For one group
of 6 subjects, the coherences levels were levels 27.5% and 32.5% for faces, and levels
30% and 35% cars. For a second group of 6 subjects, coherence levels 30% and 35%
were used for both face and car images. With two levels of coherence, this gave 2 × 20
× 3 = 80 unique images, with each being presented 4 times for a total of 320 trials per
experiment session. These were presented in 4 blocks of 80 trials, with a 60 second rest
period between blocks.
A.2.5 Main pilot experiment
The main experiment used 2 levels of coherence. Coherence values of 32.5% and 37.5%
were used for both faces and car images. The number of trials, blocks and trials per block
was identical to that of pilot experiment set 2. In this experiment, all details of the general
procedure remained the same as in the other pilot studies with the exception that now
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Figure A.2: Examples of stimuli used in Pilot Experiment 1 (above) and Pilot Experiment 2 (be-
low).
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feedback on responses was provided and the durations of the intervals before and after
the stimulus presentation were modified to minor extents. Now, at the start of each trial,
a blank screen was displayed for a random duration that ranged uniformly on the interval
1000 to 1500. The stimulus was displayed, as previously, for 100 milliseconds and a
interval of 1250 was allowed for a response. If the subject responded correctly during this
interval, a! image was displayed for 500 milliseconds. If the subject was incorrect, or if
they did not respond within the allowed interval, a% was displayed for 500 milliseconds.
The task design and the description of the stimuli for the main pilot experiment are shown
in Figure A.3.
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Figure A.3: The task design and stimuli for the main pilot experiment. The principal difference
between the task here compared to that of the other pilot experiments is that feedback after each
trial was provided.
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A.3 Results
Reaction time and accuracy for pilot experiment sets 1 and 2 and the main pilot exper-
iment are shown in Figure A.4. The data used in these plots was obtained as follows.
Trials in which the subjects did not respond in the response interval — 1.5% of trials in
pilot experiments set 1, 2.8% of trials in pilot experiment set 2, 1.5% of trials in the main
experiment — were excluded from the analysis. Although the actual coherence values
differed across the experiments in each set, we treated the levels in these experiment as
effectively high, medium and low for the three level experiments and high and low for
the two level experiments. Using the hit trials, we calculated the average accuracy on
each day and for each of the levels of coherence, averaging over all trials and all sub-
jects. For trials on which the response was accurate, we also calculated average reaction
time latency for each day and each coherence level, again averaging over all trials and all
subjects.
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Figure A.4: Accuracy (top row) and reaction time latency (bottom row) for pilot experiment set
1 (left column), pilot experiment set 2 (middle column) and the main pilot experiment (right col-
umn).
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As can be seen in Figure A.4, there is a clear apparent tendency for accuracy to in-
crease and for reaction time latency to decrease over the three testing days. This is evident
in both sets of pilot experiments and in the main experiment. This general trend manifests
itself with minor variations across each experiment version.
As mentioned, we modelled the accuracy data using a mixed effects logistic regression
analysis, and the reaction time latencies for accurate responses using a mixed effects linear
regression. The level of coherence (i.e. low, medium, high for pilot set 1; low and high
for pilot set 2 and the main pilot experiment) and day of session (i.e. day 1, day 2 and
day 3), and the interaction of coherence level and day of session, were treated as fixed
effects in this analysis. The identity of the prototype image (i.e. for each stimulus, which
of the 20 original faces or 20 original cars was used), and the identity of the subject
were treated as random effects. Treating image prototype identity and subject identity
as random effects allows us to model possible inter-item and inter-subject variability in
the effects, and does so while avoiding the known inadequacies of repeated-measures
analyses (see, e.g., Baayen et al., 2008, for further discussion). For each analysis, we
used a log-likelihood ratio test — which can be formulated using a χ2 test — to test for
main effects and interaction effects.
For the accuracy analysis, in both sets of pilot studies and in the main experiment,
there were highly significant main effects for both the level of coherence and the day of
the session. There were only marginally significant effects of an interaction between the
two main variables. The values of the χ2 statistics — the degrees of freedom are shown in
the parenthetical subscript — and their p-values are shown in the following table, where
the rows represent the study and the columns represent the main or interaction effects.
coherence session interaction
Pilot set 1 χ2(2) = 57.43, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 52.92, p < 0.01 χ
2
(4) = 2.88, p = 0.06
Pilot set 2 χ2(2) = 13.29, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 76.61, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 5.97, p = 0.05
Main pilot experiment χ2(2) = 9.56, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 160.50, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 4.97, p = 0.08
For the latency analysis, a very similar pattern was observed to that found in the
accuracy analysis. In both sets of pilots and in the main experiment, highly significant
main effects of both level of coherence and day of session were found. However, no
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significant effect of an interaction between these two variables was found. The values of
the χ2 test statistic and their p-values are shown in the following table.
coherence session interaction
Pilot set 1 χ2(2) = 35.86, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 441.85, p < 0.01 χ
2
(4) = 6.92, p = 0.14
Pilot set 2 χ2(2) = 6.95, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 53.90, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 1.52, p = 0.47
Main pilot experiment χ2(2) = 8.37, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 365.49, p < 0.01 χ
2
(2) = 3.64, p = 0.16
A.4 Discussion of pilot studies
On the basis of the pilot experiment results, we can conclude that the behavioural paradigm
appears to be robust and working according to expectation. In all variants of the exper-
iment, we have observed significant increases in both accuracy and response speed of
decision making over the course of the learning period. Given that learning has occurred
and that this decision making task has been shown to yield strong neural signatures (e.g.,
Philiastides et al., 2006b; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2009a), we can be
confident that EEG-detectable learning based changes in decision making system will oc-
cur in the main experiment described next.
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Appendix B
Pilot experiments from Chapter 4
B.1 Overview
Before embarking on the intensive main experiment, we carried out 3 pilot experiments
to verify that the main behavioural phenomenon that we expect to observe will occur with
our choice of experimental parameters. With 3 pilots, we will verify if the accuracy and
the speed of response increases with the increasing match between the pre-stimulus cue
and the observed stimulus category, and whether these accuracy and speed effects increase
with learning.
In total, 18 subjects were used in these pilot experiments and each subject was tested
on each of one or two consecutive days, giving a total of 24 experiment sessions. In all
pilots, the stimuli and the general behavioural paradigm were identical.
As was the case for the pilot experiments described in Appendix A, the general aim
of these pilot studies is to determine optimal experimental settings to observe the phe-
nomenon we aim to study in the main experiment. Specifically, we are interested in
determining the optimal levels of noise to use with our stimuli, the amount of training
that is required to see the effect of prior expectations, and which type of pre-stimulus cues
are optimal (for example, shapes or labels).
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Figure B.1: The general characteristics of the behavioural task for the pilot experiments in Chap-
ter 4.
B.2 General experimental design
For the three pilot experiments that we describe below, we always use the behavioural task
shown in Figure B.1. On each trial of the experiment, a subject is shown a pre-stimulus
cue, and then they must decide if a noisy image contains a face or car. The images were
identical to the set of 18 noisy face and car stimuli that were used in the experiment
described in Diaz et al. (2017) and in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
In all three pilots, there were three types of cues in the experiment: triangle, diamond,
and hexagon. The triangle indicates the probability of a face stimulus being shown on the
upcoming trial is exactly 0.30, which also means the probability of the upcoming stimulus
being a car is 0.70. The hexagon cue has the opposite meaning, i.e., it indicates that the
probability of a face stimulus being shown on the upcoming trial is exactly 0.70, and the
probability of the upcoming stimulus being a car is 0.30. The diamond cue indicates the
probability of the upcoming stimulus being a face or car is equally likely, i.e. probability
is 0.50 for both stimuli.
In the different pilot experiments, we use different values for the low and high coher-
ence, see below for details. As in the experiment described in Chapter 2, we also provide
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Figure B.2: Pilot experiment 1: Average accuracy of response and how it changes with stimulus
type, cue probability, and stimulus coherence.
feedback after each trial. As before, this takes the form of a correct or incorrect symbol,
which is displayed for 500ms. Pilots 1 and 3 took place in one session on one day. Pilot
2, on the other hand, took place in two sessions over consecutive days.
B.3 Pilot experiment 1
Pilot 1 used 6 participants (2 male, 4 female). Each participant was shown 6 blocks
of trials, with each block containing 72 trials. The experimental task on each trial was
exactly as described above. The two noise levels used were as follows: Low coherence
for both face and car images, 32.50% coherence; high coherence for both face and car
images, 37.50% coherence.
Accuracy analysis
The average accuracy of response and how it changes with predictor variables is shown
in Figure B.2. Note that the three predictor variables here are a) the stimulus type on that
trial, i.e., whether the stimulus is a face or car image, b) the coherence type on that trial,
i.e., whether it is high or low coherence, and c) the probabilistic information provided
by the cue on that trial. We represent the cue predictor variable as a continuous variable
that takes on values of 0.30, 0.50 or 0.70. These values represent the probabilities of
the upcoming stimulus on each trial being a face, and 1 minus the values represent that
probability that the upcoming stimulus is a car.
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We statistically model the accuracy of responses using a random effects (i.e., multi-
level or hierarchical) logistic regression model. In particular, the logarithm of the odds
of an accurate response on any given trial is modelled as a function of three fixed effects,
and their interactions, and two random effects. The three fixed effect variables are the
stimulus type on that trial, the coherence type on that trial, and the probabilistic infor-
mation provided by the cue on that trial. The two random effects model a) the effect of
the particular participant and b) the specific image that is shown on any given trial. The
purpose of random effects for the participant is simply to model how each individual par-
ticipant may have, on average, a higher or lower accuracy rate in this experiment. The
random effect for the specific image models how a particular e.g. face image may have,
on average, a higher or lower accuracy rate. To be clear, both the participant and image
random effects are effectively random intercept terms in the regression, see below for
more details. In other words, we do not model these effects as random slopes that could
model the potential interaction effects of participant or image on the stimulus, coherence,
or cue probability predictors.
We expect a potential three way interaction between the stimulus type, coherence level
and cue probability variables. In other words, we expect that the probability of an accurate
response will vary according to the cue probability and this will differ for trials with face
stimuli and car stimuli, and also with the level of coherence level of the stimulus. Clearly,
the effect of the cue is expected to affect accuracy of response differently depending on
whether the trial has a face or a car stimulus. For example, if the cue is a triangle, then
the probability of the upcoming stimulus being a car is 0.70 and the probability of it
being a face is 0.30. If the actual stimulus on that trial is in fact a car, we expect a more
accurate response, and we expect a less accurate if the actual stimulus is a face. As such,
an interaction between the stimulus and cue is necessarily the case if the cue is in any way
effective. In addition, we expect that this interaction may vary between the high and low
coherence trials. This is not necessarily the case according to the main hypothesis under
investigation. However, it is likely that the effect of cue on accuracy may be more or less
effective depending on the level of noise in the stimulus.
Therefore, in this analysis, we obtain a measure of model fit for the full interaction
model, i.e. the model that has the three-way interaction, the three two-way interactions,
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and the three main effects. We compare this to the model fit measure of the model without
the three-way interaction, i.e. with only the three two-way interactions, and the three main
effects. Below, we refer to this model as the two-way model. For completeness, we also
obtain the model fit measure for the model with only the main effects, referring to this
as the one-way model, and also for the null model where the probability of an accurate
response is modelled as a constant probability across all trials.
All three random effects logistic regression models can be represented using the fol-
lowing general form:
log
(
P(yi = 1)
1−P(yi = 1)
)
= β0+β1x1i+ . . .+βKxKi︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+ γ[subjecti]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+ υ[itemi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
.
Here, the yi signifies the accuracy of the response on trial i, with yi = 1 when the re-
sponse is correct and yi = 0 when the response is incorrect. The β0,β1 . . .βK represent
the coefficients for the fixed effects and their interactions. There is a variable number
of these coefficients depending on which predictor variables and interactions are used in
any given model. For each of the j ∈ 1 . . .J participants in the experiment, there is γ j,
and γ1 . . .γ j . . .γJ are also modelled as drawn from a normal distribution with 0 mean and
standard deviation σγ . Likewise, each of the j = l ∈ 1 . . .L participants in the experiment,
there is a υl , and υ1 . . .υl . . .υL are also modelled as drawn from a normal distribution
with 0 mean and standard deviation συ .
In the following table, we show the AIC values for Full, two-way, one-way, and null
models.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
2027 2038 2042 2059
As can be seen, the Full model has the best model fit. Each model fit can be compared
the best fitting model using the differences in AIC values. Following Burnham, any model
whose AIC value is greater than at least 10 units is said to have effectively zero evidence
in favour of it relative to the best fitting model. As such, the Full model can be said to be
highly significantly better than the other three models.
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Given that there is a three-way interaction, the effect of the cue type on the probability
of an accurate response is differ for face and car stimuli, and this effect itself differs for
the low and high coherence trials. In order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we now
use two separate regression models, one for the low coherence trials and another for the
high coherence trials. The table of coefficients for the predictors in the high coherence
trials is as follows:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 3.48 0.53 6.60 <0.01
stimulusface -2.16 0.60 -3.61 <0.01
probability -2.91 0.76 -3.81 <0.01
stimulusface:probability 4.98 1.13 4.41 <0.01
As can be seen, there is a highly significant effect of stimulus type, cue probability
and their interaction. The higher the probability, according to the cue, that the upcoming
stimulus is a face, the higher the accuracy on the face trials. On the car trials, the higher
the probability that the upcoming stimulus is a car (i.e. 1 minus the probability that it will
be a face), the higher the accuracy of the response. These results are precisely in line with
our hypothesis, and show that even with small sample sizes, the hypothesised effects in
this experiment do in fact occur, at least on the high coherence trials.
On the low coherence trials, the effect of the cue and stimulus type and their interac-
tion is as follows:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 1.58 0.45 3.50 <0.01
stimulusface 0.11 0.52 0.22 0.83
probability 0.26 0.70 0.37 0.71
stimulusface:probability -0.38 0.98 -0.39 0.70
Here, there is no significant effect of cue, nor any interaction.
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Figure B.3: Pilot experiment 1: Average reaction time and how it changes with stimulus type, cue
probability, and stimulus coherence.
B.3.1 Reaction time analysis
The average reaction time on each trial and how it changes with predictor variables is
shown in Figure B.3. The three predictor variables here are as above, i.e., the stimulus type
on that trial, the coherence type on that trial, and the probabilistic information provided
by the cue on that trial. Again, we represent the cue predictor variable as a continuous
variable that represents the probability of the upcoming stimulus on each trial being a
face.
In the Figure B.3, the results are shown for all trials, irrespective of whether the re-
sponse was correct or inaccurate. In Figure B.4, we provide the same information as
shown in Figure B.3 but where the trials are divided into accurate and inaccurate re-
sponses. In order to simplify the analysis, and given that there are accurate responses on
84% of the trials, we will now restrict our analysis of reaction times to just the accurate
responses.
Following the approach to the accuracy analysis described above, we statistically
model the reaction time of accurate responses using a random effects (i.e., multilevel
or hierarchical) linear regression model. In particular, the logarithm of the reaction time
on any given trial where the response is accurate is modelled as a function of three fixed
effects, and their interactions, and two random effects. Just as in the case of the accuracy
logistic random effects model, the three fixed effect variables are the stimulus type on
that trial, the coherence type on that trial, and the probabilistic information provided by
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Figure B.4: Pilot experiment 1: Average reaction time and how it changes with stimulus type, cue
probability, and stimulus coherence. Correct and incorrect responses are shown separately.
the cue on that trial, and the two random effects model are the effect of the particular
participant and the specific image that is shown on any given trial. The rationale for the
two random effects is identical to that in the case of the accuracy analysis model.
Again, we expect a potential three way interaction between the stimulus type, coher-
ence level and cue probability variables. Therefore, in this analysis, as above, we obtain
a measure of model fit for a full interaction model, i.e. the model that has the three-way
interaction, the three two-way interactions, and the three main effects. We compare this
to the model fit measure of the model without the three-way interaction, referred to by
the two-way model, and the three main effects, referred to as the one-way model. We also
use a null model whereby reaction time on accurate responses is treated as constant on all
trials.
All three random effects linear regression models for the log of the reaction time on
accurate trials can be represented using the following general form:
log(yi) = β0+β1x1i+ . . .+βKxKi︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+ γ[subjecti]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+ υ[itemi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
random effects
+εi.
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Here, yi signifies the reaction time on trial i. The β0,β1 . . .βK represent the coefficients
for the fixed effects and their interactions. Just as in the case of the logistic regression
for accuracy, there is a variable number of these coefficients depending on which pre-
dictor variables and interactions are used in any given model. For each of the j ∈ 1 . . .J
participants in the experiment, there is γ j, and γ1 . . .γ j . . .γJ are also modelled as drawn
from a normal distribution with 0 mean and standard deviation σγ . Likewise, each of
the j = l ∈ 1 . . .L participants in the experiment, there is a υl , and υ1 . . .υl . . .υL are also
modelled as drawn from a normal distribution with 0 mean and standard deviation συ .
Finally, the trial by trial error term is εi which is also modelled as normally distributed
with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of σ .
The model fit measure that we will use here is again the AIC. In the following table,
we show the AIC values for Full, two-way, one-way, and null models.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
-867.70 -868.80 -863.40 -599
As can be seen, the two-way model has the best model fit. Note that here, the AIC
values are all negative, while in the accuracy analysis above, they are positive. This is
inconsequential and we still interpret the meaning of the values in the same way, i.e., the
lower the AIC, the better the model fit. Each other model’s fit can be compared the best
fitting model using the differences in AIC values. The Full model clearly does not have a
better model fit than the two-way, and as such we can rule out the presence of a three-way
interaction. The AIC of one-way model is greater than that of the two-way model. This
indicates that the two-way model has a better fit than the one-way model. This difference
is, according to the widely accepted thresholds detailed in Burnham, “significant”. We
can further analyse the difference between the one-way and the two-way model by a log-
likelihood ratio test. This difference is also significant, χ2[3] = 11.33, p < 0.01
As above, in order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we now use two separate
regression models, one for the low coherence trials and another for the high coherence
trials. The table of coefficients for the predictors in the high coherence trials is as follows:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
145
(Intercept) -0.52 0.04 14.25 -13.19 <0.01
stimulusface -0.08 0.04 1127 -2.17 0.03
probability 0.09 0.05 1127 1.80 0.07
stimulusface:probability -0.16 0.07 1127 -2.13 0.03
Turning our attention the low coherence trials, the coefficients for the fixed effects are
as follows:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -0.46 0.04 13.84 -10.34 <0.01
stimulusface -0.09 0.04 1044 -2.07 0.04
probability -0.04 0.06 1044 -0.71 0.48
stimulusface:probability -0.05 0.08 1044 -0.55 0.58
Here, there is no significant effect of cue, nor any interaction.
B.3.2 Discussion of Pilot Experiment 1
The hypothesis that the speed and accuracy of response will vary systematically with how
well a pre-stimulus cue predicts a stimulus is partially supported by this pilot experiment.
In particular, we clearly see an improvement in accuracy on relatively noise-less trials
when the cue indicated that the stimulus had a higher probability. This was evident in both
our stimulus types. This effect, however, was not observed at all on the low coherence
trials. In terms of speed of response, on the relatively noise-less trials and when the
responses were accurate, speed of response increased, but not significantly so, on those
trials where the cue indicates that the stimulus had a higher probability. This effect was
not clearly present on the low coherence trials. As such, in summary, we can conclude
that the noise of the trials may make an important difference to the strength of this effect,
and also that the effect may be stronger or more evident in terms of accuracy of response,
rather than reaction time.
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Figure B.5: Pilot experiment 2: Average accuracy of response and how it changes with stimulus
type, cue probability, stimulus coherence, and training day.
B.4 Pilot experiment 2
The purpose of Pilot Experiment 2 was primarily to do a 2 consecutive day version of Pilot
Experiment 1. In Pilot 1, as we have seen, only partial support for our main hypothesis
was obtained. It was arguable, however, that the lack of the effects at relatively high noise
levels and in the reaction time results was simply due to the fact insufficient time was
given to learning the task. Our aim for the actual, i.e. non-pilot, experiment is to allow
three days for learning, and we anticipate that the main phenomenon we are expecting to
observe will become more evident with each day of learning. As such, it is reasonable to
expect that the phenomena we partially observed in Pilot 1 will be clearer or more evident
after two days of learning.
The only change that we made to the experiment was to change the luminance value
of the Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) monitor.
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B.4.1 Accuracy analysis
In order to analyze this data in a manner similar to the analysis used in experiment 1, we
perform separate analyses for data from the first day and from the second day. In both
cases, we perform a random effect logistic regression that is identical to the analysis used
for the accuracy data in Pilot experiment 1. Given that the model is identical to that used
in Pilot 1, we will not repeat its details here and instead refer the reader back to the details
in the previous section.
In the following table, we show the AIC values for Full, two-way, one-way, and null
models for the data on Day 1.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
1989 1987 2005 2119
While in the following table, we show the AIC values for Full, two-way, one-way, and
null models for the data on Day 2.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
1448 1446 1453 1481
On both days, it is the two-way model that is the model with the best model fit. In other
words, we can rule out the presence of the three way interaction between the stimulus type,
cue probability and the coherence level. The two-way model is also “significantly” better
than the one-way model too, given that the AIC value for the two-way model is lower than
that of the one-way model by 17.25 units on Day 1 and by 6.89 units on Day 2. Note that
here we follow Burnham and Anderson (2003) and interpret differences of greater than 4
units as indicating the superiority of the model with the lower value.
In order to further analyse the role of the three predictor variables, we begin by se-
quentially dropping each of the three pairwise interactions, i.e. the interactions of stimu-
lus and cue probability, stimulus and coherence, probability and coherence, and assessing
whether their is a rise in the AIC value. If there is a rise in the AIC with a particular
pairwise interaction removed, this indicates that that pairwise interaction is improving the
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model fit. On the other hand, if there is no change in the AIC value that indicates that the
pairwise interaction is not improving the model fit and can be removed. In the following
table, we see the AIC values of the model with all three pairwise interactions, and the
model when each one of the three pairwise interactions is dropped.
Two-way model Drop stim*prob Drop stim*coh Drop prob*coh
1987 2005 1988 1986
As can be seen, dropping the interaction between the stimulus and cue probability
results in a substantially poorer model fit. Dropping the other two interactions, however,
does not result in any substantial change in the AIC. In fact, dropping the interaction
between the cue probability and coherence results in a small improvement in model fit.
Note that an improvement in AIC is possible given that AIC penalises models with larger
number of parameters. As such, even if the likelihood of model without a given interaction
does not change, the AIC value may be lower due to there being less parameters in the
model.
Dropping the two redundant interactions, the coefficients for the resulting model are
as follows:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 2.45 0.30 8.13 <0.01
stimulusface -0.53 0.41 -1.29 0.20
probability -2.66 0.45 -5.85 <0.01
coherencelow -0.45 0.11 -3.90 <0.01
stimulusface:probability 3.38 0.75 4.49 <0.01
The results for the model comparison procedure on the two-way model but for the data
from the second day is as follows:
Two-way model Drop stim*prob Drop stim*coh Drop prob*coh
1446 1449 1447 1451
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Here, we see that when the interaction between coherence and cue probability is
dropped, there a rise in the AIC value by about 5 units. When the stimulus and cue
probability interaction is dropped, on the other hand, the rise is by approximately 3 units.
This is a marginal result, given that we usually require differences in AIC values of 4 or
more to be considered significant, while differences of less than 2 are not considered to
be meaningful. Dropping the one redundant interaction, i.e. the stimulus and coherence
interaction, from this model, the coefficients for the resulting model are as follows:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 4.13 0.53 7.77 <0.01
stimulusface -1.22 0.48 -2.55 0.01
probability -2.78 0.86 -3.22 <0.01
coherencelow -1.78 0.49 -3.60 <0.01
coherencelow:probability 1.90 0.90 2.10 0.04
probability:stimulusface 2.19 0.89 2.45 0.01
On the basis of these accuracy results, it is clear that on Day 1, one of the main
phenomena that we expect to observe, i.e. that accuracy increases whenever the cue has
indicated that a face or car stimulus is more likely to occur, does in fact occur. There
is a significant interaction between cue probability and stimulus type, with accuracy for
face stimuli increasing whenever the cue indicates a higher probability of a face stimulus,
and the accuracy for car stimuli increasing when the cue indicates a high probability
of car stimulus. This phenomenon occurs at both the higher and lower noise conditions.
However, as can be clearly seen in the figure above, the average accuracy for car stimuli is
much lower than the accuracy for face stimuli, regardless of the cue probability. Moreover,
this average accuracy is far lower than the accuracy observed for car stimuli during Pilot
Experiment 1. We will return to this point in the discussion of Pilot 2 below.
In addition to the anomalous result concerning the accuracy of car stimuli, the fact
that the role of cue probability on Day 2 is not as strong as that on Day 1 is not an
encouraging result. In order to explore this result further, in Figure B.6, we have plotted
the average accuracy on both days, as a function of the stimulus and cue probability and
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Figure B.6: Pilot experiment 2: Average accuracy of response and how it changes with training,
stimulus type, cue probability, and stimulus coherence. Shown for each individual subject in the
study.
collapsing over the coherence levels, individually for each subject. As can seen in this
figure, notwithstanding the considerable individual variability across participants, there
appears to be marked improvement in accuracy by Day 2, particular on the car stimuli. It
may be the case, therefore, that a ceiling effect is occurring by the second day of learning.
This is particularly evident in the high coherence trials on Day 2.
B.4.2 Reaction time analysis
In the Figure B.7, we show the average reaction time as a function of cue probability,
stimulus type, accuracy, and day of experiment.
Given that 84% of the trials were accurate, it what follows, we will restrict our atten-
tion to the data from just these trials. Likewise, following the nature of the analysis we
performed on the accuracy data, we will perform two separate random effects regressions
on the data from Day 1 and Day 2. On each day, we use an identical linear random effects
regression model to analyse how the logarithm of reaction time varies with cue probabil-
ity, stimulus, coherence, and their interactions. We use an identical linear random effects
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Figure B.7: Pilot experiment 2: Average reaction time and how it changes with training, stimulus
type, cue probability, and stimulus coherence.
model to that used to analyse the reaction time in Pilot 1. As such, we will not repeat the
details of the model here.
In the following table, using data from Day 1, we provide the AIC values for a set of
four models, each with different types of interactions, exactly as we used in Pilot 1.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
-502.10 -503.60 -477.20 -146.80
In the following table, we provide the corresponding results using only the data from
Day 2.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
-1346 -1348 -1328 -859.40
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In both of these analyses, we see that the two-way model is the model with the lowest
AIC value. Note, as was the case in the reaction time analysis for Pilot 1, the AIC values
here are negative. This is inconsequential and does not affect our interpretation of the AIC
values. As was done with the accuracy analysis, we can sequentially drop each of the
three interaction terms from the two-way model.
The following table provides the AIC values for the model based on Day 1 data, where
each one of the three pairwise interactions is dropped:
Two-way model Drop stim*prob Drop stim*coh Drop prob*coh
-364.80 -349.20 -362.80 -366.60
As we can see, a substantial rise in the AIC value occurs when the interaction of
stimulus and probability is dropped, but this does not occur for the other interactions. For
the case of the data from Day 2, the AIC values for the models with each of the pairwise
interactions dropped is as follows:
Two-way model Drop stim*prob Drop stim*coh Drop prob*coh
-1284 -1276 -1275 -1286
We can see here that it is only when the interaction between cue probability and co-
herence is dropped is there little of no change om the AIC value of the model.
In order to analyse the reaction time data from Day 1, we will drop the interactions
between stimulus and coherence and probability and coherence. The fixed effects coeffi-
cients from this model are as follows:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -0.39 0.04 17.99 -10.78 <0.01
stimulusface -0.05 0.03 2002 -1.66 0.10
probability 0.17 0.05 2003 3.84 <0.01
coherencelow 0.04 0.01 1996 4.41 <0.01
stimulusface:probability -0.27 0.06 2003 -4.23 <0.01
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From this, we see a significant effect of coherence, cue probability, and interaction
between stimulus and cue probability. Surprisingly, we do not obtain a significant main
effect of stimulus type.
To analyse the reaction data from Day 2, we will drop the interaction between proba-
bility and coherence. The fixed effects coefficients from this model are as follows:
Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -0.43 0.05 8.78 -9.42 <0.01
stimulusface -0.11 0.03 2127 -3.87 <0.01
probability 0.04 0.04 2129 1.08 0.28
coherencelow <0.01 0.01 2124 0.44 0.66
stimulusface:probability -0.16 0.05 2128 -3.26 <0.01
stimulusface:coherencelow 0.06 0.02 2124 3.81 <0.01
From this, we see a significant effect of stimulus type, and significant interactions
between stimulus and cue probability and coherence and cue probability.
B.4.3 Conclusion from Pilot 2
In Pilot experiment 2, generally speaking, we observe the expected effect of cue proba-
bility on both accuracy and reaction time, at high and low coherence levels, and on both
days of learning. Although this is generally encouraging, some results are surprising or
anomalous. In particular, the accuracy level for car stimuli is markedly lower than for face
stimuli on Day 1, but this accuracy level rises considerably by Day 2. In fact, by Day 2,
we may be observing a ceiling effect. Given that Pilot 2 differs from Pilot 1 only in that
Pilot 2 is a two day experiment, it is surprising that the accuracy level of cars in Pilot 2
Day 1 is very unlike that observed in Pilot 1. This may be due to the change in luminance
of the monitor.
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Figure B.8: Pilot experiment 3: Average accuracy of response and how it changes with stimulus
type, cue probability, and stimulus coherence. Results shown separately for correct and incorrect
responses.
B.5 Pilot experiment 3
In the previous pilot experiment, we observed a particularly low accuracy level for cars on
Day 1, and then a near general ceiling effect of accuracy on Day 2. The primary purpose
of Pilot experiment 3 is to assess whether higher noise for faces, but keeping the noise
level of cars the same, would at least partially remedy this situation by making face stimuli
more difficult to recognize. The noise levels for faces will be as follows: Low coherence,
27.50%; high coherence 32.50%. Our aim was to carry out this experiment on one day
only, and see if we observe the expected cross-over interaction between cue probability
and stimulus type. We also reset the luminance of the monitor to the original settings in
Pilot 1. These two changes are the only changes we applied, and so Pilot 3 is identical to
Pilot 1, and therefore its analysis will proceed in the same manner as the analysis in Pilots
1 and 2. As such, the details of the analysis are not repeated in full here (see above for
more information).
B.5.1 Accuracy analysis
Figure B.8 shows the average accuracy as a function of the three predictors; stimulus type,
coherence, and cue probability.
In the following table, we show the AIC values for Full, two-way, one-way, and null
models (see above for definitions of these models).
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Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
1468 1466 1476 1514
Here, we see that the two-way model is the preferred model according to its AIC value,
and we can thus rule out the presence of three way interaction. As we did in Pilot 2 when
we obtained a similar result, we further analyse the pairwise interactions in the two-way
model.
Two-way model Drop stim*prob Drop stim*coh Drop prob*coh
1466 1465 1478 1464
These results indicate that there is now an interaction between stimulus and cue prob-
ability, which is clearly not the expected result, nor is it in line with the results obtained in
the previous pilot experiments. Dropping the redundant interactions, the coefficients for
the predictors in the resulting model are as follows:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 2.56 0.41 6.29 <0.01
stimulusface -0.73 0.15 -4.99 <0.01
probability -0.94 0.59 -1.61 0.11
coherencelow 0.09 0.45 0.20 0.84
coherencelow:probability 0.52 0.83 0.62 0.53
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Figure B.9: Pilot experiment 3: Average reaction and how it changes with stimulus type, cue
probability, and stimulus coherence. Results separated by accurate and inaccurate responses.
From this, we see that the only effect that is significant is the effect of the stimulus
type. Neither the cue probability itself, nor coherence, nor their interaction was signifi-
cant.
B.5.2 Reaction time analysis
Figure B.9 shows the average reaction time as a function of the three main predictors, for
the accurate and inaccurate results.
As before, given that 83% of the trials were accurate, we will restrict the following
analysis to only accurate responses. The following table provides the AIC values for our
main models.
Full model Two-way model One-way model Null model
-738.90 -740.80 -723.40 -613.70
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Again, we see that the two-way model has the best AIC value. As before, we now
analyse the roles the three pairwise interactions in the two-way model. Again, we show
the AIC value when each one of the pairwise interactions is individually dropped.
As we can see from this, there is a marked rise in AIC when the stimulus and cue
probability interaction is dropped, but a not substantial rise or even a decrease in AIC
when the other two interaction are dropped. Dropping the redundant interactions results
in a model with the following coefficients for the fixed effects:
Here, we see a significant interaction between stimulus type and cue probability, but
no other effects are significant. The predicted reaction time according to this best model
is as shown in the following figure.
B.5.3 Conclusion from Pilot experiment 3
The aim of Pilot 3 was primarily to assess whether changing the coherence level of face
stimuli to lower values would remedy the surprising and anomalous results seen in Pilot
2. This was clearly not the case. In particular, the accuracy results show no sign of
the expected effect of cue probability which have been observed, at least partially, in the
accuracy results of the previous pilot experiments. Although these new coherence settings
for faces may not necessarily eradicate the effect we are hoping to observe, they certainly
do not make it clearer or enhanced.
B.6 General conclusions from pilot experiments
The three pilot experiments, taken as a whole, show that the effect of cue probability
on either response speed or accuracy, or both, will be observed even with relatively low
numbers of subjects, and in different noise conditions. Our main recommendations for
the main experiments on the basis of the pilot experiments are therefore the following:
• We will use the 32.50% and 37.50% noise levels for both the face and car stimuli.
• We will not use any feedback in the main experiment. The possible ceiling effects
we observe on Day 2 of learning may interfere with our analysis, and as such we
will remove feedback so that learning is more challenging.
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• The luminance setting of the monitor will be kept at the settings of Pilot 1 and 3.
• We will change the pre-stimulus cue from the three shapes used above to the state-
ments 70F/30C, 50/50, 70C/30F, which denote 70% probability of face (30% prob-
ability of car), 50% probability of face (50% probability of face), and 70% prob-
ability of car (30% probability of face). We will explain to the subjects in the
instructions what these statements mean. The purpose of making this change was
to eliminate the inevitable learning process where the participants must learn the
meaning of the cues.
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